CHAPTER IV
Sūtra literature is a speciality of India. But it is of two kinds. Certain sūtras need exegesis, while some others like the Dharma-sūtras, etc. are very clear. The work under consideration belongs to the former class. The antiquity of such literature should go back to the period of Brāhmanas, where we have a mention of sūtras, their commentaries and glosses.¹

About a sūtra, it is said that it contains the last number of words required to express the point; it is unambiguous, pithy and omnifaceted; i.e. embracing all possible implications.² Now if a sūtra is Viśvatomukha i.e. embracing all and every possible meaning, it is difficult to understand, how it can be asandigdha i.e. free from ambiguity. This precisely is the difficulty of a common man in inter-

1. सूत्राणि व्याख्यानां-व्यवहार्याख्यानानां। च ॥ ४.३.२
   ॥ ४.५.११

2. अहं ब्रम्हात्मांविवर्णं सारवदू विश्वतोमूलम्। अहं अवमनवमं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विवु। ॥
interpreting the sūtras. Prof. Ghaṭe has elab-

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orately given the reasons, why it is difficult to

understand the meaning intended by Bāḍarāyāṇa in

his sūtras. He has compared the interpretations

of different Bhāṣyakāraṇas in his book. Dr. Modi has,

however, tried to fix the true rendering of the

sūtras, by studying the sūtras themselves, and by

referring again and again to the Upaniṣads and the

Gītā "to see whether the result of such an inten-
sive study....... agrees with the doctrines of these

Prasthānas." The method followed by other scholers

would simply answer the question as to which of

the Ācāryas represents even approximately correctly,
the view of the Sūtrakāra. This method, however,
is faulty, because it would not be possible to

compare the view of the Ācāryas with that of the


1. "The Vedanta" by V. S. Ghaṭe,

the Śūtrakāra unless we know the view of the Śūtrakāra himself. Dr. Modi has shown, that in the sūtras themselves we can find certain clues that help an independent interpretation of the sūtras.

Before we deal with the interpretation of the sūtras themselves, let us remember that, what we have under consideration is a sūtra work. Why should the Śūtrakāra choose such a way of writing is a question that need not delay us much. As scholars have accepted, these sūtras are the attempts to codify and reconcile the several existing opinions on different topics, expressed in different authoritative texts. When an author therefore, thinks sūtra as a suitable style, for writing out his work, it will not be wrong to suppose that, his intention is not so much to propagate, a new philosophy but to reconcile the apparently conflicting views. The author of the Vedānta-sūtras was thus

thus a reconciler of several texts regarding philosophy. This is quite clear from the Catussūtrī, where Bādarāyaṇa declares, that Brahmajijnāsā should be carried on by fixing our attention on the agreement of scriptural statements. Looked in this light, the opinion that Sūtrakāra rejected certain views in some Upaniṣads on the strength of views in some other Upaniṣads does not appear to be convincing. Certain other assumptions of Dr. Modi too need our attention, for they have a bearing on the interpretation of the sūtras and grouping them into different adhikaraṇas. Dr. Modi says, "Sūtrakāra takes the authority for - the knowledge of Brahman only the Vedāntas, i.e. the Upaniṣads, and not the Sāṃhitā, the Brāhmaṇa, the Āranyaka and the Khila.

1. तद्भ समवसासोऽन्त महामहो | व.स. १.१.४

He does not consider the attributes of Brahman mentioned in these non-Upaniṣadic śrutiṣ as worthy of discussion in his Brahma-sūtras......" This statement cannot be accepted, for we can trace in some places references to Brāhmaṇas and Samhitā. In Sūtras I.2.20 Kāṇva and Mādhyandina Satapatha is referred to; in III.3.19, 23, 24, 25 Tāndi and Paingi is referred to etc. In I.1.30 the famous Vāmadeva legend is taken into account. When the Upaniṣads themselves do not seem to preclude Samhitā texts, there is no reason for the sūtras to leave them out. We need not hold that the Sūtrakāra was prejudiced against the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas. We have seen already that there is no enmity in the literature of Karmakānda and that of Brahma-kānda.

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2. The Kāṭhaka Samhitā is referred to in III.4.31 and the Satapatha is referred in III.3.55-56. Almost all commentators agree that these sūtras imply Brāhmaṇas and the Kāṭhaka Samhitā.
Such a tendency to disqualify the literature of Karmakāṇḍa in the consideration of the Vedānta, will not be advisable for understanding the real import of the Vedānta, particularly of the Sūtras. It can never be forgotten that the Vedānta is after all Mīmāṃsa and the Vedānta Sūtras are the Sūtras of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsa. That deliberations on problems, ritualistic as well as philosophical, were called Mīmāṃsa from very old times will be evident from the following :-

रेतं हेव बहु🏙च नहर्द्व्येष्ये मीमांसन्त हत्यगावत्वर्यवर्त
रेतं महार्थते शन्योगा एतमस्यामेत विशेषेत्यं वायासेत्माकाश
एतमबुद्धेत्मरोषथथविद्भुवें वनस्यतिश्वेतं चन्मस्त्येतं नर्कनेप्येतं
सबेच्छे पूर्वेत्मेव ब्रह्मेत्या चहे। १३

1. "..... it may be suggested that as the two systems of Mīmāṃsa and Vedānta, generally known as Purva-Mīmāṃsa and Uttara-Mīmāṃsa, are not quite distinct from each other, rather they represent separately the two aspects of one and the same goal.....the teacher of the Uttara school also may have been the teacher of the Purva.”, p. 6 Critical Bibliography of Mīmāṃsa by Dr. Umesh Mishra in “Purva Mīmāṃsa, by Dr. Ganganath Jha Benares Hindu University, 1942.

१३. पैदृयशारणवक ३.२.३ Anandāsrama Ed. Poona 1898.
सायणावार्थमाध्यनेतमू।
Sāyaṇa explains Mīmāṃsānte as Vicārayanti dhyāyantītyarthah. Thus the tendency to categorize any scriptural deliberation whether ritualistic or philosophical is styled as Mīmāṃsā, and it is also clear, that both these systems of Mīmāṃsā developed side by side. One must therefore hesitate to accept Prof. Keith's suggestion about the earlier development of the ritualistic Mīmāṃsā in the following remark, "While, of course, it is not impossible that the redaction of the two Sūtras was contemporaneous, despite the earlier development of the Mīmāṃsā, the probability surely lies in favour of the view that the Mīmāṃsā sūtra was redacted first and served as a model for other schools." It is again to be noted that according to some scholars the antiquity of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras too can go as back as that of the Mīmāṃsā.


2. A History of Indian Philosophy by Dr. Das Gupta, Vol. I, pp. 303-305.
I may be pardoned for emphasising this point; but Mīmāṁsā whether pūrva or uttara has Śruti as its basis, and hence the general principles applied for grasping the significance of Śrutis were very probably the same. It is for this reason perhaps, that commentators like Rāmānuja took the Śutras on the two Mīmāṁsās as one work. 1 Śankara has directed polemics against the superstition, that these two Mīmāṁsās should be held as interdependent; and as the theme of these two is different, Śaṅkara's contention seems to be correct. But the way in which he has made an approach to the Śutras of Bādarāyana is quite similar to that of the Mīmāṁsakas and that perhaps has brought wonderful similarity between his commentary on the first Śutra of the Vedānta, and the opening of the Śabara's Bhāṣya.

1. संहितमेतिच्छारीरकं पोढलकण्यी - - - | रामानुज श्रीभाष्य -

Cf. "It may be that the two Mīmāṁsas belong to one work." Indian Philosophy by Dr. Radhakrṣnan Vol.II p. 434.

2. शाबरमाण्य: ...... वर्ष: प्रसिद्धो वा स्वाच्छप्रसिद्धो वा।
स शेत्प्रसिद्धो न शासितव: शवप्रसिद्धो नतरामू।
सोऽयमविचार्य प्रकर्तमान: कंचिदेवोपावदानो विहन्येतानायं
चर्चितृ।

(note continued)
Bādarāyana has mentioned the opinion of many other Ācāryas in his Sūtras. It is found that many of them are Mīmāṃsakas also. It is also probable that some of these Ācāryas were Advaitins.

The name of Bāḍārī occurs in the Sūtras, and we can guess his opinion on some points. From the Advaitic point of view the most important conclusion of Bāḍārī is, that when attainment of Brahman, or going to Brahman is spoken of, it must be Kārya Brahman, and not the attributeless Brahman, about which any such statement cannot be made.

Kāraṇājini is also an important Ācārya, but his opinion is alluded only in connection with re-birth. May be, his opinions were the same as that of Bāḍārī.

Last Page Foot-note No.2...Contd.

शांकरामाण्यः- ...... तत्त्वज्ञानीय प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्वातः।
यदि प्रसिद्धं न ज्ञस्तितंसिद्धम्। बधाप्रसिद्धं नैव स्वकं
ज्ञस्तितंसिद्धम्। -- - तत्त्वाविश्वाय यत्किंचित्मप्रतिपधयमानो
नि:शेषसात्मातिःशेषानां वेयतानां वेयताः।

1. See:- "Critical Bibliography of Mīmāṃsā" by Dr.Umesh Mishra in "Pūrva Mīmāṃsā" by Dr.Ganganath Jha, pp.1-11.
Bādarāyana, Jaimini, Bāḍārī, Kāraṇājini, Kāṣakṛtsna are all Mīmāṃsakas.
2. Bhū. १.२.३०, २१.११, ४.२.६, ४.४.१०
Atreyā is an Ācārya mentioned but only in connection with a ritualistic problem. From the Mahābhārata however we gather that he was an advocate of Nirguṇa Brahman.

satkṛtaḥ tathāḥ: kṣiṃyate yā brahma nīryajnam।
upakṣet veda rājān gato lokāntarman

Atreyā might therefore be an Advaitavādin.

Andulomi is thrice referred to in the Sūtras. He is said to be Bhadābhedaavādin. But as we have seen, this term is ambiguous. Moreover, when we see that in liberated state Jīva is, according to him, identical with Brahman, it follows that their difference in empirical stage is not essential. I am inclined to believe that he too was an Advaitin.

1. व.० १२.४४
2. महाभारत अभ्यासनर्व १२६.२
   Identity of Atreyas महाभारत and सूत्र
3. व.० १२.२१/१२.४.४५/४.४.६
Jaimini was also a great Vedāntin, and on the authority of Naiṣkarmya-Siddhi Dr. Belwalkar has shown that the extent of his Sūtra work on Vedanta formed the original of the present Bādarāyaṇa-Sūtras. He is referred to a dozen times by Bādarāyaṇa. May be, he was an Advaitin, but we cannot be sure on that point.

Kaśākṛṣṭsa's view seems to be much favourable to Advaita. Non-modified Brahman is really the essential nature of Jīva, according to him. Jīva cannot be said to be the product of the Supreme Brahman. It is eternal consciousness, which cannot either be born or destroyed. The difference according to Kaśākṛṣṭsa seems to be illusory. Śankara says says about him:

काश्कृत्स्ताचार्यस्याविविधः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्ये इति मतम्। तत्र काश्कृत्स्तायेव मतं श्रव्यसारीति गम्यते प्रति-पिपाद्यिष्ठायायाः सारात् “तत्त्वमसि” त्याविद्वृत्तिध्यः। ॥

1. Sonderdruck aus der Garbe-Festgabe 1927, pp. 163-170
2. ब्रह्मसूत्र शांकरभाष्य १.४.२२.
We may discuss in brief about the date of Kāśakṛtsna. Dr. Mahādevan says, "We have no means of determining either the date of Kāśakṛtsna or any detail regarding his writings." What follows is therefore a tentative suggestion that would help thinking about the chronology of Bādarāyana also.

The first thing to be noted in this connection is, that Kāśakṛtsna is nowhere mentioned by Pāṇini, in his Aṣṭādhyāyī. This is no doubt a negative evidence, but it has some value, because in the Gaṇapātha we have twice the mention of Kāśakṛtsna. Pāṇini's authorship of the Gaṇapātha is doubted by scholars, though it may be said that some frame-work of that type might be his. But both these lists Vardhamāna suggests a reading Kāśakṛtsna, while the list of Upakāḍīgāna decidedly gives the reading

1. Gaudapāda, a study in early Advaita, p. 225.
2. See ऊपकाहिन्योऽयतस्यायमवन्द्ये and उप-छुपूकठिकिल्ले—

etc. pp. 715 and 719 Siddhānta Kaumudi with Tattva-bodhini, Nirṇayasāgara, 1915.
reading Kāśakṛtsna. We may tentatively note that Kāśakṛtsna was known to Pāṇini and might have been his contemporary. Patañjali knows the Mīmāṃsā of Kāśakṛtsni, and scholars have identified Kāśakṛtsna with him. There is however no reason to do so.

In all these three places we have a similar explanation as below:

काशकृत्स्ना प्रोक्ता मीमांसा काशकृत्स्नी, काशकृत्स्नीमधीते काशकृत्स्ना ब्राह्मणीति।

When we have a feminine word Kāśakṛtsnā we can easily have the masculine Kāśakṛtsnah, meaning one who studies the Mīmāṃsā of Kāśakṛtsni. Bādarāyana mentions distinctly Kāśakṛtsna as:

अवविस्तितेरितिकाशकृत्स्न:।

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1. पात-जल महामाधव ४.१०.१५/४.१२.१५/४.२.१५६
    सम्पादक: गुप्तसावप्रसादस्वामी।
1a. Vedānta Philosophy by Dr. Belvalkar, p. 140.

2. ब्रह्मसूत्र १.४.२२
It may then be supposed that Kāśakṛtsna might be an immediate follower of Kāśakṛtsni and hence perhaps a contemporary of Patañjali. Bādarāyana can therefore be a later contemporary of Patañjali the grammarian.

Two objections regarding this conjecture may be considered here. We have in the Bhagavadgītā the mention of Brahma-sūtra. It is remarkable that Śaṅkara the commentator does not take the word to mean the work of Bādarāyana. As Prof. Karmarkar has shown, the Gītā cannot refer to the work of Bādarāyana. It is probable, as he has suggested, that it refers to some earlier Vedānta-sūtras, which must have discussed the question of Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña. There is also another probability in this case. In some traditional schools where Advaita Vedānta is taught in old fashion, it is told that "Brahmavidāpnoti param" is a sūtra, and what appears further in the

the same text till Brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā, is
its explanation which describes the world as proceeding from him. Hence it cannot be a non-entity; and
this is the argument in:

असन्नेव स मवति असदृ ब्रह्मेति बेव बेतु।
अस्ति ब्रह्मेति बेदू बेव सन्तमें ततो विदु: - - ।

Sāṅkara's commentary on this also suggests the same view:

सर्व एव वस्तुत्योऽही ब्रह्मविवाधस्ते परमिति ब्राह्मणः
वाक्येन सुन्ति: - - - । पुनःस्तंब्रव विस्तरणार्थविशेषः
कर्त्तव्य इत्यद्वर्त्तमस्त्रिवेदिस्त्यानां श्रद्धाय शार्म्यते तस्माबः
परस्मार्थिति: ॥

1. तैत्तिकः उप. २.६.
2. प. 286 इशाविवाधोपनिषद: सांकेर-
बाणाध्यातः। काणां वाष्पोविलाससंस्कृतप्रस्तकालयतः
प्रकाशितातुः।
Another opinion is that Pāṇini has referred to the Bhikṣu-sūtras of one Pārāśarya, and these are the Vedānta-sūtras. Now in Sutras IV.3.110 and 111 Pāṇini speaks of Bhikṣusūtras of Pārāśarya and Karmanda. This Pārāśarya need not be identified with Bādarāyaṇa. In his illustrations book on Sanskrit grammar, Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka tells us, that in Sanskrit literature a tendency is often marked, to indicate the same individual by adding terminations that suggest his gotra or immediate succession to his ancestor. But this tendency is not universally applied, when we see two distinct persons mentioned as Bādarāyaṇa and Pārāśarya. The Sāmavidhanabrāhmaṇa gives us the following tradition:

1. “संस्कृत व्याकरण में गोत्र तथा युव प्रत्ययान्त्र नामों के एकही व्यक्तिके निर्देश करने की बहुत प्रायः प्रदी जाती है।” संस्कृत व्याकरणकाश्त्र का इतिहास पृ. 80.
It is thus clear that there were many Vyāsas, and Pārasārya Vyāsa preceded Bādarāyaṇa Vyāsa. It is better to hold then, that Pāṇini mentions Pārasārya himself. Now Bhikṣusūtras are sometimes said to be the Sāṅkhya-Sūtras for there were many Ācāryas in Sāṅkhya tradition like Kapila and Āsuri who were called Bhikṣus. We have already seen in the discussion of the Mahābhārata, that Sāṅkhya of the Mahābhārata closely resembled the Advaita Vedānta. Āsuri a famous Sāṅkhya-ācārya is said to have attained Brahman, which is one. It must be remembered in

1. Sāmavidhānabrahmana by A.C. Burnell
London 1873, P.101.
2. The Taṭṭtirīya Āranyaka mentions Pārasārya Vyāsa’s view in I.9.2
in this connection, that the Tantric Guruparamparā of Śaṅkara gives Kapila as the founder of Śaṅkara School of Tantric Upāsanā. This paramparā will be given later. Here it is enough to remember that Śāṅkhyā of Mahābhārata sometimes signified even the Advaita. About Pañcasikha it is said:

पाराशर्यांगोहोस्य बुद्धस्वाय युमहात्मनः।
भिषोऽपविनोस्यास्ति शिष्यः परमसंमतः॥

About it is also said:

तत्र पञ्चशिलो नाम कापिलेयो महामूनि:॥
- - - - - - - - - - - -
सुपर्यवसितार्थ्येव निर्देशने नष्टसंशयः॥

Non-duality or Nirdvandvata was thus the aim of this Śāṅkhaśārya. Is it likely that some Sūtra work of Pañcasikha was referred to by Pāṇini? Perhaps a work of some pseudo-Śāṅkhyāśārya was before Pāṇini. We learn from Pandit Udayavīra Sāstrī

2. महासरोक्षेत्र चारुतिप्रव २९२:६-११
about some such work of Pañcaśikha. Yet we cannot be sure who this Ācārya was.

From all this, I am inclined to believe that the final redaction of the Vedānta-Sūtras was effected by Bādarāyaṇa sometime when Patañjali - the grammarian - flourished. We need not dwell here on the chronology of Patañjali. It may be doubted that the mention of Buddhist Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda, which are mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa, could not have developed then. But we need not suppose that Bādarāyaṇa had Vijñānavādins or Śūnyavādins in his mind when he wrote those Sūtras. The ideology of Čārvāka or Lokāyata School which preaches the destructibility of everything, had perhaps developed a similar line of argumentation; and Bādarāyaṇa has most probably referred to them.

Before we proceed to the philosophy of the Sūtras, we should then remember primarily that the

1. सांस्कृतिक विविधता का इतिहास।
   विश्वसंस्कृति वैदिक संस्थान पृ. ४६५-४६२।
the Sūtras are the texts of Uśāra Mīmāṃsā. Like other schools of philosophy Mīmāṃsā is not studied with the help of Uddesa, Laksana and Parikṣā alone. But the peculiarity of Mīmāṃsā is that, it propagates its theme by means of Adhikaraṇas. Secondly, as it is a work reconciling Sruti texts, particularly the Upaniṣads, it should convey the general purport of the Upaniṣads.

The first Sūtra indicates desire for the right knowledge of Brahman, as a result of which

1. तदेव प्रथमाचेत एलक्ष्टाशेषांच लक्षणयुक्तवा तत्त्वरीत्वा वर्तनिष्ठ्ये — — — — — — — — — — व्यायामार्थिकात्त्वयं तत्परीति का, वाच्यप्रितिमिष्ठ

2. यथा न्यायाशास्त्रं गौतमीं उदेशलक्षणपरिष्ठामिः स्वविषयं प्रतिपाद्यति तथा मीमांसाशास्त्रमिः श्वयकरणद्वारा स्वविषयं प्रतिपाद्यति। उपवृधातः, मीमांसाविशेषमुपका न्यायाद्वयोद्धार्थनमुपका मान्यविद्यार्थमुपका सम्पादितमू। 1948
Prajñapāṭhasālā Mandala Grantha Mālā.

3. ब्रह्मसूत्र ४.४.२२
which one is said to attain the state of Anayrtti, or non-return, which must imply changelessness. Such a statement must transcend all changeability.
This is clear from the indication that an individual goes beyond the Karyabrahman. Again, liberated condition is after all a state, and we need not judge it from outward forms. But it must be remembered that liberation is not restricted to Karyabrahman. The Brahma-Sutras never mention eternal forms of Brahman which may be termed as Nityavibhutis. A jiva attains changeless state and goes to the changeless Brahman. This means essential identity of the individual with the Supreme Self. The world is also non-different from Brahman the eternal. For a Jiva to lose all Avrttis, the knowledge of Brahman is essential. Knowledge of Brahman results into the non-return of an indi-

1. Brahma Sutra 4.3.10

2. Brahma Sutra 3.4.72
individual into the world. Brahman is changeless and Its knowledge also should be changeless. When the worldly consciousness is thus changed to eternal knowledge, the world is nothing but Brahman; it loses its existence as the world full of duality which implies change. In essence then there is nothing but Brahman, the Eternal, by the attainment of which all phenomenal creations lose their phenomenal character and are one with the Supreme. That seems to be the purpose, in general, of the existant Šūtras, which we learn from the opening and the concluding Šūtras, the Upakrama and Upasamhāra. This also seems to be the message of the Upanisads, which the Šūtras want to reconcile.

Continued on next page.
That some eminent thinkers before Bādarāyaṇa thought on Advaitic lines, will be evident from reference to the opinion of such Ācāryas. We may now proceed to think of the philosophy of the sūtras themselves, though such an attempt can hardly be expected to be final. The nature of the sūtras — as it always is — is vague and obscure, and the subject matter of this thesis does not allow to centre our attention on this work only.

About Brahman, the final reality, the Sūtrakāra has said something in the beginning of his work and something in the second pada of the third Adhyāya. It is remarkable that in the sūtra the word used is Yataḥ and not Yena, giving thereby the sense, Brahman is that from which creation proceeds etc. Further on in the same chapter it is told that this Brahman, the primal ground from which worldly activities proceed, is not an

1. जन्मावस्तु यतः । १/१/२ व्र.ःृ

2. इदंते नास्तिक्षवम् । १/१/५
an insentient principle. The attributes denoting
the sentiency of this principle used not be taken
to be figurative, for the use of the word Ātman
precludes such a figurative meaning. It may
be doubted that the term Ātman also is used figu-
ratively to denote prāna or manas, etc. This doubt
is removed by pointing out, that Śruti texts de-
clare liberation of him who is devoted to it.
The following can be gathered from these asser-
tions of Sūtrakāra. Though he accepts the dis-
tinction of the conscious and the unconscious as
stated by the Saṅkhya, he wants to point out
that the conscious principle alone is responsible
as the primal ground of creation. That primal
ground is the Supreme Self, devoted to whom in-
dividuals are said to attain final release. In
the following Sūtras it is explicitly told that
the terms fire, lustre or ether occurring in Śruti

1. गौणक्षेननात्मशब्दवातः। बृह. १०९.६

2. तन्मिन्निष्ठाय मूषोपदेशवातः। १०९६
sentences, point to the Brahman and not to the elements in themselves. What are thus evolutes of the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti essentially point to Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra. It is then clear that the author of the sūtras believes in the Supreme Self as primal existence. This appears to be the general drift of the sūtras occurring here. The ultimate meaning of the terms generally taken to mean the evolutes and the conscious percipient, must be Brahman, the meeting ground of both that are differentiated as conscious and unconscious. The emphasis here is on consciousness being the essential ingredient of the primal Being - the Brahman, and it is made clear by pointing out that it is called the Self. Prof. Šarmā here significantly remarks that Sūtrakāra does not want to support Brahmāparināma-māvāda for, "If the Universe with everything in it were the modification of Brahman, there is no point in the restriction of texts to Brahman and the elimination of Vaiśvānara, Ākāśa, etc. from the sphere of inquiry. Prof.

Prof. Šarmā seems to have hit the mark by pointing out, that, when creatorship is denied to Vaisvāna Ākāsa etc. the Sūtrakāra has no intention to support Pariṇāma-māvāda. But the intention of the Sūtrakāra should be understood when he strives to show, that what is spoken of as Ākāsa or Jyoti is Brahman. As Prof. Šarmā has shown, Ākāsa etc. cannot be the evolutes of Brahman. Thus if the creation proceeds from Brahman, it is either because Brahman is the efficient cause - the nimitta kāraṇa - producing worldly evolutes from some insentient matter or because what seems as creation is really something else. Sūtrakāra has surely

1. यद्यप्यस्पष्टमित्यद्यप्यासीति न हि तत्त्र प्रसिद्धे सिन्धहितेन्द्रसिद्धुपि सख्योतिति \[1\] प्रसिद्धुप्रत्ययमयः सर्वत्र। यद्यप्यस्पष्टमित्यद्यप्यासीति न हि तत्त्र प्रसिद्धुप्रत्ययमयः सर्वत्र। यद्यप्यस्पष्टमित्यद्यप्यासीति न हि तत्त्र प्रसिद्धुप्रत्ययमयः सर्वत्र। यद्यप्यस्पष्टमित्यद्यप्यासीति न हि तत्त्र प्रसिद्धुप्रत्ययमयः सर्वत्र। यद्यप्यस्पष्टमित्यद्यप्यासीति न हि तत्त्र प्रसिद्धुप्रत्ययमयः सर्वत्र।

by Krisnasāstri, Kumbhaghonam 1926
1 surely "taken the trouble of refuting the Sāṅkhyas" but the refutation intends to show, that the primal ground intends to show is conscious, and that conscious principle pervades even such things that appear to be unconscious; rather the unconscious elements are in reality the conscious principle. If this is true, - and we find support in the ॐ Sūtras to believe it to be true - we need not think that Sūtrakāra believed in the reality of creation. ²

It is significant to note in this connection that Brahman is designated by the word Para, either masculine or neuter. This clearly denotes transcendency of the Supreme Reality. The word Para occurs seven times in the Sūtra texts. Twice it is used with "atah". Even here commentators have


ॐ. तच्चनन्त्वमारम्मणशब्दादिभ्यः | व.०. २.०.१४


ॐ. व०. २.२.११ and ४.३.१०
have tried to interpret it as Brahman; but Śaṅkara’s rendering seems to be more plausible. In other Sūtras like III.2.5, III.2.11, II.3.41, II.3.46, and IV.3.12 the word clearly denotes Supreme Reality. We gather something about the view of Śūtras in what is known as the Ubhayaliṅgādhikaraṇa. Dr. Modi has attempted an ingenious rendering of these Sūtras, and it needs examination which may be helpful in understanding the viewpoint of the Sūtras. The Sūtra runs:

न स्यानतोपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि।


2. पूर्णप्ररतवर्षनम्, मधवमाध्यसहितम् pp. 76, 110.

Pt. Jivananda Vidyasagar Ed. 1873, Calcutta. For reference I have chosen the Bhāsyas of Śaṅkara, Ramanuja and Madhva, which means the consideration of Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Vallabha also. I agree with the following remarks of Svami Cidghananda: तथा च मास्कर: संकरस्य वाणुगामी, निन्त्वार्कः रामानुजस्य वाणुगामी, वल्लभः यथा हि मधवस्य श्रृंगामी, न तथा अपरं परस्येति सिद्धविषयं। "भृद्धांत्रत्मक्ष्य-निर्णयः" श्रीविष्णुवान्नदुपुरीविचित्रितः। श्रीरामकृष्णसेवाश्रम काशी १९४२, ३. ब्रह्म सूत्र ३.२.११
In his foreward to Dr. Modi's book Dr. Das Gupta says, "According to Dr. Modi's interpretation the Sūtra runs as follows :- parasya ubhayalingam na sthānatah api sarvatra hi, i.e. the characteristic description of Brahman as rupyat and arupavat is not in accordance with the mental states of the para but everywhere .......") Dr. Modi's translation of the sutra is thus :

"The two kinds of sentences cannot refer to (the Highest One) also from the standpoint of the states, because (both the kinds of sentences refer to It) in all (the states)". What Dr. Modi wishes to emphasise seems to be that the two-fold attribute of Brahman is applicable to It, not only from the standpoint of states like waking, dream, etc. but always.

1. Foreward to A Critique of the Brahmasutra, p. 4 Bhāvanagar.
Now in the Sūtra the word "api" seems to be important. The interpretation depends upon how the word is rendered. Dr. Modi seems to take "api" with "sarvatra" which would give the sense that the twofold attribute is applicable, not in the three states but in all the states. The most natural sense "api" gives is "even" and not "but"; and this sense fits in when "api" is joined with "sthānatah" The natural order of the Sūtra also has put the word in its right place. Thus the meaning is "not due to place even, twofold attribute of Brahman." the force of "api" seems to imply, that even due to states twofold characteristic of Parabrahman cannot be real; much less can we say that originally It is so. This is corroborated by a Sūtra in the sequel:

अरूपवेव हि तत्प्रकृतिनत्वात् ॥

1. The word Parasya also should not be lost sight of. When the transcendent Brahman is under consideration, there is no point in restricting it only to three states like Jāgrat, Svapna, etc.

2. ब्र.सू. ३.२.१४
"Indeed it is only formless, on account of that being principal." Dr. Modi renders this sutra:

"(Both kind of sentences refer to the Highest One) because it is formless only in so far as that is the principal (aspect of Brahman)". The word "in so far as" do not at all seem to be implied here. Omitting these words, Dr. Modi's rendering too would support Sāṅkara's interpretation. Another Sūtra:

आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

also supports the same view. The word Tanmātra points to tatpradhānatvāt in one of the preceding Sūtras. The secondary aspect of Brahman is then explained with the analogy of the reflection of Sun:

अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकाविवत् ।

Almost all the commentators have given similar meaning of the word Sūryaka. Dr. Modi however points

1. व.स. ३.२.१६ । २. व.स. ३.२.१८
3. Cf. रामाद्वजः - अत एव जलदर्पणाचिदप्रतिविद्वत सूर्याचिवते
     वेगत्यसत्मान तत्सत्त्वावस्थितो निवासवने ।
     मद्यावः - वहव: सूर्यकाववत् सूर्यस्थ्य सहृष्टि जले।
points out that here the affix "Ka" is added to Sūrya and then the word Sūryaka means "a number of Suns". This seems to be quite a gratuitous supposition. The rendering "Sūryāṇam Samūhaḥ" of the word Sūryaka is highly improbable. It is undisputed, that in older literature, grammatical rules were not strictly observed. In such an old work like Hari-vamśa also, the meaning of the word is "resembling the Sun" as Monier Williams gives it. If we turn to grammar, we find only that meaning for the word which is given by Saṅkara and other commentators. The Sūtra of Pāṇini is:

इवे प्रतिकृतासि। ३

The affix "Kan" is added to a word when an object, either resembling the one denoted by the word, or its counterpart - reflection - image, etc. are to be conveyed. Thus "Sūryaka" should mean an object resembling the sun", "The image of the sun" etc. Affixes added to denote "Samūha" are to be

3. पाणिनि ५.३.९६
be found in Panini Sutras from 4.2.37 to 4.2.51. None of these can help us in forming the word Suryaka to mean "Suryanam Samuhah". If at all such a word is to be formed, it would be something like "Saura" or at the most "Sauraka" by adding "Ka" in the sense of "Swartha". I am thus inclined to strike to Sankara's interpretation here.

Dr. Modi has suggested that the word Sthana here means Jagrat, Svapna etc.; and he has carried the same meaning in Sutra 3.2.34. If this Sutra is taken to read:

\[ स्थानबिशेषां श्रवणादिविन् \]

1. Prof. Ghaté says that Sankara's introduction of the word "va" in interpreting the Sutras 3.2.15 and 20 is not needed. (p. 124. The Vedanta by V. S. Ghate B.O.R.I. Poona 1926) But the emphasis on the formless aspect of Brahman and the analogy of Sun's reflection would support the introduction of "iva".
the word Śthāna would be better interpreted in accordance with Śāṅkara.

The next Adhikaraṇa too has a discussion of Brahman and its relation with the individual soul. This Adhikaraṇa begins with the Sūtra III.2.22 which Dr. Modi includes in a preceding Adhikaraṇa according to his scheme of dividing the Sūtras. We shall therefore leave this Sūtra and take up the consideration of other two sūtras:

अतोःनन्तेन तथा हि लिंगम्।

and

उभयव्यपदेशात्रवहिकृतकःऽवलं।

Agreed that the Srūti suggested by Dr. Modi as significant for III.2.23 is under consideration:

महत: परमद्वैतमद्वैतात्त्युपरिः पर: ||
पुनर्वा न परं किंचित्तै सा काष्ठो तं परा गति: ||

1. व्र.सू. ३.२.२६-२७
2. कठोप.३.११
Now in this mantra of the Upaniṣad, Puruṣa is spoken of as beyond physical and psychic forms. All these forms are said to be insentient and their percipient, the Puruṣa, is beyond them. The original Upaniṣad does not seem to indicate that Avyakta is just a modification of Puruṣa. He has explained it in the next stanza that this Ātman is manifested in no way. It is only grasped through supernormal insight by sages. Particularly in Sūtra 26, Dr. Modi suggests discussion of another mantra of the sixth chapter of the same Upaniṣad, which also describes Puruṣa as beyond forms. The 2 stanza "Ayaktat tu parah etc. describes the Ātman beyond Avyakta. This Ātman is called Brahman in subsequent stanzas, and that Brahman is to be known by making the heart or mind still. The point is that Avyakta is an insentient phenomenal

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1. पण सर्वेऽथ भूतेऽथ गृहोत्सत्मा न प्रकाशते।
   दुःशये त्वायायो उद्वध्यो सुक्षम्या सुक्षमदर्शिमि: ॥
   कठोप. 3.12

2. कठोप. 6.8
phenomenal thing and the Upanisad seeks to differentiate Purusā from that. Now what does the Śūtrakāra wish to assert by citing these Śrutis? Dr. Modi tells us, "The Śūtrakāra argues that as in the above example, Avyakta and Purusa are two names of the same Brahman. The difference between the exact significance of the two names is like that between Ahi and Kuṇḍala. Thus, the attainment of Purusā is not different from that of Avyakta; either is the attainment of Brahman." This goes against what Śrutis seek to prove. Can it be, that the sūtrakāra has to establish, something very different from what the Śrutis themselves wish to proclaim, by referring to the very same Śrutis?

What seems to be probable in introducing the analogy of Ahi and Kundala, is the comparison between two such things which have the same constituents. Brahman is already established to be the conscious principle. Consciousness is also observed in an

an individual soul. If the contents of two things are the same, how can their difference be accounted for? To explain this difference the analogy of serpent and his coil is used; or it can be explained by the analogy of light also. The same view about the essential nature of the individual is corroborated by Sūtras 2.2.34 and 35; and also by 2.3.46 and 2.3.50. The word Aṁśa in the Sūtra 2.3.43 will have to be interpreted properly. Jīva may be the part of Brahman only figuratively. We can say that light in a room is a part of light all over the space. But essentially light cannot be cut into fractions. Same is true of consciousness. Thus the relation between Brahman and the individual seems to be as pointed out by Śaṅkara. There is really a great controversy on the point. Many indeed are the Sūtras that can be adduced as showing difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

1. Cf. Br. Śū. 2.2.25 and 3.2.28

In this connection some points should be considered before we charge Śaṅkara of supplementing explanations "in order that the Sūtra might not go against the doctrine of the identity of Jīva and Brahman." If this means that identity of individual soul and Brahman was not intended by Sūtrakāra, that can easily be agreed. But the same can be said on behalf of Śaṅkara as well. As long as the percipient functions with its individual limitations, it must be differentiated from Brahman. But does the Sūtrakāra intend to maintain this difference always? This precisely is the question to be solved before we reject Śaṅkara's interpretation as imposed upon the Sūtras. Sūtra 1.1.19 clearly points to the union of the individual and the Supreme Self. What sort of union can this be is again a question. Consciousness is limited in the individual, while Brahman


2. Śaṅkara clearly speaks of this difference in Sūtra 1.1.16 and 1.1.17
Brahman is Infinite Consciousness. This also goes undisputed as far as the opinion of the Sūtrakāra is concerned. When union of these two is clearly suggested, what else can it mean than the dissolution of the limitation?

It will do well to consider the following Sūtras in this connection:

१ नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्।

२ एवं चात्माकात्स्वर्यः।

These Sūtras are very important philosophically. The first of these Sūtras declare, that contraries cannot remain one and the same ground. If Ātman is really Self, it should not possess the attributes of what is not-self. As against not-self, the qualities of Self are evident. The not-self is illumined by the self, while Self in itself is self-

\[1. \text{ ब्र.सू. २.२.३३}
2. \text{ ब्र.सू. २.२.३४}\]
self-evident. When this nature of self is realised, it follows naturally that the akārtnyā- incompleteness of the Ātman cannot be accepted. Like other objects, Self has no reference to anything beyond itself. And as Self is such a reality which is not determined by any other thing beyond it, It is Self-sufficient, unchangeable, immutable whole.

We have observed that Ātman is also the final Reality according to the Sūtrakāra who perhaps had in mind a view, that such a Reality must essentially be undeterminable, not requiring definition-limitation - for its existence; and it must also be self-luminous. This leads me to believe that Bādarāyana wanted to propound the essential identity of the individual soul and Brahman.

About the nature of the final Reality we find something more, when we see the relation between

1. गौण-चेतात्मकवादः। ब्र. १०६
between the world and Brahman as given in the Sūtras. Here also the Sūtrakāra has used words pregnant with meaning. The Sūtras are as follows:

तदन्यत्वमारम्पणश्रवाविभवः ।
भावे चोपलब्धय: ।
सत्वाच्चचावरस्य ।

The Kārya or the Avara, the posterior, the creation, is one with the Kāraṇa, the prior, Brahman. All Kārya, change, action must take place in something fundamental. This directly contradicts Nihilistic position. When a change or an act is so called, it means that there is something underlying it, that has given change a comprehensive form. Change or action as a unit can be comprehended only on the background of its substratum. The Avara or Kārya does exist for it is experienced or Upalabdha. Where is it experienced? It is experienced on

1. व.पू. २.१४-१५-१६
on Bhāva - on Existence. The substratum can be said to be Existence Itself - Being Itself. It is Being undefined, unconditioned, undeterminable. It cannot be Being of something, existence of something. Being is not used here as an attribute, for such an attribute is impossible. A thing must exist before it can have an attribute. So the fundamental Reality is Being Itself, not involved in these changes. Every change has to be related to this Being which is beyond it. Every determinate thing exists in and through this Supreme Existence. The change, the creation, the posterior therefore is non-different-ananya-from the prior, the Existence Supreme. To me it appears that Sūtrakāra is very careful here in making a choice of words. Let us consider the analogies that follow in this light. The Sūtrakāra has employed the words Sattva, Bhāva and Asat. The emphasis seems to be the same as implied in the dictum:

नासतो विष्ये भावो नामार्थो विष्ये सतः।

1.

2. ब्र.-पू. २.१६/२.१६/२.१६/२.१६

3.)
The same can be proved by argument or Yukti and by other Śrutis.³ Hereafter follow several analogies to show the relation between the creation and the Supreme Being. One thing is however clear, that Existence, howsoever conditioned, must essentially run through every change. Thus the change and its ground have common constituent also. The change or its series, it is stated, arise out of, get sustenance from, and dissolve into this Being and the Being is necessarily the stuff of which these changes are formed. The analogies of Pata or Prāṇas indicate that different changeful objects are also full of the same material - the Being. The Supreme Being needs no relation, for there is nothing beyond it. Hence the changeful creation that cannot be beyond its background must have come into being without any foreign aid. This is illustrated by the simile of milk and curds² or by the multiformarious conjurations that appear within the self.³ The Supreme Reality is without parts is
is clearly enunciated. In face of these facts analogies appear to be only of secondary importance. The Sūtrakāra too does not seem to give much weight to them; for the analogy of milk and curds would, strictly speaking, show doctrinal difference with that of cloth.

Learning the analogies we may fix our attention to the doctrine alone. We have seen that the Sūtrakāra speaks of Brahman as Self, Being, Existence. Regarding this Being or Existence, which is self-evident as we have seen, the Sūtrakāra has made his position very clear in the following Sūtras:

असंमवस्तु सत: अनुपप्तते। ¹ ॐ

The Being cannot become, for it cannot stand to reason. The Sat, the Being, the Existence, is self-evident. Becoming involves relation to another object, and such a relation would mean determination of the Being. It is impossible that something would exist beyond Being - beyond Existence - by

¹ ए. भ. २.२.१६
¹३ ए. भ. २.३.१
by which Being would be determined; nor can there be anything that would include Being. Being or Existence is such a peculiar thing, the ground of all determinations, Itself ever undetermined. If Being Itself passes on to Becoming, It becomes determined, an object that needs reference to some other object for its determination. Being or Existence thus loses its very nature. Becoming of the Being is therefore impossible - anupapanna. The Sūtrakāra is very clear in expressing this. Becoming of the Being is thus logically intolerable. Saṅkara has rightly dwelt on this Sūtra at length, and has proved this very point. The veracity of Saṅkara's interpretation of this Sūtra may be doubted; but a preceding Sūtra leaves little doubt about the fact that Saṅkara has hit the mark rightly:

यावद विकारः व विपागः लोकवृतः ॥

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१. प्र.सू. २.२.७
Differentiation is valid only as far as the evolutes are concerned, just as in the (everyday) world. It cannot be extended to Being or Existence Itself. Thus, if Sat is produced from anything else, it loses its nature as Sat. Again, if anything else is really produced from Sat, it loses its nature. Being thus cannot be subordinated to Becoming; Becoming however must be subordinated to Being, in as much as it draws for its existence on Being. The Sūtrakāra thus does not seem to have held the view of real modification of Brahman, Brahma-parināma. It can be agreed that the worldly evolutes are non-different-ananya-from the Brahman the Being; for as we have seen, Being or Existence is not denied to them. Existence runs through all the evolutes. This however does not mean that the phenomena of becoming is something real. Being Itself can never pass on to a phenomena. If this view is expressed by the Sūtrakāra, we need not contend whether he has declared the world as illusory or not. That he has not accepted the Vikāra, the parināma, the modification of Ātman or 1 Brahman is enough for our purpose. Becoming, modifications

1. व.स. २.२.१६, ४.४.१९
modifications, Vikāras must therefore be illusory in some sense. Becoming thus, starts from, derives its sustenance from, and is dissolved in the Being, and all this takes place without the slightest change in the Being.

One more point needs deliberation. It may be suggested that the above position can be explained by the analogy of grhta its Kāthinya and vilayana. Ghee as ghee remains essentially the same whether it is solid or liquid. So Brahman may be transformed into its evolutes and as Brahman, it would not alter in the least. This doubt is legitimate and on the strength of this analogy, the theory of Šuddhādvaita of Vallabha has been advanced. The Śutras in my opinion should not have implied this position, mainly because it calls Brahman as the Self and the Cogniser. If we approve of Vallabha's theory, we shall have to accept, that the cogniser Himself is transformed really into the cognised, the Self transformed into a not-self, without losing its essential nature as Self, the cogniser. No criticism is needed to show that such a position is self-contradictory.
It will not be possible to enter into the discussion of every Sutra. Again, as I have suggested already, it is very difficult to say what Vyāsa himself might have intended while writing the Sūtras. But the line followed by Dr. Modi of studying the Sūtras by themselves, is also fruitful in my opinion. But as he has considered third quarter of the third chapter to be of supreme importance in this connection, I think that the fourth quarter of the same chapter needs equal emphasis. The interpretation of the Sūtra of III.4.1 by several Ācāryas will have to be changed in my opinion. The Sūtra runs:

पुश्कायाः स्थवराविति बादरायणः।

Dr. Modi says, "As Sūtras 4 and 5 clearly show, "atah" means, "from the lore of the Upaniṣads" Commentators too have not given much different

1. A Critique of the Brahma-Sūtra, p. 244."
different sense, when they say that "atah" means "Vedāntavihitadātmajñānāt". I must, however, submit, that the very opening Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa अध्यात्म ब्रह्मज्ञितसा.

must here be called in. The Sūtra III. 4.1 should be considered with the help of the Sūtra I. 1.1; and then the former would mean, that Brahmajñānasā would result in Puruṣārtha according to Bādarāyaṇa, as he has so indicated by the word "atah", in the very first Sūtra. Then comes forth the side of Jaimini which is put forth in the next Sūtra. The Sūtra "Samanvārambhaṅgat" occurs where the association of Vidyā and Karma is suggested. But the Sūtra III. 4.8 gives the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa, that knowledge is said to be superior in the Śruti. These clearly state the view of Bādarāyaṇa as to


2. ब.सु. 3.4.5
to how reconciliation of śrūtis should be attempted. Śūtra III.4.11 suggests the application of different śrūtis according to the receptivities - adhikāra - of different adepts. Then Śūtra III.4.16 finally puts an end to the issue, showing that the śrūtis speak of action being completely destroyed by Vidyā. Dr. Modi takes an objection to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Upamarga as Svarūpopamarga. According to him it should be Karmanām Upamardah as the context shows. In any case the Śūtras show Bādarāyaṇa's method of interpreting the śrūtis.

The Supremacy of Jñāna is very clear in the Śūtras, and thus interpreted with the help of the scheme suggested by Bādarāyaṇa, the Śūtras would give a system not much different from the one suggested by Śaṅkara. I am therefore inclined to believe, that, doctrinally Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Śūtras is correct for the most part.

The veracity of Śaṅkara's interpretation is corroborated by some other considerations also. As it is shown before, Brahma-śūtras are the texts
texts of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. Mīmāṃsāsā generally fix the meaning of scriptural texts, by the method of agreement. And as the Śrutis have a common message to convey, and as Saṅkara is generally agreed to be the most successful in systematically putting forth this message, Bādarāyaṇa’s codification of Śrutis need not go on different lines.

As has been pointed out, the implication of a Mīmāṃsā is to be understood by means of adhikaraṇas. From the scholarly attempt of Svāmī Čidghanāṇḍa, it will be evident, that Saṅkara’s attempt of grouping the Sutras into adhikaraṇas is almost faultless as compared with the attempts of other Ācāryas.

1. Indian Philosophy by Dr. Radhakṛṣṇan, Vol.I, p.264.

2. “ऐतन् निवेद्यकाभिः धिष्णुपाकनाविद्वाराकले शांकरमाध्यमस्त वोषाभावः, भास्करमाध्यमस्त दोषश्रयम् इत्यावित्वे हुर्यते। एवं च प्राचीनविषये प्राचीनानामेव प्रामाण्यविधिकायु इत्येव सिद्ध्यति।” पृ. ४७ श्रीमृत्युज्यमाध्यमनिर्णयः।

श्रीचिद्धानन्दन् धुरुरीविरचितः। काशी छठाख्व १९४३
“जेदन्तसूत्रां व प्रतिपाद अब्जेतत वो यो व.वा.जोगः।
Śaṅkara was then perhaps the most successful in grasping the significance of the Sūtras.

Some other Śutrakāras refer to the school of Bādarāyaṇa as the Advaita school. Śāndilya has mentioned Bādarāyaṇa as holding the identity of Jīva and Brahman:

अत्मेकपरां बाबरायणः।

The Nyāyasūtras also criticise the Unity of the Self held by the Vedāntins in Sūtras III.2.19-21. The Śāṅkhya-sūtras refute the illusory bondage of the Ātman. Pt. Uadayavīra-Sāstri has strongly supported the view of the antiquity of the Śāṅkhyā-Sūtras.


2. शास्त्रिक व्याख्या २.१.३०
3. सांस्कृतिक व्याख्या १.२०/६.४६-५२
4. सांस्कृतिकवर्तनका हितिहास पृ.२२३-२७९
I may not be far from correct then if I hold Bādarāyaṇa as an Advaitin. When it is held that Saṅkara's doctrine is that of the Sūtrakāra an objection is generally raised, "Those who hold that Saṅkara's doctrine, in which of course the notion of Māyā plays a very important part, is that of Sūtrakāra, how can they explain the circumstance that it is only once in the Sūtras that the word Māyā expressly occurs?" I think, the occurrence of the word Māyā has little to do with the doctrine. It must be remembered that Saṅkara too has not always used the word to denote precisely the same sense. He has no hesitation in employing different words such as Avidyā, Prakṛti, Avyakta, etc. in the same sense. Bādarāyaṇa might have dealt with the points in a different way, but the doctrine he wanted to establish was most probably Advaita, as the Vāyu-Purāṇa has pointed out:

निमूलित परं ब्रह्म श्रुतियुक्तविचारत: ॥ २॥

1. "The Vedānta" by Prof. Ghate, p. 173.
2. वायुपुराण १०४.२२

आनन्दवाश्म.