In one of the previous chapters, we have marked that Śaṅkarācārya has picked up the thread laid down by Gauḍapāda and started with his celebrated commentary on the Brahma-sūtras. It is also clear from the foregoing pages, that the cardinal tenets of the thought which Gauḍapāda pronounced so firmly in his Kārikās are to be found even in the Upaniṣads and in other texts like the epics and Smṛtis, the purāṇas and the classics, and in treatises on grammar, tantra etc. though it is doubtful that the treatises taken into account here all belong to pre-Śaṅkara era, it has been marked that the trend of thought represented by these was certainly originated before Śaṅkara. As European philosophy is "a series of foot-notes to Plato", Vedānta Philosophy before Śaṅkara is an elaboration of the Upaniṣadic thought, and that after Śaṅkara, is either the vindication or refutation of Śaṅkara in different ways. We have also observed that, in the crowd of varieties of ceremonies and rituals, manners

1 The Vedānta of Śaṅkara. A metaphysics of value by Dr. Singh. Jaipur Bharat Publishing House 1949
manners of worship and meditation, philosophical ideals were not forgotten. Through all these ages, Advaitic stream of thought is found running without any break. What is then the contribution of Śaṅkara? Are his writings but a restatement of the Upaniṣadic philosophy? Well, in a sense it is true. Śaṅkara's thought was not a sporadic out-burst. It had a weighty and long tradition behind. Yet the systematisation of his thought was a matter of great skill, and it will not be doubted that Śaṅkara's skill was of a very high order.

As we have seen, the systematisation of the Upaniṣadic thought had begun before Bādarāyaṇa and the commentators of Bādarāyaṇa too have done the same thing, though according to their own predications. Thus Vedānta has always been busy with the Upaniṣadic lore, when other Indian schools were thriving independently of any scriptural authority. This basic position of the Vedānta is variously understood and criticised. We shall avert to this point later, but here we may mark, that as a Vedāntin, Śaṅkara has subjected in the main his logic to Śrutis. Though other schools have their own deve-
development, it can easily be seen, that the hold of Śrūtis and the literature following them was ever firm on Indian mind, and the Mīmāṃsās, therefore, thus represent best the Indian thought in general. We can tentatively put the whole of the Indian Philosophy in a tabular form, which make the position of the Vedānta and hence the Advaita Vedānta clear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian Philosophy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Materialistic Cārvāka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schools challenging Śrūtis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baudhā, Jaina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Systems based on independent thinking calling Śrūtis for support only casually</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karma Mīmāṃsā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Puranic and the Śmārtta form of religion, which has been dominant for a very long time in India, was exercising its sway even in times of Saṅkara.
From time to time, the validity of śrutis and smṛtis have been challenged, and there arose illustrious persons to defend the śrutis. It is known that Vyāsa saw the śruta tradition sinking, and created the paurāṇic lore for its maintenance. On philosophical side, Bādarāyaṇa built up a structure entirely on the śrutis as its foundation. Perhaps in times of Śaṅkara also such a necessity did arise. But Śaṅkara was a strict logician as well, as is evident from his writings. It is also believed that non-Vedic creeds were rampant, and Śaṅkara succeeded remarkably in overthrowing their dominance. It may be helpful to evaluate the achievement of Śaṅkaraścārya, if we know the environments that brought it forth.

The date of Śaṅkaraścārya is, it is believed, more or less settled; yet on this point as on many other points, there is no agreement. Yet the lower limit of the date of Śaṅkara can be the middle of the 9th century A.D. No scholar is yet opposed to this. The Nyāyasucīnibandha is written by Vācaspati Miśra in 841 A.D. This gives not only the lower limit of Śaṅkara’s date, but makes one hesitate to
to accept the date given by Prof. K. B. Pāṭhak, according to whom Śaṅkara's sojourn in this world started in 788 A.D. and ended in 820 A.D. Bhāskara has criticised Śaṅkara and Vācaspati has criticised Bhāskara and Padmapāda. A duration of twenty years is not enough for so much of polemics. The date assigned to Ādi purāṇa is 760 Saka according to Prof. Pāṭhak. But Jinasena one of the authors of the Ādirāṇa has written another work called Hari-vamsa in Saka 705 i.e. 783 A.D. Now Jinasena refers to Vidyānanda, and between Vidyānanda and Jinasena falls Prabhacandra, Santaraksita and Kamalasīla. Before Vidyānanda comes Sureswara, for Vidyānanda refers to him. Thus the date of Sureswara goes back to the earlier half of the eighth century.

1. "श्रीशंकराचार्यं वेददेव उपाध्यायं पु. 97.
2. Vācaspati in his Bhāmati 3.4.26 quotes a line from Bhāskara's commentary: श्रान्त्या चैत्योत्सिक कर्म वैशिक दुःथास्तु ते।
3a."The date of Śaṅkarācārya, etc." by Prof. Cintamani Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 1929, pp. 44, 45.
4. Vidyānanda became a pontiff in 751 A.D.
The author of premayakamalamārtanda says that Kumārila has assailed Akalaṅka. We cannot say how far this information is correct. Maheśvara, the author of a commentary on Nirukta is said to be the disciple and a younger contemporary of Skanda, another commentator on Nirukta. Harisvāmī is also a disciple of Skanda, and in the end of his commentary on the first Kanda of the Satapatha, he gives the date of his writing as Kali year 3740 which is Vikrama year 695 or 638 A.D. 1

यदवद्वानं कङ्गेर्मु: सप्तांकिल्लकान्तानि वै
चत्वारिणिष्ठू समांक्षान्यास्तव भाष्यामिं भूतम् ॥

Harisvāmī and Maheśvara are thus contemporaries. Maheśvara speaks of Kumārila thus: 2


2. मीमांसास्लोकवार्तिक्म कार्याम् १८९६ इस्वी पु.४५३ ख्लो.५१ अथापत्तिपरिच्छेद
Kumārila thus cannot come later than the first quarter of the seventh century. Again, it is difficult to ascertain the date of Akalāṁka, though Dr. Pathak has made an admirable attempt in that direction. The commentator of Akalāṁka known as Anantāvīrya flourished in the first quarter of the eighth century. Akalāṁka had commented on the works of Samantabhadra; but Samantabhadra need not necessarily be an earlier contemporary of Akalāṁka. I shall take up this point again.

An objection to this date of Kumārila may be raised on the strength of Itsingā's pronouncement about the death of Bhatṛhari, whom Kumārila:


has criticised. In 650 A.D. Itsing wrote that Bhartrhari, an ardent Buddhist grammarian died some forty years back. In that case Bhartrhari lived till nearly 610 A.D. and was perhaps a contemporary of Kumarila. It has, however, been abundantly proved that Itsing's statement is not correct. Prof. Liebich gives three reasons which may thus be summarised -

(a) Itsing speaks of Bhartrhari as a scholar, famous throughout the five parts of India. Two or three decades appear to be a very short time for Bhartrhari's fame to spread all over India.

(b) In the part of the commentary Kāśikā, written by Jayāditya in 660 A.D., the Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari is quoted. Kāśikā was written in Kāśi, while Vākyapadīya in Ujjayini. Vākyapadīya thus must have been written nearly a century earlier than Kāśikā.

(c) Punyarāja, a commentator of the Vākyapadīya was a direct disciple of Bhartṛhari. He informs that Bhartṛhari learnt grammar at the feet of Vasurāta, who was the disciple of Śāṅka or Candragomin. Candragomin lived in times of Abhimanya, the first of Kāśmir i.e. sometime in end of the 2 4th century, or in the fifth century A.D. Vasurāta and Vasubandhu are contemporaries, and Vasubandhu is said to have lived in the middle of the 5th century. If that is the time of Vasurāta also, Bhartṛhari seems to have lived in the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth century.

2. It must be remembered that this chronology is in accordance with Stein. Even western scholars too give divergent opinions on this point and take back Abhimanya to the first, second, and even the fifth century before Christ. Lassen, Princep, Bohtlinguk, and Wilford have given dates. I have tentatively picked up the lower limit.
While discussing the philosophy of Bhartrhari we—have seen that he was not a Buddhist. Itsingle must have mistaken some other person for Bhartrhari. We have marked that Bhartrhari was not only a gramiarian but also a Vedāntin, and he had written a gloss on the Vedānta-Sūtras. Bhartrhari was thus an eminent Vedāntin of the 5th or the 6th century. This approximately is the date of Gaudapāda also. Kumārila is certainly a later writer and he could have referred to Bhartrhari.

Now Kumārila is referred to in his Bālakṛīḍa by Visvarūpa.

sarvasya hī sāstraśtu kṛṣṇu ca api kṣatrīyaḥ।
yāvat-pṛyōjanāḥ nākṣaṁ tātādū tabeṇa guṇateḥ॥

1. Is it that he mistook Harisvāmī for Bhartrhari? Harisvāmī too was not a Buddhist. Bhartrhari might have been a name of some Buddhist author also, probably Vimalamati.


3. मीमांसास्योकवार्तिकम् काठ्याम् १८२८ इस्वी. पृ.४।
स्लोक १२
This stanza of Kumārila-bhātta from his Ślokavārtika is quoted by Visvarūpa in his commentary on the Yājñavalkyasūtra. When did Visvarūpa live? M. M. Dr. Kāne has discussed this question at length. He has identified Visvarūpa with Suresvara, and accepted the date of Suresvara as that of Visvarūpa. It is rather surprising to see him accepting Vacaspati as a contemporary of Saṅkara. We have seen that such a contemporaneity cannot be accepted. As he has shown, Visvarūpa held philosophical views similar to those of Saṅkarācārya, and he seems to be acquainted with the work of Gauḍapāda also. However, if we have to identify him with Suresvara, the style of Suresvara which can be evident from his voluminous works can easily be compared with that of the author of Bālakrīḍa. This however is an independant problem, which is not to be seriously


12. याज्ञवल्क्यसूत्र: वाल्क्रीडायाय व्यास्यपेताः पु. २।

M.M. Ganapati Śāstri Trivendrum 1922.
seriously taken up here. To seek striking similarities between these two writers is rather difficult, for one deals mostly with the Mīmāṃsa while the other with the Vedānta. If, however, Suresvara and Viśvarūpa are identical, it is puzzling to see Viśvarūpa citing Gauḍāpāda a predecessor of Śaṅkara and not Śaṅkara himself. We may then assume tentatively that Balakrīḍā was written when Śaṅkara’s writings were not sufficiently known.

It has been pointed out above, that Kumārila cannot be later than the first quarter of the seventh century A.D. Śaṅkara as his later contemporary should then come sometime in the seventh century. Let us see if we can observe anything in the writings of Śaṅkara that can corroborate this view:

..... धेताक्षे: सब्जो लोक आकृतिकियते ।

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१. व्रह्मणुआर्य २२.२६
अपि च वाक्यार्थैविकित्वातःयक्षार्यात्मकिविश्वतां सुगतेन
सुप्रतीक्षालोंसंवादप्रतापितं प्रमुखे तथा प्रजायु किरदार्याय-
प्रतिपत्त्य गुप्ते पृथक्: प्रजा इति। सर्वयात्मकाच्यावरणीयायः
सुगतसमयं: श्रेयस्कामी: - - - - - - । ३

वर्त्तः ब्रह्मादेवार्णात्मानामिव पूर्वेशामपि नास्ति
देवाविश्वं व्यक्त्वहरू सामथ्यमिति स जगत्वैविश्वं प्रतिपक्षेतः।
इवानीमिव च नाम्यायापि सार्वभौमि: ब्रह्मिनीस्त्रीति ब्रह्मातुः।
तत्तथा राजसूयविधिविवेचनोपपत्त्यातुः। इवानीमिव च कालान्तरं पि
अवध्यवस्तुप्राप्तवानु: क्षणांतरमात्रानु प्रतिपक्षिनाति। २

चर्च वौचिते: ब्रह्मायुगमार्केश्वरः तत्वपुरुषम्
तद्भवत्। तत्वस्य ज्ञानम्: सत्यायुगमातुः। चर्चासौरकस्तया
अकेश्वरस्ययुगम: सोऽस्यस्य कारखुदवेरोनवत्तात्मात्माणेन। ३
It can be gathered from these passages that the Baudhāya movement had become lively, and the social order known as Vṛtāsrama was disturbed. Spiritual standard of the people in general had become alarmingly low, though there was no want of logic-chopping. We find names of certain Kings and some places. Purṇavarman is mentioned thrice i.e. twice in the commentary of the Chāndogya II.23.1, III.19.1 and once in Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya II.1.18. Balavarman is mentioned two times in the Brahmaśūtrabhāṣya II.4.1 and IV.3.5. Simha occurs once in Br. Sū. II.4.1 while in IV.3.5 we have Jayasimha. We have Krṣṇagupta in IV.3.5, and Rājarṣi in Chāndogya-bhāṣya II.23.1. Certain names in these are identified viz. Krṣṇagupta as a Gupta King, Balavarman having another name Kalyāṇavarman, the King of Pātaliputra, Jayasimha the brother of Pulakesin etc. The places mentioned are Srughna, Pātaliputra, Mathurā, Gaṅgāsāgara, Gaṅgādvāra,
Kāśi, etc. It seems that Śaṅkaracārya did most of his writing work in the modern Uttarapradēsa. A state of confusion and Buddhist advent did exist in that part of the country after the demise of Harṣa. And this is the middle of the seventh century, when, I am inclined to believe, Śaṅkara wrote his famous Bhāsyas.

I have tried to fix the date of Śaṅkara in association with that of Kumārila, and here we must think about the mutual relationship of Samantabhadra and Kumārila. We have seen that there is some confusion about the date of Akalanka, the commentator of Samantabhadra. Dr. Pāṭhak has tried to prove that Samantabhadra, though cited by a Jaina grammarian Puṭyapāda, must have lived long after Puṭyapaḍa and he has contended that the sutra of Puṭyapaḍa

1. Cf. बुद्धव्र.माथ्य ४.४.२२, ब.सू.माथ्य २.१.१८, 
   ब.सू.माथ्य ३.२.६, ३.२.२२, ३.२.२४, ४.२.५.

pāda which gives the name of Samantabhadra is an interpolation. I may be pardoned for the digression here, but I think that the case put up by Dr. Pāthak on this point cannot bear scrutiny. The Sūtras in question of Pūjayapāda from the Jainendra Vyakarāṇa are thus:

\[\text{श्यो हि श्रीधरमि हलो यमां यमि सं। शरो शरि स्वेच। चतुष्टयं समन्तप्रवङ्ग}^1\]

These sūtras number 164 to 168 and belong to the fourth quarter of the fifth Adhyāya. The first four amongst the above sūtras enunciate an option in the opinion of Samantabhadra. The commentator Somadevasūri says:

\[\text{श्यो ह इत्याविस्त्रवतं सम्तल्प्रवधावर्धधतं मध्वि नामवेषामिति विकल्पं तथा चोवहालतमू।}\]

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1. श्रीमान्वचन्द्रका। संपादकः श्रीयुत पंडित श्रीलाल जैन। सनातनजैनप्रथमाला: पृ. २२०
It is clear from this that in all these sūtras
the option laid down is according to the opinion
of Samantabhadra. Dr. Paṭhak says that the pur-
pose of option can be served simply by reading Va
in each of these sūtras, because the anuvṛtti of
of Vā is possible, for it occurs in sūtra 160 in
the same quarter of the same chapter. He says that
Jaina Sākatāyana who copies many sūtras of the
Jainendra Vyākaraṇa, is content by introducing Vā.
There is thus no propriety of giving the name of
Samantabhadra, and hence it can easily be rejected
as interpolation.

Here two points need consideration. Paral-
lels from the Jaina Sākatāyana to 164 and 165 of
Pūjyapāda number 143 and 144, and those to 166 and
167 of Pūjyapāda number 132 and 133. Thus the
scheme of these two works appears to be different,
and Jaina Sākatāyana's introduction of Vā may not

1. साकतायनं व्याकरणं। प्रकाशक : पञ्चालाल जैनं।
ि० सन् १९०७
शाकटायनीय-सुग्रीव: पु. २-४
not fit in with the scheme of Pujayapada. Secondly, can we take Vā by anuvṛtti and thus reject the mention of Samantabhadra as unnecessary? The sūtra from which Vā is to be taken numbers 160, and the anuvṛtti of Vā in sūtra 164 is possible only if it can be read in Sūtras 161, 162 and 163. It is, however, found that in 161, Vā is applicable, but in 162 and 163 Vā has absolutely no need to come in. How then can it be read in sūtra 164? Should we resort to Maṇḍūkapluti here, just to strike out Samantabhadradācārya? Dr. Pāṭhak says further “Similar remarks may be made about the names Bhūtabali, Śrī Datta, Prabhācandra and Siddhasena --------” A perusal of the text of Pujayapada creates difficulties in accepting this statement. Whatever that may be,

1. It must be remembered that Maṇḍūkapluti is resorted to, only if a Sūtra does not yield to any other principle of interpretation. In the present case, the authority of Samantabhadra can easily explain the option implied by the Sūtras.
Dr. Pāṭhak’s argument to discard Samantabhadra from the text of Pūjyapāda is not satisfactory. If the antiquity of Samantabhadra goes back, he can be assailed by Kumārila even in the sixth or seventh century.

Much has been written by scholars on the date of Saṅkaracārya, and we may roughly divide them into two groups; one holding Saṅkara to have lived in the end of the eighth or the ninth century A.D., while the other, in the seventh century. To the former group belong scholars like Max Muller, Colebrooke, Taylor, Wilson, Pāṭhak, Belvalkar, etc. and to the latter, belong Telang, Tilak, Ghosh, Cintāmaṇi, Bhauṣāstrī Vaze, Prof. Upādhyāya, etc. I am inclined to follow the latter group.

1. The passage from Anekāntakhandana cited by Dr. Pāṭhak simply gives different opinions, and does not seem to carry chronological significance.

2. Samantabhadra is believed to have lived in the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. by traditional writers. Cf. Āptaparīkṣa with Hindi translation by Pt. Darbarilāl Jain, Saharanpur 1949. Prologue, p. 5 and Introduction p. 20.
We have seen that during the regime of Harṣa and after him, the Baudhhās rose to eminence, and it was natural for them to challenge the testimony of the Śrutis on logical grounds. To prove the significance of the Śrutis as the basis of all philosophy, was the need of the time. The followers of the Vedas in those times were divided amongst themselves into several sects. Smṛtis, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and several Tāntric ideologies were rampant, all claiming their relation to the Vedas. It was therefore necessary to give a test as to the authoritativeness of the Śrutis, which would annihilate false impressions, and synthesise all the conflicting creeds, based on different manners of worship. As a spiritual leader, Sāṅkarācārya fulfilled these needs of the time by a systematic presentation of the Advaita philosophy.

I have all through used the word Advaita philosophy in a general manner. Strictly speaking, Advaita is not a system of philosophy in the accepted sense of the term. In what are commonly known as systems of philosophy, reason plays a sovereign part.

It is agreed on all hands that reason in itself
itself is not an absolute thing. It receives impressions through the senses, and passes judgements on them. The impressions received through sense-apparatus need not always be correct, and there is a possibility that our judgements based on them may be wrong. What we call experience is a result of linking and classifying the impressions that we receive. But this arrangement of impressions cannot come without the aid of the subjective element. In fact, whenever an impression comes, it is never bereft of temporal or spatial relations. It is then further determined by quantity, causation, etc. It can thus be seen, that our impressions of objects, howsoever determined by reason, cannot be said to be correct, for we have to add so much to them for their determination. Our experience is thus an alloy. It can never be pure. Howsoever vaunting, reason thus can never bring an experience of reality as it is. It is sometimes urged, that we can make better progress of holding, that, in as much as things become objects of our experience, they must conform to the constitution of our intellect. This means that though we know the
the limitations of reason, we should hoodwink ourselves, and accept what is presented by reason as correct experience. Ultimately it means, to remain content with the findings of reason, howsoever inadequate they may be. The peculiarity of Indian Philosophy, particularly the Mimamsas, is that they have resorted to a better instrument of knowledge than the limited structures of human thought. They took recourse to what is known as Sabda-pramāṇa, the authority of direct intuition. Reason may be employed as far as possible, but a point comes when it gives way, and then it should be subordinated to the Šrutis:

\[ \text{शार्मप्राणसंस्थितगण्येपव तुषामयोः धर्मवस्तुः।} \]
\[ \text{शत्युगुणत्वा एवह श्वत्ते तवत्तोः नमवांग-} \]
\[ \text{त्वेनाश्रीयते।} \]

\[ \text{न हि ब्रह्मानन्मयोः द्वै।} \]
\[ \text{शब्द्गम्यत्वारस्वार्थुत्तमपत्वार्थ्यं} \]
\[ \text{ध्यायाश्चवरिष्ठिः भवितवत्वमू।} \]

\[ \text{नै। ब्रह्मबुद्धश्राण्वकर्माभ्य २.१.६} \]

\[ \text{नै। ब्रह्मबुद्धश्राण्वकर्माभ्य १.५.२७} \]
It may be questioned whether the testimony of Sruti can be adequate. We may very well reject the testimony of reason, but as long as no more adequate instrument of knowledge is available, it will not be advisable to abandon reason. But Śaṅkara says that Sruti records an experience, a direct experience; and we need not say that such an experience cannot be had, for Sruti even tells us that there were people who had that experience and it even prescribes a process for it.

1. श्रुतिसुचिकारमाण्य २०१.१

2. श्रुतिसुचिकारमाण्य २०१.११
"स शान्त्म तर्लमलि खेतकेलि" इति च शारीरिक्य प्रहमावधापेश्वात्। स्वर्य प्रसिद्धेः हेतुष्टारीर्ष्ट्य प्रहमा-
त्त्मत्त्वपविवश्यते, न यत्नान्तरप्रसाध्यम्। - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - न चेष्मवगत्विनात्तपदात इति
शब्दं चक्तुम्। "तत्त्वार्थस्य विजयो" इत्याविश्वातिमयः।
अवगतिसाधनानां च श्रवणानां वेदानुवचनानां च
विधानात्। १

Sruti thus leads to the knowledge of Reality and hence its authoritativness should be acknowledged. Super-sensual experience is a matter which cannot be rejected. Philosophy would remain incomplete if it excludes such an experience:

योगोपच्यिमाकैवःवर्षप्राप्तिकलः स्वर्याणो न शक्यते
साहसमाणेण प्रत्यास्वाध्यम। २

1. ब्रह्मसूत्रांकरमाण्य २.१.१४

2. ब्रह्मसूत्रांकरमाण्य १.१.३३
Moreover this experience is direct. The authoritativeness of Sruti is to be recognised not because it merely describes something, but because it creates an unalterable and fruitful knowledge:

न वाक्यस्य वस्तववास्तवां वा प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यकारणं, करं ताहि निर्देशवतश्चविशालानोत्पावकत्वम्।

Changeable experience is unreliable. What is desired is thus unchangeable experience.

Here is an important point to be marked. Whatever is known as an external entity is mutable, and its knowledge also must be mutable. An immutable thing cannot be external, exclusive. We must, therefore, begin our inquiry, not with "Kimidam", but "Koham". The "I", the self, should be made the object of inquiry. In experience, everything

1. बुधव उप. शांकरमाध्य १.४.६
everything is given to this "I", the self, but the self is given to none; it is self-evident. The experience, the awareness of this Self remains always. It cannot be rejected in any individual experience. All worldly affairs depend upon the apprehension of plurality; but throughout this apprehension of plurality the consciousness of Atman is ever present; for, without it even the knowledge of an object is impossible. Thus the experiencer—the self—is ever conscious of his own self. His self-consciousness can never be denied.

न हाकाशावध: पवाधां: प्रमणानिरपेक्षाः स्वपंसदुधाः
कैनचिद्युपकव्य: अत्मा तु प्रमणाविचित्यवहाराशङ्कतवात्
प्रागेव प्रमणाविचित्यवहारात् सिद्धवित। न चेदुध्वध निराकरं
संभवित। अन्तुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियः न स्वप्नः। य एव
हि निराकऽतः तदेव तस्य स्वप्नः।

1. ब्रह्मसूत्रांकरामाथ २.३.७ अत्मनः स्व प्रत्यास्या
तुमाङ्गक्षतवात्। य एव निराकऽतः तस्यात्मङ्गतवात्।
ब्र.वृ.माथ १.२.४
Rejection is possible only of what is adventitious and not of the very nature of the thing. What is known is adventitious, while the knower himself cannot be called adventitious. He is knowledge itself-citsaktisvarupamatra-or a mass of knowledge prajñanaghana:

लप्रत्यया विषयोपवन्ति यस्य स शात्मा सर्वाभासान =न्तत् प्रत्यययस्य विषयकिल्लब्धयात्राः प्रत्ययेरेव प्रत्ययेयवषतत्यां लक्ष्यते - - - - - - - - -
शत: प्रत्यगात्मत्त्यां विचित्रं भ्रूः - - - - - - - - - ।

तपायकायनप्रक्रियायामापि सविषयस्य सेवनत्रस्य सान्तः करणस्य प्रपूणकायनमनंतरमवाहं कुल्लन प्रत्यागच्छन् व्याच्छाण: परमात्मानमेन गमयति।

The ideal of the Vedanta is to know Reality directly, and the nature of this Reality, as we have

1. केनोप. शांकरामाघ् २.४

2. भ्रूमसुलन-शांकरामाघ् १.४.१९
have seen, is beyond the sphere of senses, and hence immutable. Śaṅkara has never denied the sense-experience, but he has not accepted that Reality must bow to human structures of thought. Supreme Reality is thus different from sense-reality, or the reality within the pale of pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra. That is why Reality is called two-fold, and the Vyāvahārika Reality is different entirely from the Pāramārthika Reality, which is realised through direct intuition. Two types of Realities have been introduced by Śaṅkara out of this genuine necessity, and not out of any theological bias, as is suggested by the remarks of some scholars.

It may be contended here, after Rāmānuja, that when Śaṅkara recognises Ātman as the cogniser, it is clear that Ātman is taken to be the knower, the

the perceiver, the pramata. It is here supposed that knowledge is an act and this dynamic knowledge requires some one as the knower. Saṅkara says, that this is all very well as far as phenomenal reality is concerned. It is the relational consciousness that necessitates a Saṅkṣi, a cognizer for the act of cognizance. But this phenomenal character of knowledge would destroy its eternality, and the Omniscient nature of Brahman will not be proved:

\[1\] अनन्त्यत्वे हि साक्ष्य कदाचिज्ञानाति कदाचिन
जानातीत्यत्सर्वशक्ति प्रस्तुत। नासौ साक्ष्यनित्यत्वे
दौषोषित।

\[2\] साक्ष्यं च साक्ष्याधारत्वमेव, न ह्यति: साक्ष्यम्।
शातेव हि लोक्येवोऽऽ: साक्षीति व्यपदिस्यते न शाक्षार्थम्। द्व।४५
अते न शलोकमात्रमात्मा श्रीधरसहायस्य श्रीधरसहायस्य श्रीधरसहायस्य
प्रथमो भागः। वैक्टेस्वर कप्प्रेण हो १९०९।

\[3\] द्व।३५, ४५

\[4\] श्रृ. मू. साक्षरभाष्य १९०५
Phenomenal character of knowledge is thus only temporary; foundational knowledge is irrespective of any relation. It is the relational consciousness that presupposes pure consciousness as its basis, or else even relation will not be apprehended:

न हि सानेन सति शैयं नाम ववति कष्यचितुः ॥

1. केनोप.शांकरमाण्य २.४
ब.शु.शांकरमाण्य २.३.४० न स्वामारिकं कहृत्वमातमं: समवति। बनिष्मूःप्रसंगातु। - - - - - तस्मादुपङ्किधमार्थवासेनैवात्मन: कहृत्वं न स्वामारिकम्।

2. प्रमोप.शांकरमाण्य ६.२
Knowledge as we understand it is phenomenal. Yet it must rise from the eternal foundational knowledge, which is the nature of Atman or Brahma. It need not be held that knowledge does not exist when there is an absence of any object to know for even this absence becomes the object of knowledge:

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1. तैतिरियोप. शाक्तरामाध्य २.१

2. तच्छ सम्प्रग्नाशामेकृतं चस्तुतःस्त्रावत। एकप्रेश्च स्वविष्टो योःसः स परमार्थः - - -। भ्रमम् स्व शाक्तरामाध्य २.१.११
The Reality of consciousness thus does not depend upon that of an object. It is the senses that create the distinction of subject and object. If somehow they are transcended, it will be found that knowledge does not necessarily presuppose objectivity. Many are the statements scattered throughout the writings of Saṅkara, that give the nature of the self as real knowledge, the self as Brahman, and knowledge as and hence the self, the Brahman - unchangeable, beyond all mutability and relations.

1. Cf. अथामावे कथमपरोक्षा संविचिति चेन्न। यथासंविचव-पासाधीनत्वाद्वर्षसत्तानिन्वचयस्थ। न हि अर्थसत्तानिन्वचयाधीनः संविचत्तानिन्वचयः। अर्थसत्तानिन्वचयस्याति निन्वचयान्तराधीनत्व-प्रसंगात्। विवरण प.21 प्रमोप. शांकराचार्य ६.२.

2. ब्रह्मसंकाराचार्य १.१.१; १.१.१२; २०२.९२; २३०.१६; ४.१.२; ४.१.० केनोप.शांकराचार्य १.४; कालकप.शांकराचार्य २.१.३; २.२.१२; तात्तिका.उप.शांकराचार्य २.१.१; छावनो.उप.शांकराचार्य २.१.३; बुधदर्श.उप.शांकराचार्य १.५.७; २०२.१८; ४.३.५; ४.४.६

As far as I know, the authorship of these Bhāṣyās is not denied to Saṅkara.
Next comes an important question. How at all this foundational knowledge has become functional? When has this phenomenon begun? What is the relation between the foundational knowledge which is of the nature of Absolute Being, and the functional knowledge which is of the nature of thinking? Thinking involves relativity, objectivity, otherness. Our knowledge thus becomes double-natured. There is one element in it which is constant, while the other element is always changing:

व्यमिचरति तु सेवं, न सानं व्यमिचरति क्षताचिवपि
शेयम्। १

सर्वत्र ने बुद्धव तिरंगोप्येते समानान्यिकरणे सनु घटः सनु
पतः सनु हस्तीतिः। तयोर्यांतात्वशुद्धिव्यमिचरति, न तु
सवृंभृतं। २

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१. प्रसूणः माध्यम ६.२

२. मंगवूर्भूताम माध्यम २.१६
(a) The two components of human knowledge are the impressions received from the objective world through the medium of senses (b) and the receiver who always makes himself known as "I". It is our common experience that the consciousness of this "I" always remains unaltered, whatever an individual may think he perceive or do.

This "I" is the subjective factor in the individuality, while all else are objects. All objective

1. "All our knowledge contains two elements, one constant and eternal which is the true the real, the other changing and transitory which is the untrue the unreal"

2. ब्रह्मचर्य शास्त्रमाध्यम २.३.७
objective impressions must reach this "I" through
the medium of senses. What is called as knowledge
thus seems to depend entirely upon the sense-apparatus;
for it is through this that the "I" comes into con-
tact with the world, and even the very knowledge of
this "I" cannot be had if there is no such contact.

It is for this reason that Saṅkara begins his Bhāṣya
with the word "Yuśmat", meaning "you", which ordi-
narily starts first the process of knowing, and
later raises up the awareness of the knower. How-
ever, the senses that bring about the contact between
the "I" and the world are of different nature and
varying capacities in different individuals, and
many a time they are even deceptive. It is indeed
a pity that human knowledge has to rely on such a
frail instrument. Vedic philosophers would never
rest content with this situation; nor would they
be satisfied, saying that thoughts themselves are
thinkers and there is no necessity of supposing the

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1. The consciousness of Yuśmat and Asmat is so linked
with each other. Looked in this light Vacaspati's
explanation of Yuśmadasmata as Idamasmat etc. does
not appear to be satisfactory.
the existence of an individual ego. If the "I" were nothing but a profile of the chemical activities of human physique on the screen of brain, it would always, be in peril of damages, conversions, and even destruction. In such a state of things, what will be the merit of knowledge? All boasts of human progress and evolution would become meaningless bragging. The very foundation of ethics will be shattered to pieces. Life itself will lose its charm, and many would agree to differ with the famous Greek thinker and say, rather than being dissatisfied and advanced human beings, they would like to be pigs satisfied:

यस्यात्मनोऽपि विभाजनान्त्यकारणकारपूर्णं सर्वायं हतबलं विध्वस्तं भवति स्विनिष्टं भवति

Similar is the view taken up by the Baudhhas as regards human life by propounding the doctrine of

1. कठोप. झाँकरमाध्य २.२.४
of momentariness. The only way out of this situation is to sever the connection of the individual soul with the Karmayakra. The connection according to them is established through the ever unsatiable thirst, which also nourishes the Being of the individual soul. The Baudhhas believe in a chain of incarnations but they do not believe in the independent existence of any such thing as soul. But there is a difference in the belief of the moderns and the Baudhhas. Moderns would believe that the subjective existence of man is a silhouettic emanation of the innumerable chemical activities, which, according to them, are themselves unconscious and without any purpose or volition, and take place simply as a twig drifting helplessly along the mighty current of a

1. "The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this is proved............. Motion is the mode of existence. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion............. but if the question is raised what then are thought and consciousness, and whence they come, it becomes apparent that they are products of human brain." Reproduced from "the theoretical principles of Marxism" in the "Lennin Selected Work Series" issued by Marx-Engels-Lennin Institute, Moscow, Vol. XI, p. 14.
a rapid river. The Baudhhas hold that, though originating in this way, this silhouette does not disappear with the chemical activities; and once born of them persists, even after their destruction, on the screen of the ethereal firmament. There it is sustained by numberless desires, for according to them desire is a more real thing. Like seeds of a tree, these desires always seek their fulfilment, and by their force, new chemical combinations after the patterns of the old ones are formed. Until the complete expiration of the desire, this process continues and all the silhouettes being more or less similar are erroneously taken to be a single individual soul:

नात्मास्ति स्कन्धमात्रेऽ व क्षेत्रकां प्रियस्तुत्न।
अन्तरामाक्षस्तत्त्वा कुञ्जिमेति प्रवेषितः॥

1. अभिधर्मकोशः ३.१८ पारारंभम् काशीविद्यापीठन प्रकाशितः। सं. १९८८.
There is no such thing as soul. The Skandhas alone take new forms again and again like the ever-burning flame of a lamp. The betterment of the five Skandhas through the chain of incarnations, at some time makes the grand truth of Pratîtyasamutpâda realised. Desire is then naturally uprooted, and then, there being no vital force to sustain, the chain of rebirths comes to cessation, and with it the silhouette-like existence of the individual soul.

The Vedânta too does not believe in the Absolute Reality of the individual soul. According to the Advaita Vedânta, the Absolute Reality the Brahman is

1. विश्वनितिरिक्तो जीवः कतरं समिदुत्तितं। ब्रह्मसूत्रमा० ॥ २.३.२८ ॥
   मनःप्रचाररूपाधिकंविषयंविनिरोपयार्णु गुरुज्ञस्तत्तिक्षेिणान्तोऽजीवो जागरि। ब्र.मा० ॥ १.६.९ ॥
   बस्ति हि श्रोताघिरसंहतो यत्प्रयोजनप्रयुक्तः श्रोतारि-
   कालपो गुहाविविदित सहस्तानाम परार्थत्वावधवग्यते श्रोतावीनां
   प्रयोक्त। केनोप. मा० ॥ १.२ ॥

यदि हि देहाविविश्राघावि रूपाधाराकः सनूपादीविवजनी
वात्तृति तत्त्वापि श्रोताविविश्रा फ्रोिग्वित्वं संवं संवं रूपं च
विज्ञानीयः। न केतुस्ति। तस्माहेद्धाविविश्राघ्यांच रूपाधारानेिवेत-
नेत्र देहाविविश्राविविश्राविविदितरसैव विश्वनितिरिक्तोऽविज्ञानात्मणः विज्ञानाति ॥
   कठोप. शाक्रमास्य ॥ २.१.३ ॥
is one without the second. But in the realm of relative existence, the individual soul is a fact and not a mere silhouette; and therefore as long as the relativity exists, the individual soul must exist. It does not disappear with the destruction of the body with which it is enveloped. It is this individual which seeks new bodies for itself, gets new experiences; just as a man dreams of his going to a certain place, sleeping there, and in his dream-land, sleep, dreaming again. This is an important point of difference between the Advaita and Baudhā philosophy and it is so clear that, with all the common words and common treatment, it will be difficult to say that the Advaitins - and hence Saṅkara borrowed their philosophy from the Baudhās.

It is agreed by many thinkers, that for the solution of philosophical problems, all enquiry must start with one’s own self. It cannot be the universe; for what is universe to me if my own self is not real? But if we start with this enquiry, we find, as it has been already pointed out, that this self makes himself known as “I” and this knowledge of “I”
also depends ultimately upon the senses. The cause of all misery is not that all is \textit{Kṣaṇika} or momentary, but the fact that the soul is quite helpless and at the mercy of its deceptive agents the senses, and the fact that even the consciousness of his own existence is dependent on them and mixed with the impression they have given. Pure unsullied consciousness of his own Being is impossible at least in the present state of things. The consciousness of his Being must always remain mixed up with whatever material the senses bring in. This is the source of all miseries. All the Vedāntas seek to destroy this root-cause of all evil, and \textit{Śaṅkaracārya} attempts to show in his \textit{Śārīrakāmāṇīmāmsā} that this is the purpose of all the Vedāntas.

अस्यान्यधिति: प्रहाणाय गृह्मैक्तिबिधाप्रतिपत्तये सर्वेन वेदान्ता आर्य्यन्ते। यथा चायमर्य: सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारीरकर्मामासायां प्रवृत्तविष्णु:।

\[\text{1. \textit{व्रह्मसूत्र \textit{शांकरमाण्य १.१.१}}\]
Adhyāsa which has given rise to all troubles is an important fact brought to the front by Śaṅkarācārya, and it will do well to understand it carefully from his own words. Human knowledge, as we have seen is a compound. The impressions of subjective and objective existences do not present Reality as it is. We try to grasp Reality through our structures of thought that ultimately depend upon the senses. Our knowledge is then a mixture of Reality and unreality - Satyānṛte mithunikṛtya. Reality which is of the nature of pure consciousness must lie beyond. We try to know it. But as soon as we try to know, the very act of knowing transforms the foundational consciousness into functional, and spoils its purity. It is just like the position of an electron which has been proved to be unascertainable. To ascertain its position, electron must be subjected to some experiment; and electron is such a minute thing, that even the most powerful microscope is not yet able to visualise it. It is expressly necessary, that, to have the desired knowledge it must remain undisturbed. But it is such a
a peculiar thing, that any experiment performed on it is bound to disturb its position. So at least for the present, it is impossible to have the correct knowledge of its undisturbed position. Same is the case here. Gaudapada has boldly declared that foundational consciousness can never pass on to categories:

क्रमते न हि वृद्धस्य शान्तं धनेषु तार्यिनः।
यताते न क्रमते शान्तं - - - - - - - - । १

With this declaration in mind Saṅkara starts with his Bhāṣya as we have seen. As regards the origination of multiplicity and the evils that follow, both Saṅkara and Gauḍapāda hold, that neither the conclusion of the Bauddhas, nor that of the Saṅkhya can be final. Bauddhist analysis of everything to will, cannot be accepted, for before will comes knowledge. While analysing the process of knowledge, it is found that in it there are two elements which are quite opposed to each other as darkness and light -

भा. ६६-६६
- tamahprakasavad. And yet our knowledge, subjective or objective, cannot but be a mixture of these. Our self cannot be made known except as knower of the object, while the object in its turn is illumined by the Self. Thus both these are intimately related to and inextricably mingled with each other in our experience. By sober speculation, it can easily be agreed upon, that as these two notions are poles apart, their imposition on each other is impossible, nor can one's attributes be applied to the other:

अस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरे विषयिणि चिदात्मके युक्तमत्प्रत्यय-गोचरस्य विषयस्य तद्वधर्मां चाध्यास्त्वत्स्वपूष्पं विषयिण-स्तद्वधर्मां च विषयेत्यासो मिल्लेऽति मर्यवृय युक्तम्।

In spite of this fact which can logically be accepted, all worldly activities go on by imposing subjective the thought - structures on the objects and attributes of the object on the subject.

तथाच्चय-यो-यस्यनु अयो-यात्मकतात्म-यो-यथार्थस्वच-त्वस्येतरर्तराविशेषन - - - - - अहमिं भाववति नासिंकोव्रं लोक्यवहारः।
Consciousness which is essentially not relational appears to be relational through Adhyāsa. This Adhyāsa is known as Avidyā by wise people:

It may be marked that Śāṅkara is not very particular in making distinctions in the meanings of Adhyāsa, avidyā, māyā, etc.

As differentiated from Avidyā, Vidya must be knowledge of Reality without any imposition - vastusvarūpāvadhārana. Vidya would thus reveal Reality which
which is illumination itself, unchangeable, impartite, beyond time and categories:

पारमार्थिक कूटस्वनित्त्य व्योमवस्त्वप्याप्ति सर्वस्विनिक्रिया-
रहित नित्यबुद्धि निरवयं स्वप्न्योति स्वप्नायं यथा धर्मादेवोऽ
सह कार्येन कालाग्रंथं च नोपावित्ते।

It may be asked when, why and how has this Adhyāsa begun. In reply it can be told that it is
natural. The question as to the beginning of Adhyāsa presupposes the existence of Time. Why has the Adhyāsa
begun, is a query that presupposes purpose and hence
will; and an enquiry into the process of Adhyāsa pre-
supposes causality. All these however fall within
the pale of Adhyāsa itself, and hence these ques-
tions cannot logically be formed. The only reply
that can be given is, Adhyāsa is beginningless
and endless, natural, experienced by all and always.

एवमयमनाविरियतो नैसर्गिकों ध्यायम्: - - - -
सर्वार्थिकप्रत्यय:।

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1. ब्रह्मसूत्र शाकरमाधव १.१.४
And now we are ushered into the concept of creation as given by Saṅkarācārya. In the transcendent Reality which is one without the second, the world of duality has no place at all. Saṅkara's stress on the static nature of foundational consciousness has created a gulf between transcendent consciousness and functional consciousness; and this gulf is bridged over by the concept of Adhyāsa or Mayā. In the realm of Adhyāsa or Mayā the world is real. The terms real, unreal, sat and asat, used in Saṅkara's writings should be carefully understood. From the standpoint of normal experience the world is real.

सत एवं ब्रैतमेदेनान्यायथमाक्षमाणत्वानासत्यं कस्यचित्त
क्वचिदिति ब्रूम:।१

सत्यं च त्वंहारविषयमविकारान्न परमार्थसत्यम| 
एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म। इह पुनर्वहारविषयमापेक्षिं 
सत्यं पुमुद्धिकायंतापेक्षोदकादि सत्यमुच्यते।२

１. छाँदोग्य. शांकरमाण्य ६.२.३

２. तैसि. शांकरमाण्य २.६
On empirical grounds the reality of the world cannot be denied. But the affirmation of the empiric reality of the world is intended, not to establish its absolute reality but to realise the identity of the Being through all the changes. The relation between Being and Becoming has been elaborated while discussing the implication of the Brahma-sūtras. The process of Becoming not only presupposes, but is also pervaded by Being. Hence it cannot be disposed off as entirely unreal. But its reality consists only in the fact that it is full of the stuff of Being. As separated from Being, becoming is a non-entity, and in that sense it is unreal. Relational consciousness cannot deny the reality of objects. Transcendent identity of consciousness cannot tolerate any plurality. So creation cannot finally be described either as absolutely real, or as absolutely unreal.

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1. वृहद सांकरभाष्य ३.५.१
The world is thus a creation of Avidya. By this Saṅkara does not mean that it is merely a subjective impression. It is entirely wrong to interpret Saṅkara's concept of the world after the manner of German idealism. Purely subjective impressions cannot have spatial or temporal existence. Saṅkara has forcefully elaborated this point.

1. Brāhmaṇḍa Saṅkara Maṭha 2.1.27
2. Brāhmaṇḍa Saṅkara Maṭha 2.2.28
The objective world is thus not a mere hallucination. Saṅkara says that it is indescribable. It is entirely a new creation. But created and experienced as it is, it also vanishes from experience. This two-fold character of creation proves its indescribability, and unreality from the Absolute standpoint.

The unreality of the world as propounded by Saṅkaracārya is puzzling to many and has invited scathing criticisms. Nevertheless, it is a fact proved by strong logic, and not merely by the authority of Srutis. The changing world—the becoming—must proceed from, live in, and dissolve in the foundational unchangeable Being. The world thus, in a sense, is the effect of the Brahman. There cannot be two entities one changeable and the other unchangeable. In the unchangeable Being, all differences vanish according to the Advaita:

अभ्युपगम्य चेम्ब ठ्यावहारिकं थोक्तथोग्यलक्षं विमागं
"स्त्याल्लोकवत्" इति परिहारोभिमित:। न त्वयं विमागः
परमार्थतोस्त्ति। यत्मात्त्योऽर्थेष्टिष्ठ्वोऽर्थिष्ठ्वत्वमवगम्यभैः।

1. ब्रह्मचृत्त्र सांकरप्रभु २.१.१४
The world full of differences is thus really identical with the Brahman. But Brahman, as we have seen, is without difference. How then, the world of differences, which can be said to be the effect of Brahman, proceed from Brahman? Śaṅkara analyses this point carefully. The process of causation is generally misunderstood. It is apprehended that a seed perishes and gives rise to a sprout, etc.

"विनष्टादृषि फल वीजावंकुर उत्पन्नते।"

Śaṅkara wants to point out that such indeed is not the case:

"वेष्वपि वीजाविष्ट स्वरूपपोपमवर्गः लक्ष्यते तेष्वपि नासारापुरुषमानः प्रवृत्तियोत्सराबित्यायः कारणमपरमप्यते अनुपममानाम् नामावावावानां वीजावेक्ष्यवानांमुद्रकाविकारणमापमात्।"

1. ब्रह्मसूत्र शांकरभाष्य २.२.२६
2. ब्रह्मसूत्र शांकरभाष्य २.२.२६
The fine elements in the seed pass on to the sprout.
In the same way the Being of Brahman passes on to
Becoming:

ब्रह्मणोऽपि तत्त्व सत्तालक्षणः स्वभाव आकाशाविषु
अनुपलंगमानो दूरत्यते।

It cannot however be supposed that the difference,
determinateness, plurality, changeability of the
world is involved in its cause the Being Absolute,
for Being cannot remain Being in that case; it will
immediately be reduced to Becoming. Thus the normal
process of cause and effect is inadequate to explain
the relation between Brahman and the world. As a
substitute then comes in the famous Vivartavāda.
This can very well prove the veracity of the state-
ment of the Sankṣepa-Sarīraka:

व्यवस्थास्तेतिस्मयंपरिणामवादे स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः।

1. ब्रह्मणोऽपि (शास्करामाण्य 2.1.6)
2. संबेप्तवारीक 2.61
This again shows the necessity of bringing in
the analogy of Sukti-rajata and Rajju-sarpa. It
cannot be denied that Becoming springs up from the
Being; but it cannot be said that Becoming is its
effect in the normal sense of the term. Many criti-
cisms of the Mayavada do not sufficiently take this
necessity into account. They only stretch too much
the analogies. What is intended is to show that,
though the manifold creation is an expression of
Brahman, the essential identity of Brahman is never
mutilated in any of its manifestations:

लोकेपि देवाविहि मायात्माविहि च स्वूपा-
नुपमदेवैव विचिन्त्र हस्त्यमाविशृण्टयो हुशयते। तथेक-
स्मिन्नापि ब्रह्मजिः स्वूपानुपमदेवैवनेकाकाराः सुष्टि-
मंचिष्यतीि।

1. Cf. Nagpur University Journal No. X Dec. 1944,
   pp. 63-80 and Journal of the University of Bombay
   Vol. XIV Part II, pp. 57-68.

2. ब्रह्मसूप शाकरपाण्य २.१.२८

   Cf. "The Vedānta of Saṅkara" by Dr. Singh, p. 347.
"The doctrine of Maya is not a theory or a hypothesis. It is a statement of fact about the nature of reality."

For over a thousand years, there has been ample exposition of the philosophy of Sankara, and it is not intended here to evaluate these expositions, not even the recent and illuminating one given by Dr. Singh. It will however not be doubted, that Sankara never discarded the utility of Sadhana:

\[ \text{कर्मधि: संस्कृतता हि विद्वृत्तात्मानः श्रवणव्यात्मा-} \]
\[ \text{नमुपनिषत्प्रकाशितप्रतिविषये वैविद्यम्।} \]
\[ \text{संस्कृतत्वेः च विद्वृत्तसर्वस्य शानोत्थपति प्रतिविषयेन मवति।} \]

\[ \text{— श्रावणाराक्तव्यान्मोक्षान्नथायपि कर्मधि} \]
\[ \text{वर्त्तति न विद्यते।} \]

\[ \text{तत्साधारणात्मिन श्रमदमाति च वयाच्छम सर्वाण्येवाध्यम-} \]
\[ \text{कर्मधि विद्यात्मकार्यकृपतिभाव।} \]

1. बुधदेव, माध्यम 4.4.22
2. बुधदेव, माध्यम 3.3.1
3. ब्रह्मचर्य, माध्यम 3.4.17
From some of the minor works ascribed to Śaṅkara-ācārya we learn of the author's proficiency in Yoga. Traditional accounts of Śaṅkara's life too bear out this fact. Belief in mysterious powers was very common in India, and Śaṅkara-ācārya also was known to have been endowed with such powers even from his childhood. From an evidence brought forth recently it is learnt that Śaṅkara was an ācārya of a Tantra school. A Tāntric work called Śrīvidyārnava by Pragalbhā-ācārya gives an elaborate list of the teachers of Śrīvidyā. As this list includes almost all the traditional names of the Advaita ācāryas, it may be worthwhile to go through it. The list begins with Kapila as the originator of this sect:

Kapila, Atri, Vasistha, Sanaka, Sanandana, Bhrgu, Sanatsujata, Vamadeva, Nārada, Gautama, Saunaka, Sakti, Mārkandeya, Kausika, Parāśara, Śuka, Aṅgīra, Kanva, Jābali, Bhāradvāja, Vedavyāsa,

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१. योगतारावली, वाक्ययुग्ति - नष्टे पूर्वे विक्हल्ये वु हि

२ कक्याण वेदांतांक

In this list we find that Nārayaṇa and Padmabhavā are excluded, while all other Advaitācāryas mentioned. Śaṅkara and Parāśara are intervened by two persons, while Śuka comes after Parāśara but before Vedavyāsa. From Śuka to Gauḍapāda we have nearly forty names, and between Gauḍapāda and Govinda we have four names. Inspite of these indescrpencies it is not less striking to find that all the famous advocates of the Advaita were the adepts of Śrīvidyā. Gauḍapāda's authorship of the Śrīvidyā- ratnasūtra thus seems to be probable. If Sanat-
Sanatsujāta was really a spiritual stalwart in the line of Śaṅkara, it is likely that Śaṅkara was inspired to write a commentary on the portion of the Mahābhārata where Sanatsujāta is prominent. Kapardī is known to be an ancient Vedāntin. We find his name in this list long before Gauḍapāda. There is also another Kapardī, a house-holder, amongst the disciples of Śaṅkarācārya.

Apart from these we may pass on to some important points. In the traditional formula of the Śaṅkara system, there seems to be a long gap between Śuka and Gauḍapāda. The list from the Śrīvidyārṇava may suggest, that actually there was no gap. In the traditional stanzas, prominent persons alone are included. Gauḍapāda may be the paramaguru of Śaṅkara in the sense, that before Govinda, Gauḍapāda was the only person in the line that shone out. After Śuka, Advaitic thought continued, though perhaps it was not known as Advaita. May be, it was called Śāṅkhya; for we have seen many philosophers known as the advocates of Śāṅkhya preaching the Advaita. Kapila might have been a very early preacher of the Advaita, and it was later that his system was
was walled irrevocably into the limits of classical Sāṅkhya. In describing the evolution of the world, the Smṛtis have accepted the way of Sāṅkhya, though we have seen, that they also know the Advaita. The list of the Śrīvidyārṇava cites several authors of the Smṛtis also. In this light the following remark of Śaṅkara appears to be very significant.

येन त्वंशेन न विद्वंशे तेनेष्टमेव सांख्ययोगस्मुत्त्योः
सायाकाश्चत्वम्।

Significantly enough a fact may be noted from the Paurāṇic tradition. From the Sūtasamhitā of the Skandapurāṇa, we gather that Lord Śiva first imparted Advaita to Lord Viṣṇu. From Viṣṇu it came to Brahmā, who transmitted it to Vyāsa, the son of Satyavatī. Vyāsa passed it on to Jaimini.

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1. व.सु.शांकरशाष्ट्र २.१.३
2. सूतसमहिता यस्मैवमवल्लभ अ. २६.१८
   यथावैवमवल्लभ ब्रह्मगीता अ. ५.१६८-१८८
Jaimini and also to Sūta the narrator of the Purāṇa. We have seen how the Purāṇas record the Advaitic thought along with the Saṅkhya. The Sūtasamhitā is a work replete with the Advaita. It is believed that Saṅkara went through it eighteen times before he wrote his Saṁrikabhaṣya. Nothing can be said about the authenticity of this belief, especially when we find clear traces of modern works in it. The belief however, seems to imply one fact, that the idea of Advaita ran also through Purāṇas from which - as from other sources too - Saṅkara took inspiration.

These sources can be many, as is evident from the foregoing pages. But all these sources are not treated in one and the same manner by Saṅkara. This is one of the peculiarities of Saṅkara's treatment of the subject, and we are now in a position to mark all such peculiarities of Saṅkara.

1. तामष्टादशयालोच्य शंकरः सूतसंहितात्।
   चक्रे शारीरर्कं माणयं सर्वविद्यानन्तर्नित्यम्।

2. यज्ञवंशवंश द्रह्मगीता श्रु-३२-३३ =
   गौडपारकरिका १.४-५
(1) We have seen already the distinction of Brahmāmāmsa from other systems of Indian Philo-
sophy. This system is based on Śruti, and in his
writings Śaṅkara too has laid emphasis on the autho-
rity of the Śruti. But Śaṅkara has done something
more. In his times proof was demanded for the
validity of the Śrutis, and Śaṅkara established it
on the ground of Anubhava. The knowledge of Brahman
is Brahmanubhava according to him:

अनुभवाक्तां व ब्रह्मविवाचनम् — —

Thus in Brahmāmāmsa, mere authority is not enough.
The authoritative statement should corroborate ex-
perience:

न धर्मिज्ञातायामयम् श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजि-
ञ्ज्ञासायाम्। किंतु श्रुत्यादयोनुभवाचक्षन्त्य वाचासः संवर्धिनः प्रमा-
णनुभवाच्यात्मात् भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मानन्तत्यो।

1. ब्रह्मचुत्र माण्डळ २०१४
2. ब्रह्मचुत्र माण्डळ १९१२
Philosophical enquiry has to take into account every experience, and hence revelational; intuitional or super-sensual experience cannot be excluded. Moreover, if such an experience is unalterable, its evidential superiority too has to be acknowledged. The word anubhava is used by Śaṅkara in a wider sense.

(2) By calling the aid of experience, Śaṅkara has ably refuted the charge of dogmatism that may be levelled against the Vedānta. The Vedānta is founded on Śruti, because they record experience. They need not dictate us in a dogmatic fashion. Śaṅkara would immediately overthrow any such dogma:

न हि धीरोगिनरङ्गायो वैति श्रुत्य श्रुतिसहस्तम्पर प्रामाण्यपैैति ॥

(3) There is thus no conflict between reason and Śruti. Though based on Śrutī, the system of Advaita is as logical as any other system of philosophy.

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१. न हस्सराजे तत्वावेक्षत्वं तत्तत्त्वावेक्षत्वं तद्भिन्नत्व-मत्तवावेक्षत्वं, कित्यवाचितविषयत्वं तत्वावेक्षत्वं वाचित-विषयत्वं चातरवावेक्षत्वमवाचितविषयत्वं च श्रौते भ्रमणा चम्।

२. अज्ञातमेति, अनन्तकृष्णस्मार्कां दिच्चमानविदिपिमित्तकृता, निर्णयसा, सन् १९२७।

३. नमकचीतमाध्य १८.६६
Challenged on logical grounds Śaṅkara never felt shy of explaining his position by logical arguments. He was never oblivious of the help reason can give. He has sufficiently acknowledged the speculative merit of Śāṅkhya - Yuktigādhatva - and hence he thought it necessary to refute the system of Śāṅkhya without the aid of Śruti:

इह तु वाक्यानिरपेक्षः स्वतंत्रस्तुत्तुत्तिप्रतिप्रेषः फःक्षिते।

Śruti itself endorses the value of reason as Śaṅkara says:

श्रुतिरिपु शौचश्वयः मन्तव्यः इति श्रवणव्यतिरिक्तम्
मनन्ति विद्यन्ति तर्कमण्डृतावर्तमानं वर्त्यति।

1. Brāhmaṇa Mantra 2.2.1

2. Brāhmaṇa Mantra 2.1.4
(4) Bruti, reason, speculative Śaṅkhya, supersensual methods of Yoga, worships and ceremonials of the Smṛtis, Purāṇas, and Tantras that keep the final word of Śruti in view, all were integrated in a comprehensive theory. From the various accounts of Śaṅkara’s life we see his ardent faith in the Śruti, his shining intellect and his Yogic powers. He was also an Ācārya of Śrīvidyā. For the reconciliation of diverse Vedic views, he gave a grand synthetic outlook and metaphysics.

(5) Codifications of Śruti texts was a matter of quite old times. It was the light thrown by Śaṅkara that pointed out the main theme of the Śrutis and the way of interpreting and reconciling them. No other method could possibly have found so consistent a system out of diverse Śrutis, which may appear even conflicting. In his own days, Śaṅkara’s outlook was successful in pointing out the basic unity in diverse spiritual practices and manners of worship; and the same may be helpful even now to annul the differences amongst various religious and philosophical creeds that have been rising after him.
The Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Dvaita are the two schools that rose after Śaṅkara which may be looked upon as prominent. As shown by some, these are but the rungs of the same ladder. The following stanza makes it clear:

वेदवृद्ध्या तु वासोः हं जीववृद्ध्या त्व्वंद्वसः
आत्मवृद्ध्या त्व्वेवाशहमिति मे निश्चितता मति: ॥

Hanumāt says to Rāma that as long as body consciousness prevails, he is the servitor of the latter. In view of Jīva-consciousness, he is the part of the latter. As the supreme self however both are one. There is no duality.

The followers of Śaṅkara too had different estimates about his philosophy. Brahman to whom creatorship cannot really be allocated, becomes the creator and also the individual soul. Such a distinction is marked through Upādhis. Sky or ether is the same all over, but when limited by a pitcher or a building, we say "sky within the pitcher", "sky within the building" etc. Ghataṅkāsa, maṭhāṅkāsa. This is the
the theory of limitation called the Avacchedavāda, propounded by Vācaspati Misra.

There is another theory called Ābhāsavāda. The Supreme Self is reflected in ignorance, and gets itself identified with ignorance. The reflection is similar to, but distinct from, the original and hence it is unreal. Suresvara, a direct disciple of Saṅkara is the originator of this doctrine.

Another famous theory is somewhat similar to the one, just given; and it is the Pratibhāmbavāda. Individual soul is the reflection of the Supreme Self. But this reflection is not a separate thing. Reflection cannot be an independant thing. It is the original itself illumined by refracted rays. Reflection thus cannot be rejected as unreal, for it is the reality itself differently illumined. Prakāśātmayati, the author of a commentary of Padmapāda's work is said to have elaborated this doctrine. Many other doctrines such as Ekajīvāvāda, Nānajīvāvāda, Drṣṭisrṣṭivāda, Srṣṭidrṣṭivāda have taken inspiration from the writings of Saṅkara. None of these, however, contradict the fundamental position of Saṅkara. The
The Supreme Self, the One without the second, is the only Reality; the inscrutable Māyā is the root-cause of all duality; what is known as the individual soul is essentially identical with the Supreme Self, the Brahman. These cardinal tenets of the Advaita are maintained alike by all. After Śaṅkara, the maintenance of the Advaita required much dialectical skill, and many intellectual gymnasts came forth for the purpose. Dr. Miss Nāchane has ably elaborated in her thesis the philosophical niceties with which these stalwarts were busy. Some of these, according to some, have departed from their master. This however is an independant subject that need not engage us here. One thing is certain, that the reputation which the Advaita Vedānta and even the Hindu religion and culture enjoys today, is mostly due to this great philosopher-saint of India. None perhaps will dispute the following remark: "His philosophy is an embodiment of the cultural spirit of Hinduism and he appears before us as an exponent and as guardian of this cultural spirit. The system of thought which he has bequeathed to us is an attempt to supply the philosophical foundation on which the superstructure of Hindu culture rests."  