From the account of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Śūtras etc., we have marked already, that tendency of bringing out some conciliation between the conflicting schools was a very old practice in India; and such a conciliation was effected out of genuine philosophical necessity. We see the same attempt repeated in the Yogavāsistha. A belief is generally held as valid that the Yogavāsistha is a post-Śaṅkara work.

Dr. Winternitz regards it as a work not later than the ninth century A.D., as it was summarised by some Gaḍābhīnanda. There is however some doubt as to the identity of this Abhinanda, as pointed out by Dr. Raghavan. Dr. Ātreya assigns it to the sixth century A.D. It seems reasonable that the Yogavāsistha that is before us is an enlarged edition by later additions. There are however good grounds to believe, that the original portion of it - or the portion that preceded Śaṅkara - is much larger than what is generally held as the original nucleus. It is stated in the Yogavāsistha


   Indian Philosophy, Vol. II by Das Gupta, p. 232

2. Dr. Raghavan J.O.R.M. 1927.
Yogavāsiṣṭha that the work contains thirty-two thousand stanzas. However the Nirṇayasāgara edition contains only 29289 stanzas as shown by P.C. Diwanji.

Post-Śaṅkara date is assigned to the work mainly for two reasons. Śaṅkarācārya had not referred to this work in any of his commentaries. The second reason for supposing it to be later is the language and style of the work, which are said to be in imitation of later Saṃskṛt literature. Some prose portions in the work are believed to be in imitation of Campū writings, which must belong to quite a late period.

Mr. P. C. Diwanji has given some other reasons also, such as the reference to the Jñānakarma-samuccayavāda, or the inclusion of discussions if it is possible to be a Jīvanmukta, or if Mahāvākyas lead to ultimate knowledge simply by their repetition or by concentrating upon them. "Thus the similarity of language etc." says he, "leads to the conclusion that the author has availed himself of the ideas of Śaṅkara and has twisted

twisted them." There are also others who think that Śaṅkara's language, etc. are utilised by the author of the work. On the authority of the Rājataraṅginī, Mr. Diwanji concludes that the author must be a contemporary of Yasaskaradeva who flourished in 939-948 A.D. But, he is of opinion that the Yogavāsiṣṭha in the present form is post-Śaṅkara, but the original work must be earlier. He also admits that "the original and accretions are so mixed up that they cannot be precisely marked out." Thus there should not be any reserve in accepting that the original work belonged to much earlier date, and was enlarged by additions later; and as it is difficult to separate the old and the new portions, it is also evident that later additions strictly conformed to the general trend of thought and language of the old work.

It is true that Śaṅkarācārya does not refer to this work. But this indeed is a negative argument,

1. Cf. Dr. Rāghavan's article referred to above.

and should not be considered as having independent value as evidence. Many of good dramas of Bhāsa, which were composed so early, were lost to us for such a long duration until recently discovered. This was perhaps due to unsteady times. It is certainly not unlikely that the Yogavāsiṣṭha might have suffered the same fate. It may be observed incidentally, that in citing quotations Saṅkarācārya seems to be vigilant. Besides Śrutis and Smṛtis he has used few other works, which were absolutely religious or metaphysical in character. Though the Yogavāsiṣṭha is a work of high philosophical merit, it is after all a Kāvya - a poem. It is possible that Saṅkara might not have referred to it for this reason.

As for borrowing the languages of precocious works and imitating them, and twisting the ideas of

1. Dr. Ātreya has given some grounds for the priority of the Yogavāsiṣṭha to Saṅkara. I however cannot concur with him in his opinion that, "from the time of Gauḍapāda and Saṅkara, the Śruti has been considered as the Supreme and unquestionable source of the ......Advaita philosophy; for Vasistha, experience is the ultimate Pramāṇa of knowledge." Philosophy of Yogavāsiṣṭha, p.16. Dr. Ātreya seems to have neglected Saṅkara's remark: न न तत्त्वज्ञानोऽन्यं यथार्थविषयं च। न तत्त्वज्ञानोऽन्यं कार्याविक्षयं विषयं च।
of Saṅkarācārya, it may be argued, that reasons advanced to prove such borrowings are not sound. There are no doubt astonishing similarities between Kālidāsa and the Yogavāsiṣṭha. But it may be said, that, unless otherwise helped by valid historical evidences, such similarities cut both ways. Kālidāsa and other Sanskrit poets are in the habit of freely drawing upon their predecessors. It has been sufficiently known that Kālidāsa has borrowed not only his themes, but many of his beautiful ideas also from several sources as the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, and some Purāṇas, and even Āsvaghosa according to some. As for instance the beautiful description of Dilīpa and his wife in the first canto of the Raghuvamsa:

काम्यमिल्या तयोरासीद्‍व्रजतः: शुद्धवेषयोः।
हिमनिर्भवत्योयोगी चिन्ह्रचन्द्रम्बलोरिव॥

1. A History of Indian Philosophy by Dr. Das Gupta, Vol. II, p. 239.
2. "कालिवास" by निराकी
3. रघुवंश १.४६
This seems to have been taken directly from the Rāmāyana:

विरराज महाबाहुशिष्यः सह चन्द्रमः।

It may however be said on behalf of the Yogavāsiṣṭha, that, apart from any such real or supposed borrowals, the author has shown a genuine poetical merit; and the poem being sufficiently long, there are innumerable instances of poetic excellence, which can stand comparison with any Sanskrit poet of the front rank.

The prose portions also need not confound us much. From the later portions of the Mahābhārata to Lalitavistara, we find such mixed compositions which do not seem to be uncommon in those days. Use of long compounds, etc. too is quite an early practice found even in the works of Bhaṣa:

1. रामायण अरण्यकोप १५.३  

2. "...... the whole work seems to be a Brähmanic modification of idealistic Buddhism." A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.231.

3. "Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery", p.231. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II.
एक बड़ा सीतापर्णजनितसंतापक्ष रघुकुलप्रदीपक्ष सर्वोक्त-नयनातिरिक्तस्वरमस्य च दारामिरिलनिर्विशेषस्वरमस्य सर्वोक्त-राजस्य तुविन्दमहाश्रीवस्य तुम्मिवस्य च तत्त्वस्कारकुणजनितस्य लगभग सर्वानन लालिति हेममालिनं वालिनं हन्तु समुदयोऽ प्रवृत्ति ।

आहों तु लुण निहतपरितस्य जुरगरानरुधिरकलियुझुमप्रदेशस्य र्विविष्टवर्णक्षर्पल्पाकामारतों शरणस्कर्तकविश्वेषस्य शाक्तसत्साहितकपपिणिकालुघुश्च वेलगराकक्ष्ठेत्योऽनुभूति तिग-वाविभिरुध्यैर्कौर्ण्यः समन्तपचक्ष्य तत्त्वाभिषेकत ॥

1. श्रीमेकनाटकम्  वेनकाट्रामा स्वास्त्री मोटिलाल बानरसिद्धां, लاهोर 1930 प.3, उ. देवान्तरां ।

2. भुवनध्रुवम्  मोटिलाल बानरसिद्धां, लहोर 1933 प.14, 15, उ. देवान्तरां।

I have not discussed the problem of the date of Bhāsa, as there is a great controversy on the point. However that should not affect the issue present issue.
Long compounds are not unknown even to the Raghuvamsa and Ramayana. As for the argument that the Yogavasiṣṭha had knowledge of Saṅkara's works to such an extent that he has even twisted Saṅkara's ideas and ridiculed them, something must be said. It has been sufficiently pointed out that similarities of arguments or use of similar philosophic terms, etc. are not independent evidences for the priority or posteriority of any work. Mr. Diwanji has cited three instances where he has found an attack on Saṅkara's school, of which one according to him has the mention of Saṅkara's dictum in Vivekachūḍamani 20. However the verses understood properly, with all the context, are so clear, that one does not know what led Mr. Diwanji to think so. His first instance is as follows:

1. Rāṣṭrasūrya 1.58/9.14/10.47, 60
2. Rāmaṇand Śudarṣaṇ 9.9/9.16/16.9,10/45.6/47.14 etc.
3. P.C. Diwanji's article referred to above.
The mere words Kutārkikatā and Drṣṭāntasyāṁ-samātreṇa need not confound us. There is nothing here like an attack on Śaṅkara. What the later Vedāntins expressed by the simile of moon and branch - Śāṅkhā-Śāṅkharāntamāversedivyāya - and tried to teach is here stressed vividly. How the words "Apaṇātrairvikalpitaiḥ" are directed against Śaṅkara, it is impossible to know. In a verse in the fourth chapter, Mr. Diwanji finds not only an attack on Śaṅkara but a ridicule of his dictum. With previous context the verse is as follows:

एषांतिमदृढविषय ठकितरेव न राजते ।
वर्तमानमि विनोदवेदित नानुप्रदर्शितयुवनः ॥
प्रकाश्वयोऽन्तःप्ररोचे यः सप्तन्नोऽन्तसंवधिनः ।
नाशमायाति लोकेः स्विनं न कदाचन कस्यचित् ॥
हं जगदसुव्रहम सत्यमित्येव वक्ते यः ।
तत्युपन्तनिमित्योन्नतौ विद्वदोषोपि हसत्यलम् ॥

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1. योग वा. २.१८.६७-६८
2. योग वा. ४.३१.१९-२०-२१
It is quite clear from the context, that the word anubhūti or experience stands here for the experience of a common man of his phenomenal existence. Understood thus, the verses are very clear. There is neither ridicule nor attack in them. "Vimudhopi hasatyalam" is certainly not an attack on Śaṅkara. On the contrary the same discussion contains verses as follows:—

श्रुद्धविषये त्रेष्या राम द्वाक्राणवराजते।
उद्धवस्त्वस्त्तथा दू पेष किल नास्त्येव किंचन॥

This is not the refutation but the vindication of Śaṅkara's philosophy. A verse from the same chapter is again cited as against Śaṅkara:

श्यास्त्रेणाचार्यं दृशयमिति निर्वाच्यसंस्थिता।
नानादुः सविकाराणि दृढ्यतंताति ये॥

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1. योग चा. ४.३१.२४
2. योग चा. ३.८१.२५
3. योग चा. ४.३२.३४
Here also "Suṣkata-karamatāṇi" has nothing to do with Saṅkaracārya. The expression is too common to suggest anything like that.

But the repetition of a history in the Rājatarāṅgiṇī as Mr. Diwanji has pointed out, is certainly a later accretion, and it must be frankly admitted that there are many more in the work before us. Mr. Diwanji also admits that "the original and accretions are so mixed up that they cannot be precisely marked out." Yet according to him Sutīksna Agasti dialogue, Agnivesya Kārunya dialogue, Suruci Devahuti dialogue, Vālmīki Arista-nemi dialogue occurring in the first sarga of Vairāgya, and the two hundred and sixteenth sarga of the Uttaranirvāṇa, some prose passages, some upākhyānas like Līlā in the Utpatti-prakaraṇa and the whole subject matter of the Uttaranirvāṇa are later additions. It is not to my purpose to examine all these details. I may turn only to a few points in general.

The most remarkable peculiarity of the present Yogavāsiṣṭha is that, from the beginning to the end there is not a single self-contradiction as far as its
its philosophic theme is concerned. Accretions are, as observed by Mr. Diwanji, so perfectly cemented with the original, as to make a complete indivisible whole. This means that the philosophic contents of the accretions have no independent thought to convey and thus only help to illustrate the original theme in various ways. If the original of the Yogavāsiṣṭha can be shown to be as earlier as the beginning of the Christian era, it will not only prove the continuity of the Advaita school of Vedānta, but throw a new light on questions of chronology and borrowals.

According to the present standards, language and style form an important criterion for settling chronological disputes. Just as, inspite of additions by different persons at different times, the philosophy of the original Yogavāsiṣṭha has not slightly altered its face, so also the style and language of the poet have marvellously retained their sameness inspite of the intervention of different writers of different times. This is also not less important. All this must go to prove the priority of the philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha.

But this is not all. There is independent evi-
evidence to prove, that a part of the present work to which the remaining portions conform in all important details, is considerably older. References to the Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara and spanda school of Kāśmir, to the six Śiva Śāstras, words like Tājikī and Dīna, Dāmara Tantra and Yogini Tantra, as well as the mention of the consuring of the Gujarāthī widows are such as to convince anybody of the later date of the Yogavāsiṣṭha. Most of these references in the Līlākhyanā have an other side also. So far instance Bāṇa knows Turuṣka before the Turks, so also it is not impossible for the Yogavāsiṣṭha to know these words. It is proved by history that Persia and other countries carried on vigorous trade with west coast of India even before the Christian era. Apart from that there is also some information that enables us to fix the lower limit of the earlier Yogavāsiṣṭha:

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1. योगवा. ५.४७

2. गुर्जरानीकनाथेन गुर्जरिकेशुचवनम् । उत्पत्ति ३७.१९
(a) Instead of using the familiar word Tithi, the Yogavāśistha tells us the number of the day in the fortnight:

अरैकदा कवाचिष्ठ सहुस्थाप्टमेव दिने।
गते शुभवप्प्रत्य सहवयः क्षमागते।

As the inscriptions of the Sātavāhanas show, this practice was current at the beginning of the Christian era.

(b) On the authority of the index of the subjects in other Purāṇas in the present Nārada Purāṇa, it appears that the Purāṇas had assumed much of their present forms before the sixth century, and excepting sectarian insertions, there have been no material alterations in them. The Yogavāśistha’s description of the Śaka, Śālmali and other Dwīpas differs in many places from the stereo-typed one of the present Purāṇas. It must therefore ante-date the present forms of the Purāṇas.

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1. योगवांश. पूर्वनिर्वाॅर्ण 26.91
2.उत्तरनिर्वाण संग्रह 115,121,122,123. उत्त्यल्नि 29.70-नन्दाद्वीप
3. विनायकमहानिर्णयसल्लोलचातुर्यमुक्तः। उत्त्पत्ति प्रकरण 3.33.20

Here the mention of Mallās at once reminds us the atmosphere of the Āśvamedhikaparva of the Mahābhārata.
(c) Not only Takṣasitā, Sakas, Hūnas, and Yavanas are lively described, but such minute information as the Sakas dressed in blue or the Persians in white is also provided:

अकालर्णेऽप्रत्येकः वहच्छकककुमकः ॥
अकरोत्परसीकानां धनैक्ष्ठयोमश्रमू ॥
मन्दराहननोकीनस्त्वच्छक्कीरार्जवोरे ।
वनानीवाक्यान्वायसन् शहा०अ०क्लेयक्षुनि ॥

This shows the author's direct knowledge of them. The Persians had no doubt landed in the Gujarātha before Śaṅkarācārya, but then only a tiny group of them had confined themselves to a little territory in the Gujara. The Mlečchas are mentioned, but there is nothing peculiar about them to interpret the word as the Muslims; and after the victory of Yasodharman over the Hūnas till the Muslim invasions, India remained practically unmolested by foreigners. Therefore the date

1. अत्यत्तिरिक्त ३०.२५-२६

2. It has been shown in the chapter of Purāṇas that the word Mlečcha is as old as Patañjali the grammarian.
date of these descriptions must be earlier than Yasodharman, the king of Ujjayini, whose date is sixth century A.D. There are no doubt some words like Tājik; but the word may have been known through the Arabs who traded with the western coast long before the Mohommedans. It should also be remembered incidentally, that Tājik is originally a Khāldean word.

(d) A city of the Yavanas is described on the western coast. It is also described that the Sakas and Yavanas had colonies on the eastern coast of India. It needs no separate mention, that this state of affairs did never exist after the early centuries of the Christian era. 932

(e) Such information as Harisćandra had the experience of twelve years during one night or that a Persian King attained a high degree of esteem among the famous Rsis, the story of Bhagiratha somewhat different from the traditional one, and total disregard of Ahimsā2 and formal Sannyāsa, all point to a date much earlier than Śaṅkara.

932.2, 922.2, 922.2, 912.2, 912.2

1. राज्जि धात्व वपराणि हरिण्ह्रोऽउमुत्वान। लवणोऽबुक्तवानायुरेकराथ्या समाः शतमू। योगवाणुत्पत्ति 60.24

2. मनोरथोपास्यान पुरुषविनार्य ६४-६५-६६ सर्गः।

3. गोद्वृष्णपत्यभोजनम्। उत्पत्ति ३६.५४
(f) As already said before the author has always tried to harmonise the doctrines of the Vedānta without losing anything of his own. It was not at all necessary to do so after Śaṅkarācārya, for by that time such harmonisation and gradation was complete.

(g) In the description of battle in the Līlopākhyāna, there is a mention of machines that hurled stones, and individuals trained to hurl stones by means of chains and moving discs.

\[\text{\textit{वृक्षाला जालिनो जाते: वृक्षालोकितो मले:।}}\]
\[\text{\textit{कापादवृक्षाला मियात्रमन्त्रयतुस्तुलोऽपलब्धयः।}}\]
\[\text{\textit{प्रामणंस्मित्रब्रज्यावेयं चक्रमूर्त्विजुनो जयातु।।}}\]

\[\text{\textit{यन्त्रापामाणवर्णं वैष्णवर्मांवर्परिपन्छवति।}}\]
\[\text{\textit{सेनादुवृक्षालाजालवलना क्रियतां बलातु।।}}\]

Indians like the Romans and Greeks of Alexander no doubt had the knowledge of stone-hurling machines.
But they are not mentioned in any of the battles fought after the 6th century A.D.

(h) Such direct refutations of the Śunyavādins are remarkable:

\[ \text{Śrīmānīnāmaḥ, hi kāruṇī śrīmānāḥ,} \\
\text{nāstvēd śrīmānāṁ tadbhāvamany ākṣet,} \\
\text{sāmakṣerādhyāya kṛṣṇaśrīnāma vādakaḥ,} \\
\text{ābhāvaś caḥ sādhanāḥ, hi tattvā.} \]

These point to a time, when controversies between the Bauddhas and the Vaidikas were not mere academical but flagrant.

The very plan of the Yogavāsistha is enough to make it clear that it is written to strengthen one's own position, and bring home to the reader the futility of the Buddhist position without reviling it. The beginning of the Yogavāsistha reminds the reader of Gautama Buddha. Like Gautama, Rāmacandra was born
born with a golden spoon in his mouth, and brought up in every manner of opulence, and comfort. With all his father's attempts to keep misery and pain in the world away from the sight of Gautama, his chance excursions led him to discover the truth. Afraid of his own doom and that of mankind, he resolved to sacrifice his own life to find a nearest and surest way to eternal peace and happiness. In course of his pilgrimage, Ramaścandra had the same enlightenment, and he too became restless on account of it. But further on their ways differed, and consequently the results they arrived at became also different. Gautama resolved to be guided by nothing else but his own experience. Though experience is in fact the ultimate test it must be remembered that experience differs according to individual capacities. Therefore Vedic philosophy has always spoken of three experiences, which can be one's own experience - ātmapratīti; the experience of adepts - Gurupratīti; and the experience pronounced by the conclusion of the Śāstras - Śāstrapratīti. Vasiṣṭha has laid much stress on the agreement of these three. It is for this reason, that the Supreme way found by the Yogavasiṣṭha was the dissolution of one's own individual into the
the Absolute, unconditioned, unoriginated eternal One; while Gautama, as already described before declined to solve the problem of the self, satisfied at what he thought the surest and nearest way out of the misery, and left it ambiguous.

One always reads of the philosophy of the Yoga- Vāsiṣṭha, or of Gaudapāda or of Śaṅkara, but this language, being defective, needs explanation. By reading it one is apt to think, that, like the philosophies of Gautama and of Mahāvīra, these philosophies mutually differ a good deal. But this is not so. Of course every new writer has something new to convey, otherwise he would not be tempted to write. But such peculiarities of his, are not enough to mark his writings as something quite new and different from the philosophy of the Upaniṣads which he is trying to elucidate. Unless there is a difference in the fundamentals it cannot be a new and separate system. The Mīmāṃsa has laid down seven precious tests for knowing the essence of a writing. If in all the seven tests the writer substantially differs from any other school, he is in fact telling something quite new and original.
Apūrvatā, arthavādaḥ and upapatti are always the writers own, and in these he can have as much freedom as he can intelligently show. Therefore, if there is a difference in these, it does not necessarily mean that the writer is formulating something quite new. These are not therefore the deciding factors. The remaining four viz. Upakrama, Upasamhāra, abhyāsa and phala are the factors that can decide, whether the writer is in fact a free-lance or an expositor of any existing system. Applying these four tests to the Yogavāsiṣṭha, it will be very easy to understand that the author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha is a thorough Vedāntin, that is a follower of the Upanisads.

It appears that the author of the Yogavāsiṣṭha was a thorough rationalist. By this it must not be supposed that he was satisfied with mere reason as a trustworthy guide; for no Vedāntin can really do so.

1. "The Vāsiṣṭha cannot be credited with originality for all its views, for the seeds of most of them could be traced in the Upanisads. Surely, there was not a philosophical vacuum between the age of the Upanisads and the times of Gaudapāda and Vāsiṣṭha. There must have passed several generations of Upaniṣadīc scholars....... Vāsiṣṭha also cites the views of earlier Vedāntins." "Gaudapāda, A Study in early Advaita, p. 23 by Dr. Mahaśeṣa Mahādevan University of Madras, 1952."
We have a great fascination for the word "rational", and undoubtedly rationalism is all well against a blind belief in scriptures. But left to itself it is as unreliable as the senses. There is no doubt about the statement of Dr. Ātreya that "on the acceptance of pure empiricism and the denial of rationalism, no philosophising will at all be possible." Even the Vāsiṣṭha has said, "A reasonable statement even of a child should be accepted, while the unreasonable ones are to be discarded like straw, even though they are made by the Creator himself."

\[\text{उक्तिःकृतम् पादेयं वचनं वारङ्कवार्रि।}
\text{अन्यम् तृणमिव त्याज्यमण्ड्युक्तं पद्मजम्बन् II}\

1. "It seems, Vāsiṣṭha does not disagree with us in so far as he thinks that every doctrine must be "rational" etc. p.585. "The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha" by Dr. Ātreya. Theosophical Publishing House, Adyār 1936.

2. p. 585. "The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha"

3. Dr. Atreya's translation, p. 581.

4. 2.14.3 योगवा.
But it must be understood, that this is true only as far as the Vyāvahārika Sattā is concerned. Even the Vāsiṣṭha thinks, that reason cannot directly lead one to the Pāramārthika Satya. There it is helpful only in the sense of the well-known Sākhācandranyāya. When in order to show the new moon, the nearest branch of tree is pointed, one has to remove his sight even from the branch in order to have a vision of the moon. Thus one's own experience beyond the region of reason, is the ultimate test of validity or invalidity of highest philosophical truths. The Vedānta philosophers, in order to make sure, have not relied on this experience alone. The unity of one's own experience, with the ultimate findings of the scriptures in conformity with the experience of the adepts, is the ultimate test according to them. Though terms like Śāstra-pratīti etc. are not used in the Vāsiṣṭha, the work is never tired of repeating that reason must be guided by Sat-sāstra:

इत्यैव शास्त्रसिद्धान्तमात्रायोवारवानूऽ मव।

1. योगवा. पूर्वनिवार्ष १.२८
द्व्यं दुष्टिर्हि बालानं सिद्ध्ये सर्वकर्मणाम्।
साधुवल्यं तथा शास्त्रं सर्वविद्वानुवत्ते ॥

शास्त्रसत्तमं संपकवैराग्यं म्यासपुरुषकम् ॥
सदा चार्चित्रित्यायोऽविवेच्ये सा विचारणा ॥

वेदवेदांतसङ्कुषान्तसङ्कस्तिरित्युपस्तिरित्ये:
स्ध्वतिकारणमुः।
निर्णयन्ते विचारेण दीपेन च भुवो निर्णिः ॥

अनवरतप्रवर्थपतितोऽयमच्छिदाधिवहः
शास्त्रसत्तमं संपकवैराग्यं ॥

जीवंयुक्तं महात्मानो नित्यहुष्ण तं महाधियः।
शाब्दः ईरुगन्तत्वं न मोक्कुपणः शशा ॥

कर्तवः चा विचारवाद्यं साध्वावाद्यं वहायिया।
शास्त्रं विदुषा शास्त्रं हुज्जनेन विचारवेत। ॥

सौजन्यपहितं केलो यदा वैराग्यमागतम।
तवानुगम्भीरः गुरुवो विश्वायज्ञरतोऽपि से। ॥

अतः सौ मुग्धसङ्गृह्यं गुरुवेवानुगम्भृति।
स ततेवं विवेकेन्द्र स्वयोजयति पावने ॥

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1. योगवा.उत्पति ९५.१६
2. योगवा.उत्पति ११८.९
3. योगवा.सुशुक्ववचार १४.१९
4. योगवा.उत्पति १२२.२
5. योगवा.स्थिति ४६.२५
6. योगवा.स्थिति ६२.४
7. योगवा.उपक्रम ५.१५
8. योगवा.उपक्रम ६.१४
9. पुर्वनिर्वाचन १२६.७६-७६
10. उत्तरनिर्वाचन २११.१९ पुर्वनिर्वाचन १२७.३
Not only this, but the author even assures, that whatever has been said by Vasiṣṭha is in fact the summary of all Vedānta. Though Dr. Ātreya has expressed his satisfaction that "it is a great credit to Vasiṣṭha that he does not justify any of his views by quoting the scriptures", the Yogavāsiṣṭha says:

इति श्रूत्वा बसिष्ठस्य वाक्यं वेदान्तसंग्रहम्।

वेदान्तवादिने बुद्धया ब्रह्मेदवमिति उद्ववः।

पुकित: शमदमोपेता निर्णयं परिक्षिपता॥

1. उत्पत्तिप्रकरण ७.३३,३४


3. योगवा. धृष्टिनिवार्य १२७.३

4. योगवा. ४.२५.२६
This also is the view about the testimony of Śrutis accepted by Śaṅkara. Thus there is no necessity of pitying Śaṅkara for falling a prey to scriptural authority. 1 The question need not detain us long here. Scholars know sufficiently well, that Śaṅkara relied upon Śrutis just because they conformed with supernormal experiences of an adept. No scriptural injunction can either produce or annual right knowledge, which rests only with the object of knowledge.

In our eagerness to present an old thought in comparison with modern European Philosophy, let us not forget such peculiarities of Indian writers. The idea of an individual is one of the vital concepts of Indian Philosophy and hence of the Vedānta as well. Dr. Ātreya has compared the idea with that of a European Philosopher. Describing the idea of Vāsiṣṭha about personality or individuality, Dr. Ātreya has said, "Vāsiṣṭha will agree with James on his idea of our personality being an ever-flowing stream of thought, and with Bergson that it is in perpetual flux." 3

1. "Even a great genius like Śaṅkara fell a prey to believing that the testimony of scriptures was unquestionable."

2. "हानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं चथामूलवस्तुविषयम्। न तत्तत्त्वियोगस्तेनाः पि कार्यितुं शक्यते, न च प्रतिषेधस्तेनाः पि कार्यितुं शक्यते॥"

This is only a partial presentation of the idea, and therefore likely to mislead the reader. When Prof. James says that it is an overflowing stream of thought, he clearly means that thoughts themselves are the thinkers, and there is no necessity of imagining any separate entity as ego, which takes note of those thoughts. Is this the idea of Vasiṣṭha about personality? Had it been the case, the very dictum of the Upaniṣads, so repeatedly pronounced by Vasiṣṭha "Jñānādeva tu Kaivalyam" would lose its significance, and there would be no difference between Vasiṣṭha and Gautama, who advocated, that the cessation of the stream by means of Trṣnānāśa, leads to Nirvāṇa, like the cessation of burning fire which is not fed by fuel. Activity and personality may be provisionally identical for Vasiṣṭha. But the activity which is equated with personality by him, is not an ordinary activity.

1. Even Dr. Ātreya seems to be aware of this, since he says that this concurrence of Vasiṣṭha with William James is provisional. "Vasiṣṭha will have no objection to William James view... provided that James believes, as the Buddhists believe, that the stream continues even beyond the bridge of death, and also that the stream of thought is flowing on the surface of the calm ocean of the ultimate Reality which is consciousness". The Philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha, pp. 613-614.
It is potent activity. It has got inherent potentiality of fructifying in some accomplishments. That is why it is generally called "Saṃkalpa" Vasistha like Bergson asserts, "the form is in perpetual change, for it is determined by ever-changing activity".

According to modern thinkers, however, this sense of one's individuality is, as it were, the *summum bonum* of the innumerable activities of the physical body. It is as it were a stimulation of brain-centres, effected by the projection of the innumerable processes, subtle or gross, carried on every moment in this physical body. And therefore when this body is dissolved, the ingredients of that body are not destroyed, but utilised by nature to form some another physical body. But the individuality alone vanishes as it were into nothingness. Certainly this is not the idea of Vasistha about personality. Though, as remarked by Dr. Atreyya, Gaudapada and Sankara both agree with Vasistha on the view, that from the absolute point of

1. The root "Klp" originally means to accomplish. In such Vedic passages as "Dhata Yathapūrvam akalpayat" the root does not mean simply "imagined" but "accomplished".

2. "The Philosophy of the Yogavásiṣṭha" p. 557
of view there is no world, no individual and no ignorance or bondage; as long as the absolute point of view is not actually experienced, for all practical purposes, all of them unanimously hold, that something like such individuality exists to cognise the ever-flowing stream of thought, and persists after the dissolution of the physical frame. The Mānasa of Vasiṣṭha is not also used in the sense of the unity of mind. In the Yogavāsiṣṭha, Mānasa, Čitta and Jīva are often used as synonyms, and the idea of these appears to be quite beyond the realm of modern psychology:

\[ 1 \]

\[ जीविक्षेत मनो मायेत्वेश्वराविमिरात्लः \]
\[ दूरपैरात्मेव संसारं तनोतीममलन्मयम् ॥ \]

1. McDougal estimates the value of this psychology as follows: "We talk of psychology, of economics and political science...... and of many other supposed sciences, but the simple truth is that these five names mark great gaps in our knowledge or rather fields of possible sciences, that as yet have hardly begun to take shape.... The names stand for aspirations rather than achievements. They define a programme, they indicate regions of a vast wilderness, hardly yet explored and certainly not mapped, regions in which chaos still reigns." p. 190 "World Chaos" by McDougal.

2. उपश्रेण २.९८
Manas is clearly defined as follows:

चित्त्वःस्पन्दो हि पशिनः कलंकविचलंतरम्।
मन इत्युच्छ्यते राम न जहं न च चित्तमयम्॥

and Citta is also explained thus:

चित्तेऽवेव चित्तापरतिन्या गताया: सकलंकताम्।
प्रस्फुर्तिपरिणिष्या पताः परार्धवत्तयः॥
चित्तामुपयोगाता या गताया: प्रकृतं पदम्।
स्वैरैव सकुल्पस्तेषुथिं दृष्टिमुपागता:॥

It is also said:

1. योगवा. 3.९६.३५-३६
2. योगवा. 3.९६.४१
3. योगवा. 3.९६.३१-३२
We may now turn to the philosophy of this great work. To enumerate the salient features of the philosophy of this work is easy, for the work belongs to what may be called the Advaita-Vedānta. Here however, I am afraid, I may incur enraged contradiction from some scholars. Mr. Bhattachārya says for instance "To regard the Yogavāsishtha philosophical stuff as Saṅkara Vedānta in essence is the height of boldness and effrontery unsupported by evidence." Some apology in this connection will not be out of place here. Mr. Bhattachārya emphatically warns us, "The Ṣaiva

1. चोगवा. ३.९६.३२

philosophy of Kashmir - the Trika system - poses as the embodiment of such an advaita view, - ........ and not a little of the philosophical content of the Yogavāsiśtha is coloured with that ideology and presented in similar phraseology." Firstly it must be pointed out, that similar colours of ideologies and phraseologies are often deceptive as far as Indian philosophy is concerned. Not less than twelve essentials can be shown on which all diverse schools of Indian Philosophy are unanimous. Mr. Bhattācārya himself wants to refrain from the loose use of the term by virtue of which any system of Indian thought can be called Vedāntic. If this is true, there is no point in divesting the philosophy of the Yogavāsiśtha from Advaita Vedānta and linking it to Trika ideology. It must be remembered that the Trika ideology is essentially Advaitic and there is not much difference in the Saṅkara school and the Trika school. Scholars

Scholars have sufficiently acknowledged this fact. Prof. Sūryanārāyana Śāstri for instance says, "The dividing line between the Advaita Vedānta and this school of Saivism is, as is well-known, very thin." Now the very Trika system is not much different from Śaṅkara school; and Prof. Bhattācārya himself has shown, that in some particulars the philosophy of the Yogavāśistha differs from Trika and leans towards the side of Śaṅkara. If however, insistence on difference in phraseology and in some other particulars as naming lord as Pati or insisting on Ābhāsavāda and rejecting the word Vivarta - must be justified, I may modify my statement and say, that the philosophy of the Yogavāśistha is mostly similar to that of the Śaṅkara system. By this I do not deny that it is similar to Trika system also. But what are the essentials of the Trika school? I do not think that they are much different from those of the Śaṅkara school.

The Śiva-sūtra opens with the remark:

The individual is essentially the conscious self. It is through ignorance that he does not know himself. Emancipation is thus nothing but destruction of ignorance:

मोक्षत्व नैव किंचिदृ धामास्ति ॥
न चारि गमनमन्वय।
अश्चानन्द्रन्यथिविवा स्वस्वक्त्यमिठ्यवक्ता मोक्ष: ॥

All the sentient and insentient things of creation are projected by illusion:

शास्त्रूपक्ष एव जडचेतनवाया: ॥

All these evolutes are later divided into thirty categories. This indeed is a difference from the

1. शिवादुर्ग १.१

2. Paramarthaśarasara by Abhinavagupta Kārikā 60.

3. प्रत्येकत्वाविविष्णी ३/२/१ Paramārthasāra Kārika 12.13.
the Saṅkara Advaita. Again, says a Trika follower that though really there is no such difference as the cogniser and the cognised, difference comes illusorily through the power of the Lord. This is similar to what Gauḍapada says:

अग्नित्वत्वात्मनात्मानात्मानात्मा देव: स्वमायया।

How far, then, should we rely upon the emphasis on divergence, laid by sectarian writers like that of Pratyabhijñāvivṛti-vimārsini, which Bhattācārya has utilised? Let us not then be reluctant on accepting the philosophy of the Yogavāśistha as the Advaita-Vedānta, for as we shall presently see, all the essentials of that philosophy are found in this work. The latter half of the last section of this work is generally rejected as accretion. What I shall cite will

1. नाण्डुक्षकारिका २१२

will therefore be more from the earlier portions, though it should not be forgotten, that the accretion too does not at all sound discordant to the general note of the work.

As Descartes has pointed out, the "Ergo" must ever be the prominent problem to be investigated into, though it should not be abandoned to the mercy of "Cogito". Thus the Yogavāsistha says:

कोशं कथमं वोषः सालाक्य उपागतः ।
न्यायेनेति परामर्शं विचार इति कथयते ॥

The result of this quest according to the Vāsistha, is that Jīva is essentially Brahman. There is no separate existence of Jīva from the absolute stand-point, for neither a single Jīva or their multi-

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१. योगवासिष्ठ २.१४.५०
एक एवं जीवोऽस्ति राजीनां संस्थ हुतसः।

न जीवोऽस्ति न जीवानां राजस्या सति राधव ।

जीवो बुद्धिः क्रियास्तम्यो यन्त वित्तेयक्यमित्यपि।
स्वतंत्रां प्रकटनां तां नियोजयति वेदान्।
सावः कुञ्जः भवत् येव भवेदृश्यम वोक्षतः।
अबोधः प्रेक्षया यथाति नाश्च न तु प्रवृद्ध्यते॥

एवं ब्रह्मातेज जीवात्मा निर्विष्णां निरर्तः॥

This is nothing different from the famous dictum:

जीवो ब्रह्मातेज नापरः॥

This is again told in other words:

अप्रदुध्जनात्मारो यत्र राधव दृष्टयते॥
तत्र ब्रह्मण उत्तप्नो जीवा इत्युक्तया स्थिता:॥

1. योगवा: उत्पत्ति: १५.१८-२६
2. योगवा: ३.६५.३
The Supreme Reality the Brahman is unborn, indivisible, consciousness, one without the second, the Supreme Self:

शात्मने स्तु नमो महामविष्ठन्नविवात्मने।
मह्म तु विवस्थनताय वह तु त्वम्रं धिवात्मने।
नमो देवादिदेवाय पराय धारायणे॥

स्वात्मन्यस्वस्थमदिवव सिनिकारे
त्यक्तोधरसिवस्यतमिति स्थित एक एव।

आस्तेश नस्तमितो मात्वानजो देवो निरामयः॥

य एव देवः क्रियते नैष द्वरेः वतिष्ठते।
शरीरे संस्यते नित्य चिन्मायामिति विद्वेद।
एव सर्वसिंहिन्द विन्ध्य न विन्ध्य स्थित एवं सर्वं।
विद्यते क्षेष्ठ एवेको न दु विश्वामिश्रित दुः॥

1. योगवांशिन्द उपाध्य 34.112-114
2. योगवा.उत्पति 5.24
3. योगवा.उत्पति 5.4
4. योगवा.उत्पति 7.23
It will appear from this that together with the identity of Jīva and Brahman, that of the world and Brahman is also stated emphatically. This goes against the subjective idealism which we find often compared with the philosophy of the Yogavāsiṣṭha. We shall discuss this point later. For the present we may only mark, that identity of creation with Brahman is pronounced very clearly by the Vāsistha:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{brahmata hina neha jñānendopapade} & \\
\text{sarvaḥ ca satvic ca brahmaṇaḥ ca paramārthāḥ} & \\
\text{brahmaṇāḥ jagnātacarati nābyāstāstāya} & \\
\text{prasānga: kośānu: kā va tā tā paritātāḥ} &
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{yat Sarvaḥ satvic ca brahma tapasaśaḥ ca sthūlam} & \\
\text{stūlam ātmanānntikā ca sthūlam} & \\
\text{prasānga: satvarītī samāvatt tasmā brahmastam evam} &
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{________________________________________________________________________________________}\]

1. Yāgava. Sthānti. 40.29
2. Yāgava. Sthānti. 45.21
3. Yāgava. Uttarānvarṇa. 296.29
Thus the Brahman is the only Absolute Reality that exists. But to us it appears in a two-fold aspect:

\begin{quote}
हे दूरपेत तत्र सत्तावया एकं नानाकृति स्थितम्।
हितोकरे कृपेन तु विमागोर्वं तयोऽः चूँकु।
विशेषं संपरिस्तवज्ज्य सम्मात्रैं यवहेःपकः।
एकौपूं महादूरपं सत्तायांस्तत्तपं चिदः॥ ९
\end{quote}

From the empirical standpoint thus the Śaṁkhya view is also enumerated:

\begin{quote}
मनो उद्धिवरहकारो भूतत्विन गिरयो दिखः।
इति या वास्तव रचनाविक्षत्सत्तवाज्जगतिस्यते॥ २
\end{quote}

In the Utpatti section the 94th canto describes the permutations and combinations of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas in the manifold objects of creation. From the ultimate standpoint however, all this must be considered as illusory.

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1. योगवा.५.९९.६९-१०२
2. योगवा.उत्पत्ति.१४.९२ Cf. उत्पत्ति १२.२२-२६
शाशवेश हि नोद्पनि यस्तवेहारित्तात्र कुतः ।
कुतो मरी जलसिरु द्वितीयेन्वै कुतो ग्रहः ॥
यथा वनोध्यायोते नान्दित यथा नान्दित परो रतमु ।
यथा नान्दित नमोद्धित्वात्र नान्दित जगद्युः ॥

eṣa tā karṣitaḥ svaṁ pratāṭhaṁ śāntaṁ śāntaṁśahcha।
prānītāmātṛakānācam eva viśwānām saḥpapayoḥ ॥
nāmadānāśāyamānānāya śravaṇaṁ pratiśachiḥ ॥
asatas eva pariḥ saṁyogānathā mbhātīyamagad ॥

tasvād prānītāyā kaṁ sthātā ko vī prānītājñātā bhavā ।
sangāṁ nīrabhānānathā vādānā naṁyā naṁyā vichhūmānate ॥

rūpāṁ na naśkaramāṇaṁ satāya na kādana ।
asambhyeṁ saṁyogāṇāṁ tāsāvädeśaṁsthaḥ ॥

1. योगवा. उत्पत्ति ८.४२-४३
2. योगवा. उत्पत्ति २०.३-४
3. योगवा. उत्पत्ति २०.५
4. योगवा. ५.९३,१०२
What is then the relation between Being and Becoming? How does the phenomenon of Becoming come about at all? The only answer possible is, what appears as the manifested form or Becoming, does never in fact manifest, but appears to do so through an inherent power of the Absolute One called Māyā or Prakṛti or Sakti:

महाजीवात्म तदृ श्रृंग सर्बेच्छिन्तमयात्मकम्।
क्लेष्या ह्रजातया ब्राह्मण नियमोऽयं प्रकाशितः॥

1. योगवाद.वैराग्य. १.२.५
2. योगवाद.स्थिरति ४५.२०
3. योगवाद.उत्पति १५.२९-३२
The world cannot thus be either real or unreal.

It is unreal from the absolute standpoint, for it is never created. However, it cannot be rejected as unreal on empirical grounds. So, it is called a mixture of reality and unreality:

अन्यथूपा विद्यान्य तेजस्वात्थोक्तोदे।
तथा श्रृंहन्य विश्वस्म: सत्यसत्यात्मिक चितः॥

1. योगवा.उत्पति. ६६.२८-२९
2. योगवा.स्थिति. ४३.१७-१८
3. योगवा.उत्पति. ६९.२३
Such a view about the relation between the Absolute Brahman and the phenomenal world, naturally brings in different stand-points which are later on called as Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika:

For the realisation of the Absolute - which is identical with liberation - disillusionment through right knowledge is the only way. This is expressed by the famous line "Jñānadeva tu Kaivalyam". We find this concept in the Yogavāsistha:

निर्वाण नाम परमें चुल्ल घेन धुर्जनः।
न जायते न भ्रमते तत्त्वानादेव लग्यते॥

1. योगवास. उपश्ल. १९.४६
2. योगवास. उत्पत्ति. १२२.३५
3. योगवास. उपश्ल. ६२.१०५-१०६
4. योगवास. मुद्रिकावहार १०.२१
For the attainment of this goal, the means employed can be many, resembling those of the Sāmkhya, Yoga, Baudhāyaṇa, Śaivism, Śaktism, etc. It is however important to mark that making allowance for any type of practice or contemplation, the author of the Yoga-vaśisṭha has not left his Vedāntic stand. He is also very particular to employ Śruti texts.

1. योगवा.उत्पति ७.२७-२८
2. योगवा.उपशम ६८.११-१२
If it is a matter of satisfaction to some that Vasiṣṭha has not quoted the scriptures, they will have to remain satisfied only so far as sometimes Vasiṣṭha

1. योगवाल उत्पति ६.५
2. योगवाल उत्पति ६.१०
3. योगवाल उत्पति ६.१८
4. योगवाल स्थिति ४०.३५
5. योगवाल उत्तरनिवार्य २१६.१५
has added a few words like "ﻕﺍ" etc. and utilised theSruti. But the general spirit of Vasiṣṭha to take the Vedic texts as supreme authority will be evident. "Prāmāṇya-buddhir Vedeṣu" is thus quite true about this work. "Sādhanānāṁ anekata" is another principle followed. Worship of Devi, Viṣṇu, and even Tāntric method is included. "Upāsyānāṁ aniyamah" - or freedom for the choice of a deity is a feature that is evident from the acceptance of all these cults.

Inspite of such divergence in the realm of Vyavahāra, what was aimed at was the state of release even in this very life. This is termed later on as Jīvanmukti which is thus described in the text:

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2. Yāga-pātha. śivapātha. 46.9-16
यस्यास्विद्विमत्यास्या निहृत्ता सर्वस्त्रुदुः।
क्रोडीकरोति सर्वं नाविकः तमवास्तवी॥
अहं जगच्छेकिमिव सर्वमिवेत यस्य थोः॥
आस्थानन्द्वः परित्यत्व वस्त्रं स न मण्डति॥
शुद्धिः सर्वसतोन्नभं पदं बुुध्याबलमवः॥
सतायाम्यान्तरे दृश्यम् मा गृहाण किवमः कराः॥
अत्यन्तरतिः स्वस्यः सर्वावस्त्रविविष्टः॥
यथोपवतिष्ठते नीरागो राम कार्यपरेषपि सनु॥
यस्य नेत्रिः न वाः निष्ठा तस्य कर्मिः तिष्ठतः॥
न तस्य विष्फ्फ्फे प्रशोऽपृवमप्रभःवाम्बुः॥

Again:

तत्रस्यं विगतासंगो जीवोक जीवगतां गमः।
वत्वहारिः सवं मा करोदु करोदु वा॥

आत्मारामम महत्म्मम् प्रजावा परम् कवः॥
वाहः पितातः तत्तरः अन्त्मराधूरवाचः॥

आत्मारामत्वा जीवो आत्मसंगतामिह।
आत्मान्त्वभेन स्वगत्वात्मातवित नान्यतः॥
जाग्न्तकैव बुधुःतः जीवो भवति राधव ॥
शस्यं दृश्य संगते इन्त्यानस्तमयीवः॥

1. योगवाच. उक्तम ६९.९
2. योगवाच. उक्तम ७०.५-३२
सुचुपत्रुषिकि: कर्मणि पूर्वेऽवाचार्यः।
कुर्वनन् बद्धं जीवो जीवचन्मुक्तत्वः स्थितः॥

आन्नन्दमयेववानंतः प्रश्रीणसकलागमयः॥
शत्यन्तरस्तगतंत्रमा भवति शो महोदयः॥
तत्रस्यो शः प्रमुखित: परमानन्ददुर्गमितः।
हीलामिवेवं रचनां सदा समनुपमयति॥

प्राच्य स्वां पदवीं पुण्यां चतुं श्रमितं जगतू॥
शैलस्तव्य इवाधेः स्यं हसन्यपश्यति धीरेशीः॥

अनन्नमहानन्दकलातीतस्ततोऽपि धि।
मुक्तं इत्तुष्ट्यं चोगी तुयांतितं परं गतः॥

तुयांतितवचं तज्ज्ञा यथा यान्त्यात्मकोविवा:।
तथापिनिक्षत निर्णीयं परं रघुकृष्णेऽश॥

१. योगवा. उपवस. ७९.६
In this state of Jīvanmukti such difference as the measured and the measurer, the knower and the known, etc. vanish away. What is called as Tripūti in later times is annulled:

From this it is clear that, as long as the illusion of empiric world exists, the difference of measurer and measured, knower and known, etc. must exist. When this difference persists, it is also evident that the knower and the known must exist as separate entities. It is true that the philosophy of the Yogavāśistha and that of Gaudapāda closely resembles that of the Drsti-sārddhānta-muktāvalī. This school is often dubbed as

1. योगवासिष्ठ . उत्पत्ति. ६०.६१

1a. "The similarity of the philosophy of the Yoga-vāśistha to the idealistic philosophy of the Laṅka-vatārā sūtra is so definite and deep......... On Vedānta lines it is very similar to Prakāśānanda's interpretation of the Vedānta in later times, called drsti-srsti-vāda........." p. 234. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II by Dr. Das Gupta.
as idealism which reminds us immediately of European philosophy of that type. I think, sufficient attention is not given to the point, that either the Yoga-
vāsiṣṭha or the doctrine of Drṣṭi-srṣṭi never asserts that cognised objects have no existence independant of the cogniser. According to these texts which strictly adhere to the Advaita Vedānta, objects exist independently of the subject or the ideas of the subjects. Ideas of the subject are not identical with object. In the realm of illusion ideas and objects, both are separate entities, and from absolute viewpoint both are forged by ignorance or avidyā. Let this be clearly understood before we brand this philosophy as idealism. Objects of creation are not the result of psychic phenomena or individual mention. The world may be formed of a stuff with which individual mind is formed, but mind is not a supreme substance. Both these are creations of avidyā, the great illusion. Creation is not said to proceed from individual mind, it proceeds from illusion. Illusion is illustrated by the analogy of rope and serpent. It is possible for an individual to misapprehend a rope for a serpent, but it is certainly not the nature of mind to create illu-
illusion of a serpent, of its own accord. The state-
ments of these texts that world is a mind-stuff must
not therefore be shorn of their associations and handled
separately. Comparisons are all very well, but they
should never be allowed to plead for unproved conclu-
sions.

Several stanzas from the Text are cited above
that the world is illusory in character and many more,
I am aware, can be cited. Many principles of the Ad-
vaita Vedānta given above, are also so frequently re-
peated in the Yogavāsiṣṭha in various manners, that any
exhaustive list of such passages would be entirely be-
yond the scope of this work, of which the discussion
of the Yogavāsiṣṭha forms but a small portion. It will
not be too much to assert confidently, that there is
not a single line in the whole extent of the work that
contradicts the Advaita Vedānta. While reading the
work it has to be remembered that, though the subject
matter of the Yogavāsiṣṭha is philosophy, it is not a
regular treatise on philosophy; and such writing is
likely to cause misunderstanding, that the writer has
made a jumble of too many things, or has even diverged
from the Vedānta. But if understood in the light of
of the aforesaid principles, his being a thorough
Vedāntin will not be doubted, and what sound as diverg-
ences may be found to be only apparent, as remarked
by Śrī Jñāneswara in his glorious work Jñāneswarī, a
lucid commentary on the Lord's song:

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।े श्र्याच्चया मयम्मागीं। नाना अधिकारप्रसंगां।
निरूपण अनेन्स। केलें असे॥
तरी तेवुलेही सिवृश्चान्त। इये शास्त्रां प्रस्थुत।
हे पूर्वांपर नेणत। कोणी जे मानी॥
ते महासिवृश्चान्तचाच आवाका। सिवृश्चान्तकं अनेका।
भिडवृनि बारंबू वेता। संपवोष असे॥

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१. श्री ज्ञानेश्वरी १२५० - १२५२