The Upaniṣadic lore has gained glorious and wide reputation, for they mark the culmination of Vedic speculation. May be, it is due to this reason that they are called the Vedānta. It is suggested that they are the later products of the Vedic literature, and hence, as they come in the end of the Vedic lore, they are styled as Vedānta. It is also true, that these texts are studied by persons, who retire from the world to contemplate on mysteries of the Universe and its creator and hence in order of study they come last. The word Vedānta and the word Upaniṣad, both deserve some deliberation. The former word has two components in it; Veda and Anta. But does the word Anta convey any chronological sequence, and can the whole Vedic literature claim the title "Veda"? The Sūtras include the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas in the Vedas, and that gives the generally accepted view,

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1. मन्त्राश्च विद्येयम् ज्ञात्व श्रोऽपि सू. २४.१.३१,
   मन्त्राश्रमणं वेद इत्याचार्य वोधा गृ. सू. २.६.३
   आर्यनाय: पुनर्मन्त्राश्च प्रमुखद्रमणानि च कौशिक सू. १.३
that the aggregate of the Samhitās, Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads should be captioned as Veda. Leading religious thinkers of the later age also have given their full assent to this view. But the Brāhmaṇas seem to assign the term only to the Samhitās:

..... इसे सर्वे वेदा .... सक्त्या: सरहस्या:
सश्राहण: तौपनिषत्का: .....।२

The Brāhmaṇa passage here clearly suggests, that Brāhmaṇa literature is intended for the elaboration of the Vedas, i.e. Samhitās, though figurally the application of the term has gone even as far as including Itihiśa and Purāṇa. Some of the later commentators have acknowledged the prevalence of such a view for quite a long time. On the Āpastamba Sūtra  मन्त्राह्मणयो वेदनामधीयम, the commentator Dhūrtaswāmī remarks:

1. शब्द २.१.३३ मन्त्राह्मण ब्राह्मणं च वेदः - कुमारिल तत्त्वार्तिक १.३.१० मन्त्राह्मणयो वेदनामधीयम्
पदगमेकमु इति। मेघातिथि हौ मनु २.६ वेदवब्देन
क्रेयुः सामानि ब्राह्मणर्गहितान्युच्चयन्ते। सायण तैति.
सं.भाष्य मन्त्राह्मणात्मको वेदः
2. गोपय का. पूर्व २.९
Another commentator Haradatta Misra also gives the same view:

कैशीचन्द्रन्नारायणमेव वेदत्वमात्रिष्टम्।

Śrī Dayānanda Svāmī is sure on the point and says:

वहुमि: प्रमाणेवन्नारायणमेव वेदसंहा न ब्राह्मणानामिति सिद्धम्।

Whether Svāmījī's assertion is acceptable or not, it need not be disputed, that such a view did exist. It may not, therefore, be altogether hazardous to say, that the term Vedānta was originally applied to the last chapter of the Vājasaneyi Samhitā, and was later extended to hundred and eight and even more Upaniṣads. Vedānta and Upaniṣad are synonymous terms and both are generally applied

1. कष्टवेदा की मात्रमूलिका।
applied to the texts that now go by the popular name Upaniṣad. These texts mainly contain the Jñānakāṇḍa and are distinguished from the other texts that deal with the Karmakāṇḍa. As action and speculation stand distinguished in normal parlance, these texts, which deal with different themes, are also dealt with separately. From a strictly modern standpoint, we mark difference of language in the Samhitā, Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad texts. It is also clear that as the Upaniṣadic writings deal with Rgvedic texts, the Samhitā literature, is older than the Upaniṣads. These three differences — that of time, of theme and of language from the foundational ground, on which the structure of Vedic thought — progress is generally constructed.

While discussing the general character of the Brāhmaṇa literature, it has been pointed out how sometimes interpretations are shaped by assumption of different ideologies in the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas, when really there is no evidence for such a difference. The difference of theme is no
no doubt important. Ritualism, which is the theme of earlier literature, is an outcome of crude thinking according to normal development of philosophy. Philosophical speculation, which involves, independent reasoning, is therefore not compatible with ritualistic dogmas. The people who had developed speculation, could not have acquiesced in dogmatic beliefs, and this tendency of the Upaniṣadic people is seen in some of the remarks of the Upaniṣads.

But is the struggle between action and speculation a permanent feature in any civilization? Is it not possible, that, after a particular stage of development, rationalisation and ritualism, both can thrive side by side and form different aspects of one harmonious culture? We have seen, that the spirit of speculation was not wanting in Vedic times.¹ In

¹ Refer discussion on Saṃhitās. Cf.

कुल आजाता कुल इवं किस्मिटि: नासवीय १०.१२९
कोविद्यासुपगात्मप्रशुन्मतत्तू १.१६४.४
आपो मुनिष्ठा इत्येको अब्रवीतू कः १.१६१.९

Cf. also कः १.१६४.१२ कः १.३.१२
In Upaniṣadic times Karma or Upāsanā cannot be said to be condemned altogether. Philosophical discussions were held during sacrificial sessions themselves. In the Upaniṣads, we have the description of sacrificial fires like Trināchiketa, Vaisvānara etc.; we have the elaboration of different chants like Gāyatri, Udgītha, Śakvarī, Pranava etc. we have Puruṣa, wind and the individual self worshipped as the forms of sacrifice; we have worship in the form of human meal performed with five offerings to Prāṇa, apanā, etc. changing the whole performance into Agnihotra sacrifice; we have different vidyās as Madhuvidyā, Paryāṅkavidyā, Manthavidyā, Pañcagnividya etc. Does this show antagonism of the Upaniṣadic sages to Karmakāṇḍa? Far from it; it shows that ceremonials were utilised and were thought necessary for philosophical advancement.

It will be advantageous to mark the use of the word Upaniṣad in this connection. The main root in this word is "sad" with "Upa" and "Ni" as its prefixes. This root with the two prefixes is found used in the Atharvaveda:
It may be noted that the word is closely
related with spiritual contemplation and austerities
that are calculated to provoke it. The same line
occurs with slight variations in the Taittiriya
Samhitā:

\[\text{श्रवण्यन्ति उपासुरुप्रेम: तपो दीपिकायुपविषेषु।} \]

The words “Upaniṣeduh” and “Upāṣeduh” mean
practically the same thing in both places. If we
turn to the use of “Sad” with “Ni” we find it connot-
ing high spiritual attainment.

\[\text{क्षत्रो अश्वे परमेव ध्यायो चर्मिन्न देवा शवि विनेते निषेधु।} \]

\[\text{देवा एतस्यामयवन्त पुर्वेः सप्तर्षिक्षस्तपसे ये निषेधु।} \]

\[1. \text{अयोध्या} १९५१.१
2. \text{तैतत्रिसंह} ७.७.४
3. \text{Cf. Saṅkar's remark in \text{तैतत्रिसंह} Intro.}
\]

\[\text{परं श्रेय: शस्यां निषेष्यणमिति।}
\]

\[4. \text{क} १.९६४.२९ \text{अयोध्या} ९.१०.१८
5. \text{क} १०.१०९.४ \text{अयोध्या} ५.१६.६\]
Turning to the Brāhmaṇa and the Āranyaka literature, we see, that the root, with the prefixes added jointly or separately, hints at more or less the same meaning we have seen above. The word Upaniṣad can be variously understood here. It may mean particular kind of ceremonial worship. In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa for instance we have:

वषय आदिदेश उपनिषदाङ्ग्। १

Here the worship of Agni in the form of Vāyu is described. In the same Brāhmaṇa we also have:

तस्य वा पत्त्य अग्नेवादिन्य उपनिषदां वाचा हि चीयते क्रचा यजुष्मा साम्मन्ता हि। २

Here we see that the Vedic Mantras are called Upaniṣad. The Sadvīmśa Brāhmaṇa says:

\[\text{The Daivata Brāhmaṇa also indicates the ritualistic significance of Upaniṣad.} \]

1. छतपथ ब्राह्मण १०.४.५.१
   उपनिषदाङ्ग रहस्यार्थानाम (वाज्येवप्रकाशिका)

2. छतपथ ब्राह्मण १०.५.१.२

संहः १ मंत्र २२
...अद्वित ब्राह्मण उद्धीश्य वचने ते होः
...हन्त इयमनुव्याहरामेति तं ह अयुत्याहसरिष्यन्त
उपपत्तेणः...।

The Samhitopanishad Brahmana says:

श्रवते वेदस्यान्वताः उपपत्तेण भवन्ति। विचित्रोपः
स्तववः दमक्ष्य विधेयो च सम्प्रसन्नः, अनाकाशीकरणं च योगः
आचार्यं जुश्यो च हैति।

In the Tattiriya Brahmana the word "Niṣasāda" in
III.6.10.3 or II.4.6.11 Sayana interprets as

निषसाद निवेतापतिवेशं and अस्मात्यं कर्मणुपपिष्टं

In the Aitareya Brahmana 26.1

देवा ह वै ...... सत्रं निषेणः

1. संहितोपपिष्टवाहमण ३.
Sayāṇa says देवा: ..... सत्रं किंचित्तुषष्ठितवन्न:।

In the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa sometimes we see philosophical significance attached to the word. In chapter X.3.5.12 we have:

अथ अक्षयात्मपूर्वः प्रारम्भं न हैतरस्मातः किंचितेन ज्यायेः स्तितं ..... तद्वेतव ब्रह्म अभूव्यमपरवत। स योह प्रत्येक ब्रह्मापूर्वमपरवतं बेद न हास्यात्मकं स्तम श्रेयाः समानेः भवति ..... तस्य का प्रत्स्य युक्तो रस एव उपनिषतः .....।

From the use of the word in the Upanisadic lore itself, we find that the term has twofold significance viz. sacerdotal and philosophical. The Brhadāranyaka 5.5.3 and 4 says:

... वै प्रतिष्ठा देः प्रते अब्धे तस्योपवेदनिष्ठः हन्तिका पाप्मां जहाँति च य एवं वेद।

योऽयं विधिपर्युपस्तस्य म्हूर्तिति विश्रेष्ठ च व किंचिते एकनेत्रम् शुद्ध इति वाहु छो वाहु है प्रते अब्धे स्तेषार्थ प्रतिष्ठा वै प्रतिष्ठा देः प्रते अब्धे तस्योपवेदनिष्ठः हन्तिका पाप्मां जहाँति च य एवं वेद।

...
Here particular chants are called Upaniṣads. In the same Upaniṣad 2.1.10 there occurs:

यथाग्ने: भुज्या विस्फुलिंगा व्युष्चवर्तित, एवमेव-स्मावात्मन: सर्वं प्राणा: सर्वं लोका: सर्वं देवा: सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युष्चवर्तित। तस्योपनिषत् सत्यस्य सत्यमिति।

Here a particular statement pregnant with meaning is termed as Upaniṣad. In the Kena Upaniṣad while commenting on Upaniṣadom Abrūma Śaṅkara says:

उपनिषदं रहस्यं याच्चवन्त्यं मो महयनु। ब्रूहि हि।

In the Aitareya and the Tattirīya Upaniṣads, some pieces of advice or some philosophical truth are said to be Upaniṣads. Thus, from Saṃhitās to the Upaniṣads, the use of the term does not indicate that rituals or austerities were tabooed in the subject matter of the Upaniṣads, by ancient sages.

1. The lexicon Śabdakalpadrumā (P.256) cites from the Śādvaśayanagrhyakārikā, maintaining that Upaniṣad is some ceremonial to be performed by Dvijas: (Dvijatikartavyo Vratabhedah):

प्रथम स्यान्त्वहानानां द्वितीयः महात्रत्तम।
तृतीयः स्यादुपनिषद् गौरवानुष्ठ तत: परम्॥

1.
The currency of the word Vedānta is no doubt old, but, unlike its present meaning that signifies a particular system of philosophy, it conveyed the Upaniṣadic texts. In commentaries we see the word used in the plural:

अस्यानन्दोः प्रहा श्रात्मेकत्वविवाप्रतिपतते सर्वेः
वेदान्त आराध्यन्ते। यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेः वेदान्तानां तथा
चायमस्य शारीरकमीमांसायां प्रदर्शिष्याम्। ६.६।

In the Upaniṣads themselves the word occurs very rarely only twice; once in Mundaka and once in Śvetāśvatara. But the implication of that word also does not preclude the Vedic literature pertaining to Karmakanda. The Kāṇḍanukramaṇī defines:

वेदान्त उपनिषद: तास्त्रय: सांहित्यो वाशिक्यो वाशृष्टवः

1. ब्रह्मसूत्र शास्त्र १.१.१.

Kālidās also uses it in plural:
वेदान्तेशु यमाहुरेकपुरुषं .........।
In the Manusmṛti however we find it in singular:
वेदान्तं विधिवच्चूत्वा संन्यालेवनुपो ब्रजः। मृ. ६.६।
Some passages indicated herein do not occur in the portion included in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, but the Anukramaṇī has no hesitation in styling them by that term.

After the traditional manner in which Saṅkar-ācārya has tried to explain this term in his commentaries, the Vācāspatya lexicon cites the following derivation: ।

उपनीय तमात्मानं ब्रह्मापास्तं यत् ।
निहत्त्विधां तज्ज च तस्मादुपाणिनिषव्य भवेत् ॥
निहत्त्वानर्थेऽवृज्ञ स्वाविधाः प्रत्यक्षतया परम् ॥
नवत्यपास्तसंबेदवतो वापनिषंदुभवेत् ॥
प्रकृतिस्थितो नि:शेषास्तंस्मूलो चेष्टेवत् ।
यतोऽस कसाबेव विधा तस्मादुपाणिनिषव्येव ॥
वयोकः स्वतःविधाहैत्यत्वादु ग्रन्थ्योऽश पि तत्त्वेवेदत् ।
भवेदुपाणिनिष्ठामा लाइगं जीवनं वधा ॥

1. वाचस्पत्य कोश  P.1222

Kavya Prakash Press, Calcutta 1873.
It is clear enough, that these derivations are intended, not to show the authenticity of the derivation itself, but to point out the subject-matter of the text. Sankaracarya too never claimed authenticity to the etymological explanation offered by him; for, as we have seen above, he interprets the word as Rahasya also. But if Colebrooke argues on the strength of tradition, that Upanisads have no direct connection with the idea of secrecy, concealment or mystery "his opinion seems to be correct. European scholars too have suggested several renderings and they are one on the point that there is something of secrecy in these teachings.

\[^1\] That the term connoted the philosophy of human life can be inferred from the following:

असुराणां हेतोपनिषत् प्रेतस्य दरीयं विश्वास वसनेन अठाकारेण इति संस्कृति प्रवेण हि अमुं लोकं ज्यैत्यन्तो मन्यन्ते। छाँ. ४.४.४

The implication of Sankara's interpretation does not thus appear to be altogether unfounded. The Aitareya Brâhmana 1.4.23 gives a legend when the Gods performed a sacrifice called Upasad for vanquishing the demons. The root-meaning of "Sad" here is to attack and vanquish and the same is suggested by Sankara when he explains: सुदेश्यांतोविश्वारमणार्थवादनार्थवायस्य

in the introduction to his commentary on the Kathakopanishad or: उपनिषदितिविषयं चवे।

तच्चां विधिनां गर्भजनां मर्जराविश्वातिनानां तवकाव्यनात्रात...।

Footnote continued on next page.
Now, in these "secret teachings" if secrecy was observed while transmitting some Mantra formula, that was purely a sacerdotal matter. But by Upaniṣads are primarily indicated the philosophic teachings and discussions, and it is difficult to understand why secrecy was observed in these discussions which were held in open court of kings. It can well be understood, that philosophical lessons were imparted only to those who had sufficiently attained the Adhikāra or aptitude and development needed for the grasp of the intricate subject. 1/

Footnote continued from previous page.

in his commentary on the Taittiriyopanishad. (पैत्रक, ब्राह्म १.५.२२)

It can thus be seen that the etymology suggested by Saṅkara is not altogether bereft of traditional support.


MaxMuller History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, Macdonell History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 204.

1/ The following sentences indicate that particular care was taken before imparting a lesson to the student to see his eligibility.

इद वाच तर्ज्ज्येष्ठाय पुष्पाय पिता ब्रह्म प्रेमवातु प्रणामयाय वां न्येवासिने (चं. ३.२४) तमेवं नापुष्पाय वां न्येवासिने वा ब्रह्मवातु। (दृ ६.३.१२) नाप्रेमवात्ताय वातःयमु....(काठ २.२४, अक्षे.६.२२ प्रशांतिचित्ताय जितेष्ट्रयाय च...।(मुंडक ३.२.१२.

Continued on next page.
But that simply meant that students of different subjects were classified according to their receptivities, and instructions were given accordingly. This procedure might have involved some privacy which the term Upaniṣad may indicate. The difference between privacy and secrecy can well be marked. There is no use entering into a side issue that would land in a discussion whether philosophic thinking and teaching was first set afoot by Brāhmāns or by Ksatriyas; but the contention takes its stand on the assumption, that the Upaniṣadic literature is entirely different in spirit from the earlier Vedic literature, and hence must have its origin in society, that was different from Brāhmāns, incessantly

Foot-note continued from previous page.

The legends of Prajāpati and Indra and Virocchāna (छ.०८४), Yājñvalkya and Janaka (१.०१३), Śūkākāyana and Brāhadratha (२.१.०२) Satyakāśā and Upakosala (२.१०.०२) Yama and Nachiketa (काठ) Raikva and Jānaśāturuti (छ.०२) etc. show the vigilant attitude of the teacher towards the taught. From Brh. 3.2.13 it is inferred that secrecy was observed while imparting the teaching (Deussen, p.2, p.15). The narrative here referred to is regarding the condition of the soul after it leaves the body. In cases like these, and others where initiation into mystic mantras was necessary, secrecy might have been observed. But the general theme of the Upaniṣadic lore for which it is called the Vedānta, has little to do with this type of secrecy.
incessantly busy with the bizarre sacrifice. The assumption of complete antithesis between the spirit of earlier Vedic lore and that of the Upaniṣads has given rise to the theory of war between the priest class and the ruling class. Such a war between the church and the state, however analogous to European historical tradition, is not an important feature of Indian History. It is, therefore, misleading to hold that philosophic speculation was originated only amongst Ksatriyas, especially when we find, in the realm of philosophy, the supremacy of both.

Secondly, the arguments adduced to prove, that the Upanisad literature is different in the spirit from earlier Vedic literature, are not convincing. We have seen, that Brāhmaṇa literature is not so. About the difference between Brāhmaṇas and the later literature, scholars pronounce, "......the distinction

Cf. Dr. Pusalkar's article Hiriyanna Comm. Vol. PP. 157-158.

1. This view is quite opposed to that of Pargitar which he has put forth in his famous work Ancient Indian Historical Tradition (PP. 58 onwards).

2. बुधवं १.४.११ and चतुर्दशिवं ५.३.७ (Ksatriya Supreme)
बुधवं ४.२.४ and मैत्रायणि १.६-७ (Brahman supremacy)
distinction of Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka is not an absolute one; in no case have we in the works handed down to us Brāhmaṇas which always suppose the performance of ritual, or Āraṇyakas which assume that it is not to be performed." Again ".... the Brāhmaṇas shade off imperceptibly into the Āraṇyakas the Āraṇyakas shade off into the Upaniṣads without violent change of any kind." ¹

We have to remember ourselves too often of the fact, that, while reading the old literature, we must shed modern vision, which is used only to an orderly presentation of ideas in specific branches of literature. The manifold usage of the term "Upaniṣad" that is seen above shows that though the term has a connotation of spiritual advancement, there is no such specification to exclude Karmakāṇḍa. The Kantian and Platonistic impression about higher religious ideas that has lead Deussen to classify

¹. Religion & Philosophy of Veda and Upaniṣad, pp. 490-492. Cf. C.R. Lanman Beginning of Hindu Pantheism, p. 12. There is no abrupt break in the course of development from the old Brahman religion to that of the Upaniṣads. When however S. Radhakrishnan (Indian Philosophy, Vol. p. 72) wonders that "Some of the hymns shock us by their highly abstract philosophical and from primitive polytheism to systematic philosophy it is a long, long way," he appears to have taken for granted that Vedic religion must present a uniform spectacle of primitive polytheism.

¹a. pp. 44, 46, The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads
classify Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa after the analogy of the Old Testament and the New Testament, has created a total disregard in his mind for the Indian literature that precedes the Upaniṣads. In Brāhadrāṇyaka 1.4.10, 3.9.6 etc. or in Chāndogya 1.12 4.1-3, etc. he sees vehement denunciation of sacrifice, and in the replacement of psychic processes for outward sacrifice, and in some chapters (3.2) of Kathā and Maitrāyani (7.8-10) he sees cooperation with older ritualistic cult, which was later overthrown by Buddha in accordance with the "daring" attitude of some of the Upaniṣadic utterances.

It is, however, probable that the same utterances may be differently interpreted, if they are not torn from their textual associations. It has been already observed by stalwarts that, "although therefore the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads may be

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1. These opinions which indeed have no claim for an established fact are treated as such and used by writers of popular histories. "...the priestly tradition when the Mantras were compiled had entered on a perilous path, and that a Buddha was needed to lead the Aryan people back to the ancient way of right thinking." p. 26. A short history of India by E.B.Havell 1924 (MacMillan and Company).
be said, in a sense to constitute a "revolt" against the old Brāhmaṇa way of belief and practice, still when we consider that neither the Āranyakas nor the Upaniṣads entirely negated the way of ritualism but only subsumed it under the way of knowledge, we cannot say that either of them, in the form in which we have them before us, aimed at the destruction of the hypothesis put forth by the Brāhmaṇas. Nor can we entirely separate from one another the Brāhmaṇa, the Āranyaka, or the Upaniṣad texts in such a way as to prove that the lines of cleavage between them were absolute or fore-intended. It is interesting to see that one is often confounded at the variety of Upaniṣadic statements in the same breath, each of them equally full of vigour and force. While discussing the second section of the Muṇḍaka one is invariably led to an almost insoluble problem expressed in the following words: "We may say that the two parts of this section constitute the thesis and the anti-thesis of the philosophical argument of this Upaniṣad, although the synthesis of the two, if implied, is not as clearly indicated."
Even if it is agreed that Déussen's remarks have some amount of truth as regards the subordination of ceremonials, it will not be too much to say that no trace of any serious hostility towards sacrifice is to be found in the Upanisads.

In judging the profundity and the range of philosophic thought and vision in pre-Upanisadic literature, a tendency is generally observed "thus far and no further". What is not found in that literature is taken to be non-existent in those times. To speak in Sanskṛt terminology, though anupalabdhi is useful as pramāna to some extent, it cannot replace abhāva. Though we do not find an elaborate presentation of high philosophy, we cannot ignore that higher conclusions are to be found even in the Saṁhitās. But such conclusions are ignored, and hence come some such remarks, "In this pre-Upanisadic period, the nature of reflection not being anthropo-centric or psychological, we have no special term for the specific function of man's knowing or consciousness." The remark leads to

1. Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy by Dr. Saksena, pp. 15, 16. 1944.
to believe that speculation was indeed very superficial in earlier literature. But a perusal of the previous chapters along with the appendix does not give the impression that such can be the state of things. Again what is meant by the assertion that speculation was not anthropocentric? We have marked that Ātman, a principle distinct from body, was known as the inner being, not only of man, but also of every form in the world. In the previous chapter it is pointed out how an Āranyaka speaks of the development of Ātman in plants, in beasts etc. If the above remark of Dr. Saksena means that speculation was not restricted to human activities alone, then the Upaniṣads too are not anthropocentric. The Upaniṣads speak of Ātman as the inner principle of man as well as of every other form that exists in this world. The Maitrāyaṇuṇaṇiṣad speaks of antar- ātman and bahir-ātman.

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1. Ṛṣistha 117
This anthropocentric frame of mind has brought forth certain extremely idealistic interpretations of the Upaniṣads, which have neglected an important aspect of Upaniṣadic philosophy. Deussen for instance tries to put "the entire Upaniṣad philosophy" in "the simple equation -

\[ \text{Brahman} = \text{Atman}. \]

This equation, however significant, is apt to mislead a reader, if by Atman is meant the individual soul. The Upaniṣads certainly want to emphasise that what is known as the individual soul is essentially Brahman; but they also emphasise that what is perceived as the world full of duality is also essentially Brahmāṇa. To describe the Upaniṣadic thought therefore, Deussen's equation should be supplemented by another equation:

\[ \text{Brahman} = \text{All this}. \]

1. I use the word idealistic as derived from the word idea, when it signifies an ideology that is opposed to realism.
2. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads by Paul Deussen, p. 39, Edinburgh.
3. तवें तत्विवं ब्रह्म। छाया: उप. 3.१४.१
   सर्वं क्षेत्रवृ ब्रह्म। मांह्रूः उप. २.
Unless the second equation is sufficiently given attention to along with the first, there is every likelihood that the negation of the manifold world in the Upaniṣads would be misunderstood. There is so much misunderstanding about the unreality of the world as propounded by Śaṅkara, perhaps because the former equation is cut away from the latter, though both form the essential constituents of one whole theory.

The Upaniṣads are the texts of Jñānakāṇḍa, and Jñāna signifies philosophical knowledge. Philosophy, as is well known, attempts to think of the world as a whole. The Upaniṣadic seers too wanted to know the key of such a comprehensive understanding. The fundamental philosophical enquiry then streamed off in two channels, which may be termed conveniently as cosmos-spection and introspection. Both these methods of enquiry seem to be utilised and reconciled in the Upaniṣads, the final solution of both being the same.

\[ १. \text{कस्मिन्यं मनवो विषतां सर्वमिदं विषतां भवति।} \]
\[ \text{मुंहुप. १.१.३} \text{ Cf. झांकोग्य उप.६.१.२-३} \]
If this reconciliation is sufficiently taken into account, perhaps many of the seeming contradictions in the Upaniṣadic texts will be dissolved. Prof. Keith has criticised Deussen in the following words, "... the identity of the Self and the Absolute is based merely on the abstraction of the self as subjectivity, and that of the absolute as subjectivity, and the identity is therefore meaningless and a mere matter of words." In his criticism he has however raised interesting points when he says, "... the conception of the Upaniṣads formed by Deussen as containing a definite doctrine of idealism, that of Yājñavalkya, which is variously broken down by realistic intrusions and accommodations to commonsense, is one which is contrary to all probability and reason." This criticism though particularly in connection with Yājñavalkya, may hold good while dealing with the whole of Upaniṣadic philosophy. The controversy between Deussen and Keith is based mainly on the supposition that idealism and realism

1. Religion and Philosophy of Veda and Upaniṣads by A. B. Keith, p. 593.
realism must stand in sharp contrast as they do mostly in western philosophy. In India, Philosophy however no such distinction can legitimately be made, for mind and matter are considered to be the manifestations of the same substance. An illuminating observation of Dr. Raju would perhaps put an end to such a controversy: "Where no ideal reality is posited then does the controversy between what are usually called idealism and realism make its appearance. Further, the starting point is mistakenly regarded as decisive. One who starts with mind and its ideas calls himself an idealist, and another who starts with the belief in material objects existing without any relation to mind calls himself a realist. But neither can be wholly just in his contentions, as both must be one-sided in their arguments." In the light of this observation we may think about the above remark of Prof. Keith, which implies three points:

1. Idealistic Thought of India by Dr. P. T. Raju 1953, London George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., p. 70.
(a) The philosophy of Yājñavalkya cannot be explained on idealistic lines, though Deussen has tried to interpret it thus.

(b) Yājñavalkya maintained that Ātman was the only real thing and that plurality was illusory; but this doctrine of idealism is broken by realistic intrusions.

(c) The idealistic doctrine of Yājñavalkya cannot be reconciled with his realistic statements.

If realism stands in contrast with idealism, Prof. Keith's assertions are correct, but if idealism, has a new significance as pointed out by Dr. Raju, realistic theories in the Upaniṣads which appear along with other theories need not be called intrusions. The reconciliation of the apparently contrary theories is then quite possible, and it was always attempted by later Ācāryas, amongst whom Śaṅkara is generally taken to be the most successful.  

1. "But the task of systematising once given, we are quite ready to admit that Śaṅkara's system is the best that can be devised." p.CXXII. Thibaut's introduction to the Brahmaśūtra-Bhāṣya.  
"...if any one of the interpreters of the prasthāna has fully understood and impartially explained the true philosophy of the Upaniṣads, it is Śaṅkara and none else..." Prof. M.N. Dvivedi, Intro. to Maṇḍukyopanisad.
About the system of Śaṅkara too, some scholars do not hesitate to remark that "he never faces the problem squarely." Whether Śaṅkara was justified in introducing the double standard of truth is not to be dilated upon here; but the words denoting truth and falsity, existence and non-existence occur in his literature in the context of these two standards. What may be given full measure of reality from the standpoint of finite experience - vyavahārābhāviprāya, may be unreal from the absolute standpoint - paramārthābhāviprāya. It may be marked in passing, that when Yājñavalkya considers plurality as illusory, probably he does it from the standpoint of absolute experience. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Upaniṣadīc philosophy thus appears to be fairly convincing.

The whole of the Advaitī philosophy—may it be termed as Ajāti or Kevalādvaita—is expressed in a nutshell in the following pronouncement of the Upaniṣad:

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"The You is fulness, fulness this. From fulness, fulness doth proceed.

Withdrawing fulness' fulness off,
E'en fulness then itself remains."

The verse is enigmatic indeed. If anything is withdrawn from the whole, the whole must lose its character as a whole. It can also be well understood, that there is no such thing that could really be added to a whole. If it were possible for any such thing to exist, the whole will at once lose its character as a whole, and be a part. It therefore naturally follows that all such additions and subtractions are apparent, seeming, phenomenal or illusory in some sense. The same truth is voiced in the Kathopanisad:

अण्टेरणीयां महतो महीयानात्मास्त्य जन्तोत्तरित्तीलो गुहायाम।

1. बुधव ०५.१.१


3. कठोप. २.२०
For a thing to be the minutest and at the same time the largest even in a given area, the thing must be all-pervading in the area. Any attempt to divide it must reduce its character as the largest in the area. This can be illustrated better by means of a figure:

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  _C_
 /  |
B   A
|   |```

The square "C" stands for our Cosmos. "A" is the largest space in the cosmos. If "B" is taken to be the minutest space, that "B" must necessarily be apparent; for any magnitude of "B", however infinitely small, must reduce the all-pervading character of "A" in "C"; for, "A" then becomes (C-B). Such expressions regarding the Supreme Reality therefore indicate, that that Reality must remain
remain indescribable. Description involves finitude, which as shown above is apparent. Thus the passages that emphasise Atman or Brahman as the only reality clearly mean that all else is apparent, unreal:

श्रोमितीं श्रुत। श्रोमितीं सर्वं। ३  
सर्वं सत्तवं श्रुव। २  
सर्वं श्रेष्ठं श्रुव। ३  
महान्तं विभुवात्माणं .... ४  
नित्यं विषुं सर्वं स्वसं श्रुव। तवव्ययं - - - ५ 

The description of Atman or Brahman in contradictory terms shows its transcendant nature and indescribability:

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1. तैत्तिरी.उप. १.८.१  
2. छांवो.उप. २.१४.१  
3. मांहृत्यु.उप. २  
4. कठ उप. २.२९  
5. पुंडकोप. १.१.६
Direct descriptions of the transcendency and
ternality of Brahman or Atman or the Supreme
Reality are also not wanting. We can only turn
the pages of the Upaniṣads to find such statements:

�स्मातमन्वहस्यहवर्धमलोहितमस्तनेहममचाया्यमतमोऽवत्वनाकाश्चमसंगमसमगं्मच्छृष्टक्षेत्रमवागमनोऽतेजस्कमश्रयमकुलममसाब्रम्हन्तरमवाहम्।

तत्व ब्रह्म तद्विप्रत्य शात्मा - - -।

एष एतस्मिन अद्वैताः अनात्तमेऽनिन्यक्ते अनिलयने
शमय प्रतिष्ठां विनवते।

1. कठोप. 2.29
2. ईशोप. 6
3. छांदो. उप. 3.14.3
4. वृहदरण्यकोप 3.8.8
5. छांदोग्योप. 8.14
6. तैत्तिरीयोप. 2.7
अमान्तकऽहणां चत्रवहार्यः प्रपंचोपशमः श्रवोर्द्धितः - -
- - - - - ।

विषयो हामृतः पुलवः सबाहा-मृत्युंतरो हः । ॥
श्रेंद्रेष्वप्रायोश्च नामचुः श्रोत्रं तदवपाणिपावम् ॥
नित्यों विचुं - - - - - - ॥ ॥

श्रवियक्षायमश्वरीरमलोहितं ज्ञामसवरं - - - । ॥

नित्यों नित्यानं चेतनं भेतना नाम । - - - -
- - - - अनिवस्यं परं मुखम् ॥

न जायते भ्रियते - - - - हः नित्यं भास्वतरोर्यं
पुराणः ।

श्रवियक्षायमश्वरीरमलोहितं तथा तं रसं नित्यम् । - - - । ॥

स पर्वव्यक्तक्षायमश्वरणम् । - - - - । ॥

1. मान्द्रव्योप. 12
2. गुंडकोप. 2.१.२
3. गुंडकोप. 1.६
4. प्रस्तुतोप. ४.१०
5. कठोप. ५.१३-१४
6. कठोप. २.१८
7. कठोप. ३.१५
8. ईश्वरोप. ८
To establish the eternality of Brahman it is very essential that it should be bereft of all changeability, and hence, as we can see from the above quotations, every possible form of changeability is denied to Brahman the Supreme Reality, and the Upaniṣads are never tired of emphasising Its transcendency even while dealing with Its immanent aspect.

The Supreme Reality is described in the Upaniṣads in two ways. It is called transcendent as well as immanent. The changeless principle Itself becomes unchangeable, and hence it is called "biformed":

१. वे वाच ब्रह्मणो दूपे मृतेः चैवामृतेः च मत्यं चामृतं च निम्नतं च यथव सच्च त्वच्छ। इत्यादि -- -- ।

२. तदुप्रविश्य सच्छ त्वच्छचामृतं निम्नतं चामृतं च निम्नरं च चामृतं च -- -- -- ।

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१. बृहस्पति उप. २.३

२. तैत्तिरि उप. २.६
Previous to the phenomenon of Becoming, the individual soul does not exist according to the Upaniṣads. The creatorship of Brahman is an attri-
applicable only in the domain of Becoming, and even here, the creator of the Universe is infinitely
greater in every respect than the individual soul. From the creator come the individual mind, thought, etc. He thus precedes all individuals, all indi-
vidual ideas and ideals, and even the phenomena of ideation. If this point is well remembered, the following statement will need amendment: "The Universal Self, the creator of the world, is not differ-
ent from the individual self within each of us.1/ Brahman is thus the psychic principle." In Its prēstine state, Brahman is not the psychic principle.

A great confusion arises when we see Brahman described as the transcendent as well Immanent principle, and the difficulty is enhanced when we find several accounts of creation in several texts

1/ Doctrine of Māyā, p. 78
texts e.g. Taittirīya 2.1.1; 2.3.1; Aitāraya 1.2; Mundaka 2.1.4; 2.1.9; 1.1.7; Chāndogya 3.19.1; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; 7.26.1; Brhadāranyaka 1.2.5; 1.4.5; 1.4.10; 2.1.20 etc. From these and also from certain findings about the ultimate Reality as fire, water, food, air, ākāsa, breath, mind, Sun, Being, non-Being etc. it is sometimes thought that these views represent different speculations current in the Upaniṣadic age. It may be so. But it is also true that the theory of causation, immanence and transcendence are not really conflicting; rather they help the formulation of a comprehensive metaphysics.

The difficulty in harmonising these theories perhaps is, that Infinite aspect is supposed to be totally opposed to the finite aspect of Brahman. But Infinity and finitude do not stand mutually opposed. Finitude is not the negation of Infinity; rather it

1. Cf. Katha 2.5; Brhad 5.5.1; Taitti.3.2; Chānd. 4.3.1-2; Chānd.1.9.1; Kausī.2.1; Chānd.4.33; Taitti.3.4; Brhad.1.2.1-2; Chānd.3.19.1-3; Chānd.6.2.1-4; Taitti.3.4.
it is included in Infinity. Then again we have the thought that the Mūrta - or the Finite - springs from the Amūrta - the Infinite i.e. the latter is the effect of the former. The Infinite expresses Itself as the finite, and the finite always implies a reality that lies beyond. The Infinite issues Itself out as finite without losing its own nature.

Here is the significance of the account that tells us about the Infinite Brahman as the cause of the whole creation. The very finitude of the creation engenders a sense of something beyond; a thing beyond which in Itself is not finite. This not-finite thing cannot be excluded by the finite, for one finite thing can exclude only another finite thing. Thus the Infinite runs through the finite without limiting Itself, without losing its own nature. The Mūrta issues out in its fulness from the Amūrta, and what remains is again an unimpaired whole. The cycle of causation freely has its round, and the cause remains unaffected. This sort of relation between cause and effect is normally not observed. A sapling sprouting from a seed destroys the seed. While here the effect is said to take its full shape
shape from the cause, but the cause remains absolutely unaffected. The description of creation given in the Upaniṣads does not thus seem to imply causality as observed in the Universe. Projection of the world from God implies outwardness and a purpose. But Brahman, which has no second, cannot have any purpose.

न तत्स्य कार्यं करणं च विश्वते - - - - - - ।

The account of causal origination scattered all over the Upaniṣadic lore is perhaps intended to make intelligible the identity of the changeful world with the primal Being:

सम्मृङ्गा: सोम्य इमा: सवा: प्रजा: सवायतना: सत्प्रतिष्ठा: ॥

1. Ṛgveda, Ṛg. 6.8
2. Ṛgveda, Ṛg. 6.8.4.
There is also a statement that points to the real nature of plurality:

स यथा सैधवसिल्व उदके प्रार्त्त उजकाखानितियेव न हास्यवृहस्त्रयशेव्य स्वातृ, यतो यत्स्तवादवीत लवणमेवेञ वा अरे इव महाध्युतमनन्तपार्व विज्ञाणानं एव।

Thus the attempt to drive the whole discussion towards fundamental Oneness is so apparent and forcible in the Upanिसads, that in the ultimate analysis, the Upanि�ṣadic seers do not seem to harbour plurality in any form.

Let us now see how, independant of Brahman, the world full of plurality is thought of. In the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa we have seen how the creation is called Śvovasyasam Brahma. The Taittirīya Upanिषad calls it Anrtam Brahma. The world is thus Anṛta-negation of reality-unreal.

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1. ब्रह्म. उप. २.४.१२.
2. छांवो. उप. ६.२.१-२ एकमेवाभित्तियम् - - -।
The sentence is very clear, but in spite of it Dr. Prabhudatta remarks, "The Taitt. Up. does not contain much on the subject. It is mainly concerned with the more realistic conception of the creation of the world from the Ātman." It is amply clear from some discussion above, that what is branded as realistic conception is not in conflict with the Absolutism that all Upaniṣads want to establish. Other Upaniṣads too bear out this very concept about the world expressed by the Taittirīya. We may take note of some of them:

यथा हि ब्रैतमिव भवति तत्वितर इतरं जिग्रति तत्वितर इतरं पश्यति - - - - - -। २

1. तैत्ति. उप. २.६
2. तैत्ति. उप. २.४.१४
It is told that Atman or Brahman is to be concentrated upon, the rest mere verbal exertion:

The same spirit is permeated in the following remarks:

1. बृहदूप. उप. ३.५.२
2. बृहदूप. उप. ३.६.१
3. बृहदूप. उप. ४.५.३२
4. कठोप. २.४.१९
5. बृहदूप. उप. ४.४.२१
6. छांवो. उप. ६.४.४-६/६.४.१-४
Plurality is mere name; modification has no other significance. What we see as modification is a mixture of the pure essence with something wretched:

एष ब्रह्म एष इन्द्र एष प्रजापतिः सर्वेष देवा इमानि
च पच महामृतानि --- --- --- --- इमानि च
शुद्रमिथापीयैः।१

All the finer and grosser evolutes are not reality. They are mixtures of reality with some baser element. We may recall the phrase used by Śaṅkara, Satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya. The limited, the little is always a source of misery. Plurality is called little, limited. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka calls it Ārta as we have; The Chāndogya calls it as little, the source of misery, mortal, destructible:

नाहषे युलसमस्ति।२

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१. पेतेकश्योप. ३.३
२. छांदो. उप. ६.२३.१
The Alpa is thus evanescent, destructible, misery incarnate. One should, therefore be after not Bhūma and after Alpa which is mortal. Those who run after plurality, transitoriness, are called persons labouring under avidyā.

Those who are thus blinded by ignorance must revolve in the round of birth and death.

1. हांवो. ६.२४.१
2. शुंड. इप. १.२.८, कठोप. २.५, मेघुप. ७.९
To be immortal, one must realise Brahman, the one without the second.

About individual soul, we see that the ideas in the Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas continue in the Upaniṣads. We have seen that the microcosm and the macrocosm are not essentially different. They have similar features. The stanza "Sūryam caksur gacchati vātāmātma" indicates this idea in the Ṛgveda. The same is repeated in the Brāhmaṇas as we have seen. The Upaniṣad also gives it thus:

गता: कला: पंचवध प्रतिष्ठाद देवावस्थ सवे प्रतिदेवताः

The individual Ātman is however identical with

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1. बुधब. उप. 4. 4. 19
कठोप. 2. 4. 10
2. मुंडकोप 2. 2. 7
with the Supreme Brahman, as is declared in the famous Mahāvākyas:

अहं ब्रह्मास्ति ।
भवत्सलमात्रम् ब्रह्म।
तत्त्वमासि।
सौःसमस्तमिः।

Many more passages that imply nothing but the essential identity of Ātman and Brahman can be given. The Upaniṣadic lore however, is studied very widely and the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is known too well to need elaboration. It will not perhaps be contradicted, if we compress that philosophy thus:

1. Brahman is the only Reality.
2. Plurality is transitory.
3. Jīva is Brahman alone, no other.

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1. ब्रह्मच.उप. १.४.१०
2. मांडू.उप. २.
3. छांडो.उप. ६.४.७
4. इश्वास्त्रोप. १६
5. मुंडकोप. ३.२.१/३.२.८