Gauḍapāda is much studied by Orientalists, and there is no want of independant books, articles or auxiliary writings on him and his work. Though it is evident now, that his may not be the earliest systematic exposition of the Advaita, no other systematic work is available than his Kārikās. His glory, according to some, lies in the reconciliation of the Vedānta and the Śūnya or Vijñāna doctrines of Buddhists, while some say that it lies in retaining definite forms of the Advaita against partially similar theories, by showing crucial points of difference between the Vedāntic and the Buddha theories. Others reject him to be a crypto-Buddhist. The last charge is no longer very cogently asserted by scholars, but doubt still lingers in the mind of many, that Buddhist arguments were utilised by Gauḍapāda, though ultimately he wanted to establish the Vedāntic truth.

What is necessary to settle such problems is not so much the similarity of words. When the mutual

mutual relation of two antagonistic systems is to be settled, it will do well to take into account both the systems in all their aspects. Let us therefore, first have a general idea of the development of Vedānta on the one hand, and that of the Śūnyavāda or the Vijñānavāda on the other. I may not be mistaken here, to deal with chronological development which does not always coincide with the logical development. My statements regarding the development of the Vedānta need not be lent a historical tone.

Prof. Keith has nearly given assent to Prof. Jacobi's opinion, that in some form or other Sāmkhya must have helped the formula of causal origination - the pratītyasamutpāda - so often emphasised by Buddha. For this formula Buddha may be said to be indebted to Ārada on the evidence of Asvaghosa. Prof. Keith's remark is quite true that, there is certainly no difficulty in deriving Buddhism from the earlier doctrines of the Upaniṣads." It need not be dis-

disputed that the Sāṅkhya theory is responsible for introducing first, a clear division of spirit and matter. The Upaniṣadic emphasis on the Absolute as the only reality, is certainly a development on the Sāṅkhya, by laying a stress on the spirit element, and relegating matter to the domain of ignorance. An opposite way of thinking would be to lay stress on matter as the substratum, from which evolutes would proceed, what is known as spirit being one such evolute. The Vedānta is emphatic in asserting the reality of the Supreme Self. Materialism would hold quite an opposite view. There are many shades of thought in Buddhism, but it can be said without fear of contradiction, that no school amongst the Buddhhas has cared to lay emphasis on the Supreme ConsciousSelf as the Absolute Reality.

By the Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya position is taken into account first. But it does not stop at spirit and the matter as the ultimate analysis. It searched out a common ground of both of these, and it was called Brahman, the Supreme Self, Consciousness Absolute. All explanations of the material world have this truth as its background. Gauḍapāda as a
a Vedāntin seems to have followed the same procedure, while enunciating his famous doctrine of Ajāti.

Gauḍapāda is a writer of "a matter of fact tame work" as Prof. Karmarkar puts it, the Sāṅkhya-kārikā-bhāṣya. According to him Gauḍapāda appears to have been attracted by the Sāṅkhya-kārikās in the beginning, "from which he learnt of the Puruṣa being entirely different from the Prakṛti, which alone was responsible for the evolved world." Later he was influenced by the Mādhyamika doctrine, which taught the unreality of the world, and this enabled Gauḍapāda to preach his Ajātivāda based upon the Upaniṣadic doctrine, the oneness of Brahman. There is also another probability in this case. As a Vedāntin, Gauḍapāḍa perfectly understood the utility of the Sāṅkhya doctrine in the study of the Vedānta philosophy, and used the Sāṅkhya-kārikās as the first rung

1. Introduction to Gaudapāda-kārikā Ed. by Prof. R. D. Karmarkar, B.Ô.Ô. Institute, Poona, 1953.

2. Ibid, Introduction, p. X.
rung of the philosophical ladder, himself he was constructing. Vācaspati Miśra, the famous writer of Bhāmatī, whose glory is elevated by styling it as a separate Bhāmatī-prasthāna, was a staunch follower of the Advaita-Vedānta, as preached by Śaṅkarācārya. But he has written standard works on many other Indian systems of philosophy such as Nyāya and Śaṅkhyā. Such graduation of different philosophic schools, however antagonistic in other ways, is not unknown to India; and hence it appears probable that Gauḍapāda may have written his commentary on the Śaṅkhyā treatise for the use of his students. As for the unreality of the world, Gauḍapāda is likely to have derived inspiration from the Mādhyamika thought, but Mādhyamika thought itself is indebted, as is the opinion of scholars, to Upaniṣadic ideology. Again, Gauḍapāda's unreality of the world stands in the light of the reality of the Absolute Brahman, the one without second, while the unreality preached by Mādhyamikas has no such background. Gauḍapāda's treatment of the Ajātivāda is, as written by Prof. Karmarkar based upon the cardinal doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the oneness of Brahman, and hence his Ajātivāda stands
stands different from the unreality asserted by the Madhyamikas. If then we are to concede to any doctrinal influence of the Buddhas on Gauḍapāda, it cannot be of much consequence. The final Reality or the Uttama Satya according to Gaudapāda was the Brahman, while Buddhist doctrines, whatever their peculiarity must ultimately lead to the propogation of ultimate void.

But what can be the object of Gauḍapāda in writing the Kārikās? Gauḍapāda was certainly expounding a Vedic doctrine, and like all Vedāntins he was a practical philosopher. The Vaitathya prakaraṇa of his Kārikās enlightens us to some extent on this point. Even if the oneness of the Absolute Brahman is proved, the human quest is not at rest. One question still remains to be answered, and unless human intelligence seeks out an answer to it, it is still somewhere midway on its journey. This fact must be taken into account while deciding influences and borrowals. Just as all the followers of Buddha, no matter whatever their differences, are unanimous on two important points viz. the pratītyasamutpāda and
and Trsnäsanti, so also, all the conflicting schools of the Vedânta agree on the decision, that final emancipation is possible only through right knowledge, whatever their interpretations of that knowledge. According to all the schools of the Baudhânas, cessation of all desires, no matter how or by what means it is accomplished, is the only way to Nirvâna. The Vedânta is explicit in asserting that, right knowledge is the only way to final emancipation. Now, what is this right knowledge? In answer to this question Gauḍapâda begins with the exposition of the Sâńkhya-kârikâs and ends with his chapter known as "Quenching the fire-brand".

Gauḍapâda does this quite in conformity with the practice of old Vedântic tradition, found in the Upaniṣads and even in the Nâsadiya Sûkta. It need not be repeated here, that according to the Vedânta, all the activities of man and the evolution of his intelligence must ultimately end in the realisation of the oneness of the individual self with the Supreme Self, and in order to realise this, the intelligence of man must be advanced enough to con-
conceive the idea of the separateness of his own self from his physical existence, which is wholly phenomenal. What one calls the individual self, though enmeshed by one's gross and subtle phenomenal existence, is in fact a mere knower of it, has nothing practically to do with that existence except cognising it, and therefore, it is possible for it to realise its own identity with the cogniser of the whole universe. This is the first step of man towards the Vedānta. It was Kapila who first recognised this division of the knowledge of man into the knower and the known, and asserted first the neutrality of the knower. Though there is a great difference between the Vedāntic adaptation of this doctrine and the doctrine itself, the Vedānta has already accepted it with some reservation. When an individual is sufficiently advanced to grasp this relation between the knower and the known, he is said to have developed the wisdom's eye-Jñānacaksu - as the Gītā says. This is why Gauḍapāda did not in-

1. Bhagavadgītā, XIII, 34.
include the Sāṅkhya in his Kārikās. He preferred
to write a separate commentary on the Sāṅkhya-kārikās,
and after preparing his students with its help for
the understanding of the Vedāntic doctrine, he wrote
the first chapter of his kārikās, which he begins
with the meaningful and auspicious "Om", and calls
it as Āgama-prakarana. That is why the beginning of
his Kārikās is so different from that of the Māṇḍukya
itself. The Māṇḍukya begins with the idea of the
identity of the individual self with the universal
one. The Kārikās begin with description of the indi-
vidual self as something abiding in the phenomenal
body, and yet quite apart from it, and with its
position as a mere knower.

In the treatment by Gauḍapāda of the words
and the ideas, there seems to be a method. It should
also be remembered, that Āgama is a particular Tantric
term. Though in common parlence the words Āgama and
Nigama, are generally taken to mean the same thing,
they have technical interpretations in the Tantra-
Śāstra. That Gauḍapāda wrote also Tantric treatises
is known from his commentaries on the Śrī-vidyā-
ratna-sūtra, etc. and this does not seem to be a
a mere conjecture, as in the lineage of Tāntric teachers almost all the famous Ācāryas of the Advaita-Vedānta including Gauḍapāda, Govinda and Śaṅkara are mentioned. According to the Tantra, Āgama literally means the science of evolution. Nigama therefore should mean the science of evolution.

Stripped of its anthropomorphism, the statement means the science of the evolution of the cosmos. For a long time the word might have been restricted to the Tāntric lore, after which it came to be used loosely in a generic sense.

The Śabdakalpadruma adds further:

1. This lineage will appear in the account of Śaṅkara Śācārya.

2. श्रेष्ठकल्पद्रुम, प्रथम: काण्डः, कलिकाता राज्यायां
लक ११०८
Many topics are thus included in the scope of Āgama, one of them being meditation.

The Sāṅkhya teaches man to know that the knower and the phenomenal world, of which he supposes his personality to be only a minute part, are two different entities. The Vedas take a further step and teach him, that, to realise his own identity or oneness with the cosmic self is the highest goal. But further deliberation shows him that it is not so. One must transcend even this universal consciousness. The identity or oneness of the individual self with the cosmic one, is the subject-matter of the first chapter of the Kārikās. That being the sum and substance of the Karma and Upāsana part of the Vedas, Gauḍapāda styles his first chapter as Āgamaprakaraṇa. In some colophons, we have Āgamaśāstra, Oṃkāranirṇaya or Oṃkāropāsanā, as Prof. Karmarkar has pointed out. All these terms, practically mean the same thing.

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There is much dispute about Gaudapāda's authorship of the Kārikās, about the priority of the Kārikās to the Māndūkya, about the inter-relationship of the four prakaraṇas of the Kārikās, etc.etc. Dr. Mahādevan and Prof. Karmarkar have proved to the hilt that Prof. Bhattācārya's conjectures on these points cannot be accepted. What however should be remembered is, what Gaudapāda has written can scarcely approach the name commentary, nor does the commentator Śaṅkara-whosoever he may be - think so. In the opening remark of the commentary he says:

बेवान्तार्थसारसङ्ग्रहपूर्तिमि प्रकरणचुङ्कत्वमोमित्या-धाराम्यः।


2. About the commentary on the Kārikās Mr. Majumdar says, "We can, therefore, safely absolve Śaṅkara of having written the almost foolish commentary on the Kārikās, specially on the fourth chapter, the Alātasāntipракaraṇa." p. 13. "The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Vol.IX, Part I. This indeed is an unkind cut! In my opinion the commentary has its own merit, sometimes, very helpful in understanding the impliction of the Kārikās. At least, it is not "foolish".
(1) Om is Akṣara.
   Akṣara is all this.
   Om is all this.

(2) = Brahman is Akṣara.
   Akṣara is Om.
   Brahman is Om.

(3) Om is Brahman.
   Brahman is Ātman.
   Ātman is Om.

(4) Om is all this.
   Ātman is Om.
   Ātman is all this.

The identity of Om with the Akṣara Brahma is the subject-matter of the Māṇḍūkya. By penetrating deep into one's own consciousness or by meditating upon Om, an aspirant will attain the same result.

After taking an adept to the stage of Upāsanā with the help of the Upaniṣad text, Gaudapāda lifts him still higher in the second chapter of his Kārikās, by proving to him the necessity of going beyond it, and by impressing on him the emptiness of all the Śādhanās within the realm of Vyavahāra. The words "Upāsanāśrito dharmah" at the beginning of the third chapter and "sanirvāṇam akathyam sukhamuttamam" in the forty-seventh verse of the same chapter are very eloquent. An adept has not only to realise the oneness of his individual soul with the cosmic soul, but he has also to realise that himself he is Dharmī - as distinguished from Dharma - on whom all the changing Dharmas are somehow super-imposed. Just as a man, who in dream, fancies to have slept under a tree, and dreamt that he was saved from being devoured by a tiger, on account of his being awakened by a friend, is still dreaming a dream, so the self who has taken himself to Upāsanā is labouring under wrong impressions. By Upāsanā, he will not reach the final stage, and hence he is called Kṛpaṇa. Jīva is essentially Dharmī, but he has not recognised himself as such, and hence Gaudapāda uses the word Dharma. Dharmī is one on whom the ideas of
of origination, becoming and destruction are imposed. Patañjali defines Dharmi thus:

श्वान्तोन्विताभ्यपनेवथर्मानुपाती धर्मिः ।

Bhoja in his commentary on his Sūtra rightly explains Dharma as energy in motion:

नियतकारणार्थतारूपयोग्यताः वच्छिन्ना शक्तिर्वेह धर्मशब्देनामिधीयते ।

Dharmi or the Self is thus beyond all superimpositions and must realise himself as such. This subject naturally involves many philosophic questions, such as what is the real nature of this outside world etc. Gauḍapāda has referred to the answers given to such questions by other schools. It must be noted that

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७ योगसूत्र २.१४.
that such allusions to other philosophies have come only by way of purvapaksa. It is not also unnatural, that there should be striking similarities between these conflicting ideologies. The similarities in such cases do not necessarily mean borrowals or adaptations, nor are they of any importance for deducing historical truths. Differences, and not likenesses, are really important in this case. These conflicting creeds had already reached a stage, where differences become too subtle for ordinary men to distinguish and present a spectacle of similarity. Children born of the same parents naturally must possess many similar qualities, but they are distinguished by their peculiar differences. After discussing the validity of all rival theories, Gaudapada has offered his own solution in the form of Ajativada.

1. "Of the non-Vedic works, the Lankavatara and the Mulamadhyamakakarikas have undoubtedly influenced a good deal. He seems to have thoroughly mastered the Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, but mainly for the purpose of showing where his doctrine of non-origination differed from that of the Buddhists." "Gaudapada-karikas" by Prof. R.D.Karmarkar, B.O.R. Institute, Poona, 1953, Introduction, p. XLVII.

Cf. "It is also true that the Yogacara philosophy and the Madhyamika too with some additions and alterations can be turned to Advaita. But these

Continued on next page.
In enunciating his doctrine, Gaudapāda has
has employed many ideas and terms, and scholars have
been at pains to show their similarities with Bud-
dhist terminology. Even if it is accepted that
Gaudapāda pressed into service Buddhist terminology,
there is no harm; the commentator Śaṅkara has already
said that the view of Vijnānavāda is cited:

“प्रश्नते स्विन्यामित्वम् मित्रेष्वतो विश्वानवाविनो बौद्धवस्य
वचनं बाष्पार्थवादिप्रतिप्रतिपरसमानाणामुमोक्तिम्।”

There is also another side to this problem. We see
that many similar terms can be found in Brāhmaṇic
sources also, and Prof. Karmarkar has already shown
many such similarities. He has also said that many

Footnote from previous page.
these modifications and alterations are so important that
they change fundamentally, both the outlook and the
method of Buddhist philosophy." - Proceedings and
Transactions of the Tenth All India Oriental Conference
1940, p. 263. Article by Dr. P.T. Raju styled, "The Bud-
dhistic and the Advaita view points."

Cf. also Dr. Mahadevan's remark, - Gaudapāda's purpose
in so doing is not to commend Buddhism to his follow-
ers, but to establish the conclusions of Vedānta
as indisputable truths." Gaudapāda a study in early
Advaita, p.212 by Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan University of
Madras, 1952.

1. Cf. Prof. Karmarkar's introduction, pp. XLI to
XLVI.
many more such similarities can be shown. I may give a few more which would strengthen the belief that the terminology used by Buddhas might have been a common property of philosophers of various schools in those times. The following stanza of the Mokṣa-dharma gives us the Asparśayoga:

न युगःपति न चाप्रांति न रस्त्वति न पश्वति।
न च स्वप्नेऽविज्ञानाति न सङ्कल्पयते मनः॥

This is the sixteenth stanza of a chapter of the Mokṣadharma. After a detailed description of this state, which is the same as that of a Sthitaprajña, the 24th and 25th stanzas say:

विश्वस्ते वितस्ती निलेखो विंगसंति।
योग एष हि योगानां मनः योगस्य लघुम्॥

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1. शान्ति, मोक्षयर्थ २५४.१६
2. मोक्षयर्थ: शान्ति २५४.२४-२५
From this the word Asparyayoga can easily be formed. In the 32nd stanza of chapter 284, Parāśara's advice is given that natural inclinations of an ordinary man are towards Sparśayoga:

इष्टायतात्मार्थे हि स्पर्शयोगे रति: स्पर्शात।
रसने दर्शने ध्राणे श्रवणे च विशांपते॥

This also can directly suggest the word Asparśayoga. That the idea of this Yoga is found in the Bhaga-vadgītā is shown already by Prof. Karmarkar. The word Sanghāṭa also seems to be much used:

संघात्वव्य-पर्यंति: परस्यपरसमाधितः।
चित्तमित्रयसंघात्तपरं तस्मात्तपरं मनः।

1. Prof. Bhattacharya has discussed this word at a great length, finally accepting the rendering deducible from Asaṅga's citation. Asaṅga is removed from Buddha by seven or eight centuries. The word Sparśa used by Asaṅga is in the sense of experience as Prof. Bhattachāryya would have. Buddha himself would understand it as sense-contact. Cf. Mahānidāna Sutta 19. The Gītā, the Mahābhārata and Gaudapāda are one on the point, while there seems to be divergence amongst Buddhist interpretations. Cf. Agama Sūtra of Gaudapāda, pp. 96-99.

1a Prof. Karmarkar’s introduction, p. xxxviii.

2. ज्ञात्ति:मोक्षम् २८७.१६
3. मोक्षम्:ज्ञात्ति २६६.१६
The following will show the usage of Saṅghāta and Skandha:

अठयंकर-विषयः । अशेतनः सत्यसंघात्युक्तः Generated by Nut

संक्षेपः सत्यसंघात्युक्तः । २

We trace the idea of Nirvāṇa thus:

चुएन तेन संन्यासः संस्कृतेः ध्यानकर्मणि । गच्छन्ति योगिनो भृव निर्वाण तन्निर्मयम् ॥

But this final beatitude has essentially a positive character, though sometimes we find it described in negative terms as the sublation of Ātman:

परमदेवविच्छेदः तत्त्वेषविश्वेः पुनः ।
अमृताचवामूलं प्राप्तः कीर्तिमूलो निरात्मवान् ॥
ब्रह्मसुवतः स निर्धेिः इति शान्तो निरामयः ॥

1. Mahābhārata कुम्भकोणमुः, श्वेतमेधः, अ.५०.१२
2. गहःपारुः कुम्भकोणमुः, श्वेतमेधः, अ.५०.१६
3. मोबधर्म शान्ति १८८.२२
4. मोबधर्म शान्ति १९२.१२१-१२२ Cf. २४२.१०-११
This sublation is certainly of an individual cogniser.

In his work Gaudapāda states the condition of a yati thus:

निःस्वतिनिर्मस्कारो निःस्वथाकार एव च।
चाचाचाचार्यनिर्बिङ्गच्छिन्नचो मवेदू॥

This is an echo of many utterances of the Mahā-
-bhārata:

निःस्वतिनिर्मस्कारः परित्यज्य शुचार्यमेः ॥
अरण्ये विचारकास्ते चेन्केन्निन्दास्तिः ॥

निर्भेद्यान निर्मस्कार निराभिध्यान 'वन अुधा: ॥
विमुक्ता: सर्वपापेन्यथरवन्ति अच्छो: मला: ॥

निर्भेद्यानो निर्मस्कारो निस्वथाकार एव च ॥
अच्छो: चाचार्यनिर्बिङ्गच्छिन्नचो मवेदू॥

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1. Gaudaṇḍakumāra 2.36
2. Māṇḍavini 234.9
3. Māṇḍavini 261.2
4. Śravavītikā 86.42
The same is repeated in chapter 50 stanza 10 and also chapter 49.

The use of the word Dharma as Jīva is suspected in the Kaṭhopaniṣad, and Dharmaskandha is used in the Chāndogya.

Regarding the word Dvipadāṃ varam, some are inclined to think that the salutation is to Buddha. The word Sambuddha appearing closely in association with this term has perhaps invited such a conclusion. The main objection here which scholars know well, is the emphatic statement of Gauḍapāda, "Naitadbuddhena Bhāsitam." It is rather sad to find a prodigy like Keith unkindly accusing Gauḍapāda of ingratitude, "Gauḍapāda in fact borrows without wishing to admit his debt in full," though he accepts the right of

1. कठोपनिषद् ४.१४
2. चान्दोग्य २.२३.१
5."Buddhist Philosophy"- By A.B.Keith, p. 263.
of Gauḍapāda for such a borrowal! While dealing with a similar occasion in the Laṅkāvatāra he says, "Nothing but a mere suchness or thuness (tathatā), or voidness without origination or essence, to which also the style is given of womb or source of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha). We are, however, expressly warned by the Laṅkāvatāra against the heresy of deeming that this conception is parallel to the Brahman or absolute of the Vedanta." If there is no suspicion here, about the fact that the Laṅkāvatāra is just making its position clear, why should Gauḍapāda's honesty be doubted? I think, we should not attribute ugly motives to such a high philosopher as Gauḍapāda, in view of the fact which Keith himself has no hesitation to mention, "The Mahāyāna in its turn had doubtless drawn from the stream of Apaniṣada tradition in its conception of the final reality of the world." This Apaniṣada tradition is maintained in the Mahābhārata as I have pointed out already.

1. P. 248 "Buddhist Philosophy" by A.B. Keith.
2. P. 263 "Buddhist Philosophy" by A.B. Keith.
Some ideas that Gauḍapāda might have picked up from this great Epic are given above. The word Buddha, Buddhais, Sambuddhah etc. are also not foreign to Aupaniṣadā tradition. The following will make this clear:

\[\text{अवृद्धसेवनांश्च च जुदयं चित्तवी चिन्द्रासभाम} \text{यथा}।
\]
\[\text{पहुँचिष्टे राजसारौ तत्ते जुद्धवस्त्ववर्जिते}।
\]
\[\text{न केर तरवास्ताति मिस्वस्त्वत्वेष जुदिदमान।}
\]
\[\text{पृष्ट सुंचित तरवे हि विज्ञ पृष्टवास्तवम}।
\]

None can reasonably say that Buddha here means Siddhārtha Gautama, the Sākya prince. From chapter

\[1. \text{शान्तिपर्व मोख. २९३.१०}
\]
\[2. \text{शान्तिपर्व मोख. २९६.११}
\]
\[3. \text{महाभारत शान्ति. मोख. २९६.१५}
\]
chapter 312 to 322 of the Mokṣadharma of the Mahā-bhārata published by the Bhandarkar Institute a lucid account of Śuka's attainment of liberation is given. Nārada tells Śuka a practice to be followed by those, desirous of Mukti:

शद्वर्णसंस्पर्शस्त्रासंभाषणं सुवा।
यथा मूले: सह मुने स श्रेयो विचलते परम्॥

I am inclined to think that when Gauḍapāda wrote the stanza:

शानेनाकालक्षणेन धर्मान्यो गणोपमानृ।
शेयामिन्नेन संवृद्धस्तं वने द्विपवां वर्म॥

he had the description of Śuka before him. The description runs thus:

\[\text{1. शान्ति. महाभरम. ३१६.१६}\
\[\text{2. Gauḍapāda-कारिका IV.1}\\

Such descriptions are not wanting elsewhere also. Pañcasikha relates to Vyāsa, how liberated souls behave:

श्रेयोपमाकाशमहिंमेवमास्त्याय पर्यंति महेः हरसक्ता:

To Śuka, Vyāsa gives the account of a Vimukta almost in the same words:

विशुद्धं सर्वं गोप्यो युनिमाकाशवत्सलम्।
शस्यमेकरं शांतं तं देवा ब्रह्मणं विदु: ||

1. स्वान्ति. मोक्षम् २२०.२-३
2. स्वान्ति. मोक्षम् २१२.४६ This line occurs in the Naradiya Purāṇa and is cited in the Chapter on Purāṇas.
3. स्वान्ति. मोक्षम् २३७.२२
Desirous of reaching such a state Śuka is said to have practised Yoga - which can easily be styled Asparśayoga - and was successful as described above. After this account, comes a dialogue between Nārāyaṇa and Nārada; and Bhīṣma while concluding this dialogue says "Nārada the Supreme amongst men was told thus by Nārāyaṇa:

ś एवमुक्तस्मि द्विपदव वरिष्टो
नारायणेनलोकलोकयात
जगद वाक्यं द्विपदं वरिष्टं
नारायण लोकहिताधिवासम् ॥

It is quite likely, that, with this verse before him, Gauḍapāda was inspired to extend the same title to his own Guru. Prof. Karmarkar has dealt with this point at length, and shown that Prof. Bhattācārya has not succeeded in proving, that by Dvipadām vara we must understand Buddha. He has

1a "Dvipadām vara" in Gaudapāda Karika by Prof. R. D. Karmarkar, pp. 166-173, A.B.O.R.Institute, Vol. XXXII.
Cf.also Intro. to Gaudapāda-Kārikā, p.xxv.
has also suggested that Gaudapāda has saluted his
direct teacher, who is said to be Śuka. A glance
at some of the foregoing pages will reveal, that
his suggestion has full support of traditional inform-
ation regarding Śuka, especially the one furnished
by Mahābhārata, which is not contaminated by fabulous
descriptions.

Dr. Mahadevan and Prof. Karmarkar have answered
almost all objections against the genuineness of
Gaudapāda’s system. Mr. Jnānendralal Majumdar has
followed, though independently, the lines of Prof.
Bhattacharya, and has tried to vindicate the same
position. For evidence he has called in the Lāṅka-
vatāra. He has discussed the philosophy of Gauḍa-
pada in four articles appearing in the numbers of
the Journal of Gaṅganāth Jha Research Institute. In
the last article he has shown how the commentator
Śaṅkara misunderstood Gaudapāda’s purpose. He has
given twelve points as wrong interpretations of
Śaṅkara the commentator. Almost all the points raised
raised by him are advanced by Prof. Bhattāchāryya and answered by Dr. Mahadevan and Prof. Karmarkar. Most of the points raised by Mr. Majumdar rest on the contention, that unlike Gauḍapāda, his commentator did not understand the importance of Mahāyāna. The favourite word Agrayāna is shown as being dubiously interpreted due to the ignorance of Mahāyāna. Prof. Karmarkar has shown rightly that the use of words Heya, Jñeya, Āpya and Pākya leaves little doubt that Gauḍapāda here referred to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. It is not necessary to deal with all the arguments of Mr. Majumdar. A few considerations however should not miss our attention. Mr. Majumdar says, "...... it is certain also that Saṅkara was not acquainted with the other form of Śūnyavāda in the realm of the developing Buddhist philosophy which spoke of a positive aspect of Śūnya......"

1. Gauḍapāda Kārikā by Prof. R. D. Karmarkar, p.142. The word Agrayāna might have been coined by Gauḍapāda after Devayana, Pitryāṇa, etc.

This is not a new argument. Even Nāgārjuna had to plead that Śūnya is not a void. But as long as the whole system leads finally to nothing else, a repeated assertion of the positive aspect of Śūnya is meaningless. It must be told without any ambiguity, what exactly is to be posited, as the Vedāntins have done. Howsoever positive, no Buddhist school has told any such thing. On the contrary, even today contend, after quoting Nāgārjuna, "..... it is the absence of any permanent, unchanging self-nature that makes religious progress possible." We are not concerned with the veracity of this statement. Enough it is to remember, that, whether positive or negative, Buddhist philosophical treatment has always this thing to prove. It has been told already, that whatever its creed, no Buddhist system of philosophy has done away with the idea of Pratītyasamutpāda. Even the Laṅkāvatāra, which Mr. Majumdar has brought in comparison with

1. A mote on Anatta by Sramaner Sangharaksita Vedānta Kesari May, 1950, p. 27.
with Gaudapāda's work, has warned that preaching of Pratītyasamutpāda by Buddha should not be confused with a similar doctrine of the Jainas, who advocate creation owing to some cause; for according to Buddha causal origination means the ephemeral nature, both of the cogniser and the cognised. Buddha says that Pratītyasamutpāda would lead to regressus-ad-infinitum only in case of those who would stick to the cogniser or the cognised.

Again it is told:


This cycle of causal origination is motioned by Tṛṣṇā as the mother and ignorance as the father.

But the whole cycle is ephemeral, that nothing is permanent, is not perceived by unwise people.

Whatever the description of Nirvāṇa, this line of argument destroys for good, the cogniser as well as the cognised, without marking any permanent factor in these. It is for this reason that the declaration comes:

1. p. 323. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra ibid. सगाधक्रम ५६.२
2. p. 359. Ibid. सगाधक्रम ७६.२
3. लोकातीतत्व २०
Gaudapāda’s stand is altogether different. An Immortal Unoriginated Reality is the principle that he wants to establish:

अजातो हंसुतो वर्णो भर्तर्थां कथमेष्यति ।
सदृष्टानेन हर्षं सर्वभुव्यैवस्तं नास्ति वै ॥

Whatever is immortal, can never become mortal.

All is unborn, for it is existent. There can indeed be no destruction. This Reality is thus of the nature of Absolute Existence. It is also always conscious:

अजगनिनिधमस्वच्छम् ।

This Reality is termed as the self, the Ātman.

All differences are forged by the self through His own power.

1. Gaudapādakārikā 4.20
2. Gaudapādakārikā 4.57
   Cf. 4.38 न च मूतायम्मुन्मत्स्य संवृष्टिः कथण ।
3. Gaudapādakārikā 4.96
Gaudapada is thus nowhere ambiguous in asserting the existence of the fundamental Reality. Mr. Majumdar has discussed error or Viparyaya and compared the views of Gaudapada and the Lanka vatara. He gives the teaching of the Buddha thus, "From the attachment to name and form arises the seeing of name and form. This seeing of name and form where there is the pure Mind or Vijñana only is the Viparyaya (also called Viparyasa) or error which constitutes the world. Mind itself has no cognisance of name and form, and hence it is free from error; in fact there can be no darkness in light itself."

Happily Mr. Majumdar has stated clearly the Baudhaka H view. The statement, "...seeing of name and form where there is the pure Mind or Vijñana" means

1. Gaudapadakarika 2.12

(a) that mind and Vijñāna are identical, (b) and where there is this pure mind or Vijñāna, people see name and form; and this is Viparyaya. Baudhā Viparyaya thus has mind or Vijñāna as the base on which name and form are seen. What is the nature of this mind? Mr. Majumdar tells us, "the mind itself has no cognisance of name and form..... in fact there can be no darkness in light itself." Thus mind is light itself, and name and form are darkness. Mr. Majumdar then goes on, "This teaching of the Buddha is contained in verses 27, 31, and 41." Verse 27 runs thus:

निमित्ते न सदा विचित्रं संस्तुपत्यत्वः कः प्रः।
शनिमित्तो विपयाः कण्ठ तत्स्त्व मविश्वति॥

Prof. Karmarkar translates the stanza as follows:

1. These are the verses in the Alātasānti Prakaraṇa of the Gaudapāda Kārikā.
"Ever in the three paths (of time), the mind for all time does not contact the cause; how would there be its causeless false impression (or, modification)?" Svāmī Nikhilānanda translates the same:

"The mind does not enter into causal relation in any of the three periods of time. How can the mind be ever subject to delusion, as there is no cause for any such delusion?" Mr. Majumdar would say that this stanza of Gaudapāda vindicates Bauddha position. Is it so? Does Gaudapāda accept that name and form are seen in the place of mind which is of the nature of light? In the very next stanza Gaudapāda clears up:

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तुद्वयं न जायते ।
तत्स्य पश्यन्ति वे जातं से वै पश्यन्ति ते पवम् ॥

1. Gaudapāda Kārikā, p. 38
God the Self, the omniscient is never contaminated by the categories. The distinction between the position of the Gauḍapāda and that of the Baudhāyas can be very clear from Dr. Mahādevan’s illuminating remark, "The central theme of Gauḍapāda’s philosophy is that nothing is ever born, not because "nothing" is the ultimate truth, as in Śūnyavāda, but because the Self is the only reality". If this difference persists, it is difficult to subscribe to the view propounded by Mr. Majumdar, "..... the days were different when Gauḍapāda lived probably in the 3rd or 4th century A.D. within about two centuries from the time of Nāgārjuna. Then certainly the Mahāyāna was a power in the land, and great teachers were not ashamed to call themselves followers of the Buddha and Vedāntists at the same time....." As a philosopher, Gauḍapāda was courageous enough to accept and follow, not tacitly but openly, the Baudhāya ideology.

1. Gauḍapāda, a study in early Advaita, p. 128.
if he had so desired. He did not do so, because his doctrine was fundamentally different from that of the Baudhas. This doctrinal difference between the Vedānta and Buddhism was acutely realised even in the 3rd or the 4th century A.D. as will appear from the early Purāṇas. We need not deny Buddhist philosophy as powerful, but the Vedānta did never compromise with that power by leaving its own grounds.

Gauḍapāda's acceptance of the Buddhist ideology either partial or full - cannot thus be accepted. An attempt is implied in the remarks of some scholars, to show a difference between Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda. "It seems to me likely that Śaṅkara was brought up in the Bhedābheda tradition and that he later turned away from it under the influence of a much more phenomenalistic school that is now represented only by the Gauḍapāda-kārikās. But Śaṅkara never went so far in the direction of phenomenalism as Gauḍapāda." 1 Dr. Radhākrṣṇan too speaks of the divergence of Śaṅkara from Gauḍapāda in the following words. "Both Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara strongly urge that,

there is a genuine difference between dream impressions and waking ones, and that the latter are not independant of existing objects. Gauḍapāda however, links the two, waking and dreaming experiences together.' These objections have come, just because Gauḍapāda has compared waking state with dream. Let us see how far the comparison goes, and that will decide the matter.

Gauḍapāda starts with the assertion: All entities in dream are declared to be unreal. Why? Because they have a location within; they are enclosed. From the opening stanza of the second chapter to the eleventh stanza Gauḍapāda proves the unreality of objects even in waking state. In what respect are the objects in dream similar to those in waking state? Gauḍapāda gives the answer:


The point of similarity is Ādyantavattva which is the significance of Saṃvṛtatva. Like dream objects, objects in waking state have a beginning and an end. Before origination the object did not exist; after destruction also it will not exist, so in the present state too it should really be non-existent. If Saṃvṛtatva is taken to mean the condition of being enclosed by the limits of a beginning and an end, there is no harm even if we accept Prof. Bhattācharya's reading "Saṃvṛtatvam na bhidyate", which may mean that the state of having limits of a beginning and an end does not differ in waking as well as in dream state. In any case the comparison is here restricted to the point of Ādyantavattva.

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1. Gauḍapāda Kārikā II.6
2. Gauḍapāda Kārikā II.7
3. The Āgama Sāstra of Gauḍapāda II.4 p. 17.
The difference in dream and waking state is clearly meant in I.3-4 and IV.87. If this differentiation is understood, I think, no divergence of views can be marked between Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda.

Much has been written upto now on Gauḍapāda, and there is hardly anything more that needs be said here. With the help of Dr. Mahādevan and Prof. Karmarkar, I may state in brief some points of the philosophy of Gauḍapāda.

Gauḍapāda's speciality is his emphasis on non-origination - the Ajātivāda. This being his central theme, he reiterates it in his work in various ways, directing all his logic to that conclusion. The conclusion he puts thus:

न किस्मज्ञाते जीवः संयोगस्त्य न विष्यते ।
एतत्ततस्मं सत्यं प्रत्य किंचिन् जायते ॥

The highest reality which is called here the Uttama Satya, is elsewhere called Paramārtha:

ब्रह्मेत परमार्थो हि

Advaita is the only Reality. It is of the nature of Existence:

सब्यावेत श्रेणे सर्वम्

A corollary of this statement is, that there is no duality, nothing destructible or non-eternal. All the distinctions of knower and known, subject and object are the result of Māyā of the Lord. Philosophical scrutiny shows that they are not real.

1. Gaudapāda Kārikā III.18
2. Gaudapāda Kārikā IV.57.
The arguments given by Gaudapada for his assertion of Advaita are, that Existant thing can never become non-existent, immortal can never become subject to mortality:

स्वपाणेनामृतो यस्य मायो गण्न्ति मत्त्वताम्।
हृत्वपाणेनामृतस्वस्तम्य कथं स्वास्थ्यति निर्द्वहः॥

If any one believes that immortal really becomes mortal, how can his immortal remain changeless and retain his immortality? In fact such a belief cannot bear scrutiny even for a moment. The becoming of a Being is intelligible only through Mayā.

सतो श्री मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तर्यतः॥

This position of Gaudapada must always be borne in mind, to guard ourselves from being led astray.

1. Gaudapada Kārikā III.22, IV.8

2. Gaudapada Kārikā III.27.
led into a different interpretation. Existence is essentially the nature of the Supreme Reality, for even appearance is impossible on a non-existent thing.

असतो मायया जन्म तर्भतो नैव उज्यते। वन्यापुष्पो न तर्भेन माययं चापि जायते॥

In any of the schools of the Baudhānas, there is no such emphatic statement. From this Existence then proceed appearances, not merely in dream and waking state, but even in the heavens. Vibrations are created in mind by Māyā, and then come distinctions of cogniser and the cognised, mind and matter, etc. Prof. Bhattāchārīya says, that IV.72 and IV.47-52 describe all external things as “the creation of mind”. Gaṇḍapāda uses the words “Citta Spandita”


2. Gaṇḍapāda Kārikā II.8.

and "Vijñānaspadita" which give the sense of vibration and not of creation. Gaudapāda has stated that this vibration comes through Māyā. Gaudapada's statements that external objects are not apart from mind, if not looked in this light, are apt to be misunderstood. On the authority of these statements, Prof. Bhattāchāryya assures us, clearly this is the Vijñānavāda idealism before us." Let us elaborate this point a little.

The vibration in mind is created by Māyā, says Gaudapāda. Transformation in mind comes through Vāsanā according to the Laṅkāvatāra as pointed out by Prof. Bhattāchāryya. Vāsanā is compared with that of Māyā by Prof. Bhattāchāryya with the aid of "The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa", a work published

1. Gaudapāda Kārikā IV.72 and IV.47.
2. Gaudapāda Kārikā III.29
published from Leningrad. Let us however mark that the word "Vāsanaih" in the stanza, is used in plural in the Laṅkāvatāra. To create vibration in mind manifold Vāsañās must exist before mind. If this is granted, then the creation of duality through mind cannot be a Baudhā doctrine. The use of Vāsañā in plural clearly indicates that it is not pūrva jñāna. The Laṅkāvatāra here has the implication of desires. Baudhās ascribe the origination of spanda to Vāsanā, while Gauḍapāda ascribes it to Māyā, the former to desire, and the latter to wrong knowledge. Can we then speak about the philosophy of Gauḍapāda as the "the Vijñānavāda idealism before us". Then, mind finally must become non-mind according to Gauḍapāda, while no such statement about Vijñāna can be made. When mind goes to the state of non-mind, it is realised that the cogniser and the cognised are both Brahman.

This is what Gauḍapāda has to drive at. From this,

1. These points of difference are not taken into account by Dr. Paul Hacker when he says, "Die Lehre, dass es Kein Werden gebe, ist bis zu den verwendeten Termine identisch mit der des buddhistischen Laṅkāvatāra sūtra etc., etc. Vivarta von Dr. Paul Hacker. Jahrgang 1953. Nr. 5. pp. 207-208.

2. Gauḍapāda Kārikā III. 33.
it will be clear that as long as cognisanship remains, object is different from the idea of the cogniser. The difference comes through Māyā of the Lord.

Individual soul or Jīva too has no existence apart from the Supreme Reality:

\[1/\]

गटाविवृत्ति प्रलीनेषु गटाकाशाध्यो यथा।
आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते तद्भज्जीवा इहात्मनि ॥

In the same chapter Gauḍapāda elaborates the same point by many illustrations. Ātman is indeed not contaminated by pleasures and pains, though, he appears to be affected by these. Essentially He is Paramātman.

I am, therefore, inclined to believe that there is no difference between the doctrine of Ājativāda of Gauḍapāda and Māyavāda of Śaṅkara. According to both the whole illusion starts, as soon as the Absolute

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\[1/\] Gaudapāda Karika III.4
Absolute Consciousness is transmitted into limitations. Gauḍapāda says that such a phenomena is logically impossible. Śaṅkara picks up this thread, and makes the opening of his famous commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra. This will be more clarified when put in a syllogistic form thus:

1. Whatever is not, can never become whatever is, can never perish

2. The immortal cannot become mortal nor can the mortal ever become immortal

3. It is never possible for the unreal to be born of the real

1. Bhagavadgītā II.16
1. That which is beyond negation is Sat
   What is Nitya is beyond negation

   Nitya is Sat

2. Nitya is Sat
   The knowledge of buddha is Nitya
   The knowledge of buddha is Sat.

3. All anitya is asat.
   Dharma is anitya.
   Dharma is asat.

4. The knowledge of buddha is Sat.
   Asmat-pratyaya is the knowledge of Buddha.
   Asmat-pratyaya is Sat.

5. Dharma is asat.
   Yasmat-pratyaya is Dharma.
   Yasmat-pratyaya is asat.

6. Mutual negatives are opposites
   The knowledge of buddha and Dharma are
   mutual negatives

   Kramate na hi buddhasya ānānam dharmeṣu tāyinah.

   The knowledge of buddha and Dharma are opposites.

7. Mixture of opposites is illusory.

Sat and asat are opposites.

The mixture of sat and asat is illusory.

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१. ब्रह्मचुत्र शांकरमाध्य १.२.१