CHAPTER II
THE THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN
YOGACĀRA-VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

1. Literary Sources of the Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda

The Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda is one of the most major schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It was founded by Maitreya or Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. As the name implies, Asaṅga’s school continued to emphasize meditation and the practice of yoga (yogacāra) as central to the realization of Bodhi or enlightenment. It has been given to this school largely because the term yogacāra occurs in the title of Asaṅga’s chief work Yogacārabhūmiśāstra. Therefore, this school is called as Yogacāra School. However, the system of Yogacāra is interpreted and systematized by Vasubandhu later, and designated as Vījñaptimātra (consciousness-only) with the works Trimsikāvijñaptikārikā, Vīṃsatikākārikā etc. Hence, it is called as Vījñānavāda School.

The Vījñānavāda literature is the highest philosophical illumination of consciousness in Mahāyāna Buddhism, Vījñānavādins explain on mind/consciousness with new methods. The Yogacārabhūmi-śāstra, Vījñaptimātratāsiddhi śāstra, etc., are great texts that give profound and meticulous analysis on the problem of Mind-consciousness.

The Vījñānavāda School advocated that ‘all that belongs to the triple world is mind-only’ is found in a number of sūtras that are quite early such as the Pratyutpannasūtra and Daśabhūmisūtra, as well as the Saṃdhinirmocara sūtra etc. Thus, the Vījñānavāda system has a very rich source consisting of a large number of sūtras and śāstras of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The most important works of Vījñānavāda doctrine mainly bases on the thought of the
Samdhinirmocarasūtra, the Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra, the Mahāyānālankāvatārasūtra and the Avatamsakasūtra. The Vijnānavādins usually notice its main source with six sūtras and eleven śāstras, they are as follows:

The six sūtras are Avatamsakasūtra, Samdhinirmocanasūtra, Tathāgataguṇalamkarasūtra, Abhidharma-mahāyānasūtra, Mahāyānālankāvatārasūtra, and Ghaṇḍavyūhasūtra.

The eleven śāstras are Yogacāryabhūmi-śāstra, Āryadesanāvikhyāpana-śāstra, Mahāyānālankāra-śūtra-śāstra, Pramāṇasaṃuccaya śāstra, Mahāyānasamgraha śāstra, Daśabhūmika śūtra-śāstra, Viṅkalpa-Yogacāra-śāstra, Madhyaṃta-vibhāga śāstra, Vijnāptimitrata Viṃśatikā, Ālambanaparīkṣa, and Mahāyānābhidyarma samyuktasaṅgiti śāstra.

The great masters of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school

This school of thought is called Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda – an expression that may indicate originally particular interest in a data of meditation experience (yoga) or sometime Vijñānavāda, Vijnāptimitrata or Cittamātra. The theses such as cittamātra, ālaya-vijñāna, trisvabhāva, etc. contained in the mentioned sūtras and which were to constitute important elements of the doctrine of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school, were developed, systematized and put together in a coherent whole logically constructed, during the fourth century A.D. by Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga (C.E. 310-390) and Vasubandhu (C.E. 315-395) and so on.

In the sixth century there is an active series of great commentators of the works namely, Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu; among them we mention Sthiramati (middle of the sixth century) who is one of ten Indian commentator, wrote a commentary (ch’eng wei shih lun–Vijnāptimitrataśiddhi) on the Trimsikā of Vasubandhu and so forth. We shall now refer to four important authors viz., Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga Vasubandhu
and Sthiramati are generally associated with the development of Yogācāra school of philosophy in India.

**Maitreya or Maitreyanātha (270-350)**

It is possible that the earliest named Yogācāra master was the shadowy Maitreya or Maitreyanātha. He was the teacher of Asaṅga. Tibetan tradition however holds that works attributed to Maitreyanātha were in fact delivered to his pupil Asaṅga by none other than the great ‘celestial’ Bodhisattva – to be the very next Buddha here on earth Maitreya himself. Willis also said that the name Maitreyanātha becomes an epithet associated with Asaṅga and his written works.¹ Lamotte also mentioned the extremely clear position taken by Prof. Yamaguchi with respect to the question of the historicity of Maitreya: in contrast to many historians, ancient as well as modern,² hold that there was a historical person who was named Maitreya or Maitreyanātha. Prof. Yamaguchi refused to see Maitreya as a historical personage. According to him, the five treatises which are attributed to Maitreya, the Sūtrālamkāra, etc., are in fact the works of Asaṅga, who wrote them under the real or supposed inspiration of the great Bodhisattva. In order to defend this thesis, Prof. Yamaguchi based himself on the formal declarations of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati in their concluding stanzas (*abhyarcanakārikā*) where they designate Asaṅga as the true narrator (*vaktā*) of the works upon which they are commenting. Prof. Lamotte also argued that if the Hīnayānists could legitimately consider their Scriptures as the very word of the Buddha himself transmitted down through the ages by a succession of masters and disciples, the masters of the Mahāyāna found themselves in an infinitely more delicate situation since the Mahāyāna sūtras, which mark a considerable progress from the original doctrines of the Buddha, appeared only at a relatively late date,

¹ Willis, Janice Dean., *On Knowing Reality*, p. 10.
perhaps around the beginning of the Christian era. Not being able to place their texts within the authority of an uninterrupted oral tradition, the Māhāyānists sought to authenticate their scriptures by means of different stratagems. Five works are sometimes attributed to Maitreya, whoever he was:

1. Abhisamayālaṃkāra,
2. Madhyāntavibhāga,
3. Dharmadharmaṭāvibhaṅga,
4. Mahāyānasūtraṃalaṃkāra and
5. Ratnagotravibhāga or known as the Uttaratantra.

**Asaṅga (C.E. 310-390)**

In spite of the fact that Asaṅga as an important Buddhist philosopher who composed important works in which he developed and systematized the Yogācāra philosophy, the exact events of his life are not known. There are, however, three sources for biographical information: (1) P’o ts’ou p’an t’ou fa shih chuan (婆薮槃豆師傳) by Paramārtha, (2) Ta T’ang hsi yu chi (大唐西域記) by Hsūan-tsang⁵, and The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet by Bu-ston, English translation by Obermiller.

According to these narratives, Asaṅga was born in Puruṣapura (Peshawar) in Northwest India (now in Pakistan) in a family Brahman, he was the eldest of the three brothers; Vasubandhu was second, and Virūciṣṇvatsa was last.

Asaṅga was a man “endowed with the nature of a bodhisattva.” He became a monk in the Sarvāstivādin order.⁶ Though this was probably true for Asaṅga, who entered monastic life much earlier than his brothers, there is clear evidence that before entering the Mahāyāna he belonged for many years

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⁵ P’o ts’ou p’an t’ou fa shih chuan [婆薮槃豆師傳]. T. 50, No. 2049.
⁶ T. 51, no. 2087, p. 867b10-947~1 (especially, 896b20-897a7). English translation has been made by S. Bed. See *Records of the Western Kingdoms*. Trubner & Co., London 1906.

According to Hsūan-tsang, Asaṅga first belonged to the Mahāsākha sub-school. The two sources need not be considered contradictory since the Mahāsākha was a branch of the Sarvāstivāda. However, according to the Mahāvaṃsa, Ch. V, 8, the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Dhammaguptakas sprang from the Mahāśākas: Mahāśākapahikāḥ, bhikkhū sabbatthivādino,
Dhammaguttiyabhikkhū ca, jātā khalu ime duve
In any case, the Mahāśāka and Sarvāstivāda belong to the same lineage.
to the sect known as the later Mahīṣāsakas. Along with their unique blue vestments, the Mahīṣāsakas were famed for the great emphasis the sect placed upon meditation. Because of the dissatisfaction with the doctrine of the Mahīṣāsakā School, he later converted to the Mahāyāna; he was then initiated by Maitreyanātha in the ‘śūnya’ doctrine of Mahāyāna, it was apparently during this time that Asaṅga listened to Maitreya expound the Mahāyāna doctrine in its entirety and that he learned the real significance of all the sūtras. Having accomplished this, Asaṅga then listened to the “Five Books” of Maitreya. As before, it is said that Asaṅga immediately attained samādhi on each aspect of the teachings. Having successfully completed his meditations and studies with Maitreya, Asaṅga was fully equipped to work for the good of mankind. Asaṅga himself wrote some commentaries as well as an important compendium of Yogācāra Mahāyāna, such as the Yogācārabhūmi śāstra, the Mahāyānasamāṇgraha, the Abhidharmamasamuccaya, etc.; and he developed and systematized the Yogācāra philosophy. The following books are ascribed to him:


Vasubandhu (C.E. 315-395)

Vasubandhu was a great philosopher of Buddhism. His position in Buddhism seems wider than his brother, Asaṅga. His stature can compare

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7 Alex Wayman., *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi*, p. 25-30.
with the role of Nāgājuna who before him. The traditional account of Vasubandhu’s life is found in Paramārtha (499-569)’s *P’o ts’ou p’an t’ou fa shih chuan* (婆薮槃豆法師傳) he was born in Puruṣapura, present-day Peshawar, in what was the kingdom of Gāndhāra, around the year 315 C.E in a Brahmin family, his father was a Brahmana of the Kauśika gotra, and his mother was named Virinçī. He has an elder brother, the famous Asaṅga, and a younger one by the name Virinçivatsa. Gāndhāra as a whole was still a stronghold of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism, Vasubandhu entered the Sarvāstivādin order. Vasubandhu studied primarily the scholastic system of the Vaibhāṣika. Initially, he was quite impressed with the Mahāvibhāṣā (Great Book of Option). However, while studying Vaibhāṣika thoughts, he has doubts about the validity and relevance of Vaibhāṣika metaphysics. He was soon dissatisfied with that Sarvāstivāda School. But before leaving it, he composed the famous Abhidharmakosa. Later on he frequently refuted and rejected orthodox Sarvāstivāda in favor of Sautrāntika position.

At that time, Asaṅga fell ill and sent to Vasubandhu. During this reunion, it may be possible that Vasubandhu has discussed with Asaṅga on many problems that arose in his mind. Asaṅga urged Vasubandhu to use his superior mental consciousness to study, spread, and interpret the Mahāyāna. The result of this is that a new series of works on śāstras as well as some Yogācāra śāstras were composed. His own works as the ViṃśatiKā, the Trimsīkā, the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, the Pañcaskandha, the Karmasiddhiprakarana, the Vyākhyāyukti etc. together with commentaries on various Sūtras as well as on the works of Maitreya and Asaṅga, completed the Yogācāra system and designated the tenet of the Vijñānavādin School or Vijñaptimātra.

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Works of Vasubandhu:


Sthiramati (470-550 A.D.)

Among the others, who have made significant contribution to the development of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda is Sthiramati who was one of the ten leading Vijñānavāda scholars who developed the ideas originally formulated by Vasubandhu. Sthiramati was born in Valabhi in Kāthiawar, and became a disciple of Guṇamati, who had settled in Valabhi after some years of scholarly activity in Nālandā, where Buddhist studies were in full bloom. At the time of Sthiramati, Valabhi had attained similar prosperity to that of Nālandā, it is known from inscriptions that king Guhasena of Valabhi, (ruled C.E. 558-566) had a monastery erected for him there. Sthiramati was a contemporary of Dharmapāla, a renowned scholar in Nālandā whose
interpretation of the Yogācāra doctrine was introduced into China by Hsüan-tsong, who himself studied in Nālandā under Śīlabhadra, a disciple of Dharmapāla. On many doctrinal points, Sthiramati differed from Dharmapāla. In the CWSL [成唯識論] of Hsüan-tsang, a compendium of ten commentaries to Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā chiefly based on Dharmapāla’s interpretations, the views held by Sthiramati are often referred to.

Sthiramati is supposed to have written commentaries on Vasubandhu’s eight works, such as Triṃśikākārikāprakaraṇa, Viṃśatikākārikāprakaraṇa, Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa, Vyākhyāyukti, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Sūtrālaṃkāra, Pratītyasamutpādasūtra and Mādhyāntavibhaṅga, and did not compose any independent treatise. The most famous being the Trīṃśikāvijñāaptibhasya (唯識三十論頌疏). Thus with Sthiramati the first phase of Yogācāra idealism comes to an end. Let us see Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda’s analysis of consciousness.

All things, from birth and death to the cause of attaining nirvāṇa, is based upon the coming into being and the ceasing to be of consciousness, that is, of distinctions in the mind or consciousness. Consciousness is subject to suffering because of ignorance, or fundamental not-knowing, which divides consciousness into ātman and dharma or subject and object. In other words whatever is designated as ātman and dharma are merely transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-parināma), attributing the existence of the entire visible world to inner consciousness.

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9 Lamotte., The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu, p. 36.
11 Triṃś. I, p. 28: कोष्ठ परिणामो नाम? अन्यायात्मक / कारणात्मणिोपसमकाल: कारणात्मणिलक्षण: कार्यस्यतत्त्वात्मात्मा: परिणामम्//; AKB. II.36d, p. 64: कोष्ठ परिणामो नाम/ सम्भवस्यात्मात्मम //
12 Triṃś. 17, p. 102: इदंगीमत्सन्धधार्मिकं परिशिष्टं वर्णनं संवेदनस्य ज्ञानात्मा एवं संवेदनस्य प्रकारस्य ज्ञानात्मा धर्मं वै द्वितीयस्यति तत्रसाधनस्यां गार्भ /
consciousnesses’ are ‘consciousness-only,’ (vijñāptimātra). But how can this be proved logically? The outer world does not exist but the internal consciousness presents appearance as if it were an outer world. We know this from the fact that we can nowhere discover any ātman or dharma that is real. What we consider real is not real but only an outward manifestation of consciousness. The whole world is therefore of either imagination (parikalpita) or dependent on nature (paratantra) and no permanent reality can be found. According to Vijnānavāda School suchness (tathātā) is unattained knowledge to realize that the entire phenomenal world with all beings is but a temporary and imagined existence manifested by consciousness on the ultimate perfect ‘reality’ (parinispanna). Thus, based on the transforming interactions of two upacāras, ‘self’ and ‘dharma’ everything follows. These interactions occur in consciousness, which is threefold (ālaya-vijñāna, kliṣṭa-manas and pravṛtti-vijñāna). Let us examine them in more detail.

2. The meaning of consciousness-only (vijñāpti-mātra)

The word ‘vijñāpti’ includes both mind (citta) and feelings (caitta). The word mātra here (only, nothing but, or mere) excludes external objects; it does not do away with mental associates. When inner consciousnesses arise,

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13 Trimś. 17: विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व विकल्पो विकल्पते / तेन तत्सति तेनेदें सर्व विज्ञानपरिभाषकम् //; MVK. 1.9 and Trimśb.17, p. 102: यो यो विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व: तेनें तत्सति सर्वे विकल्पते / तेनें तत्सति / अस्यात्मतत्वाद्यायः: वै शुचित्विषयेऽविकल्पते उपलब्धिः / तेनें तत्सति सर्वे विकल्पते / तेनें तत्सति: / अस्यात्मतत्वाद्यायः: वै शुचित्विषयेऽविकल्पते उपलब्धिः: // Mahāyānasraddhotpadeśastra [大乘起信論], T.32, No. 1667, p. 586a5; STCL [十地經論], T. 26, No. 1522, p.169a16: DBS, VI.49, p. 32: सत्येव भवति विज्ञानपरिभाष्येदिदें जैवत्वकम् / STC [十地經], T. 10, No. 287, p. 553a: सत्येव भवति विज्ञानपरिभाष्येदिदें जैवत्वकम् / यदु तैतत्त्विमित्यूज्ज्वत् / STCL [華嚴經論], Asaṅga also quoted this statement from DBS. T.31, No. 1593, p. 118b24-28; MSA. XI.34: विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व: ग्रहणप्रतिभास ग्रहणप्रतिभास च / तथा साधारणप्रतिभास तथेऽपि // TSN 36: विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व: त्वथायंत्वृत्तमभवत / त्वथायंत्वृत्तमभवत स्थ्याचित्तन्तुलभम || BB. IV, p. 30: तत्त्र कथा यथा निरमणिश्चित्यवस्थायमादि सर्वसंधिर्य विकस्य / वै स्वल्पक्ष्यासाधित्यां यदु रूपभिषि वा वैदेशि वा पूर्वादेशि वा वाक्ष्यविशेषमिति वा प्रस्तुतादेशि लवं विकल्पत / STCL [華厳經論], Asaṅga also quoted this statement from DBS. T.31, No. 1593, p. 118b24-28; MSA. XI.34: विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व: ग्रहणप्रतिभास ग्रहणप्रतिभास च / तथा साधारणप्रतिभाः तथेऽपि //; see also Lanka. III.57, p. 69, X 436b-77a: विज्ञानपरिभाषापूर्व वाक्ष्य / तथा, vijñāpti-mātra (consciousness-only), prajñāpti-mātra (representation-only), and citta-mātra (mind-only) for Vasubandhu, these three phrases are synonymous with each other, and therefore, interchangeable.
seemingly external objects appear; as persons having bad eyes see hairs and flies. But herein is no particular of truth. And by using the word mātra Asanga and Vasubandhu mean that the term ‘only’ indicates the exclusion of the external objects. So the meaning of the term ‘vijñaptimātra,’ would be a theory of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra), representation-only (prajñaptimātra) or mind-only (cittamātra) according to which all the phenomenal objects are to treat in the realm of one’s own saṃsāric experience (grāhya-grāhaka) as consciousness-only or the projection of the discrimination (vikalpa). Since consciousness-only is synonymous with vikalpa, the notion of a cognition that is non-discrimination (nirvikalpa-jñāna) warms us that ultimately something other than the transformation of consciousness or its alteration is the goal. Hence the ultimate insight (prajñā) is characterized as nirvikalpa-jñāna, i.e., as knowledge that is completely freed of discrimination, wholly apart from imaginative constructions. But the often misinterpreted term cittamātra-vijñaptimātra-prajñaptimātra, therefore, which Asanga and Vasubandhu made the hallmark of Yogācāra thought, refers not to a claim of absolute idealism but rather to that state of knowledge which arises when one directly realizes the cause of ignorance or delusion, which is the realization that ordinarily all that we perceive is overlaid with and is consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra) or imagination-only. With such realization there is the concomitant arising of prajñā and the beyond the subject (grāhya) and object (grāhaka) duality. Similarly, terms found in Yogācāra texts such as kalpanā-mātra (nothing but imaginative construction), bhrānta-mātra (nothing but cognitive error), ākṛti-mātra (construction-only), and so on. These terms are emblematic of the problems Buddhism


15 MSA. XI.34, p. 185: वित्तमात्रयुज्यम नामात्मिकं विभ्रस्तं विकल्पयुज्यम च/तथा वकशिव मशिन्य तत्त्वेच्छात्रदित्ताय / MVBT. 1.7-9, p. 20: अपि ज्ञातसन्तलक्षणं हि क्षणसिद्धिकल्यात: कल्पकारमण्डलस्य सम्प्रदायते/ ... तथा विभ्रस्तात्मप्रतिकृतिपरिक्ष्यतं संस्करं प्रज्ञावर्त इति प्रदर्शनायं ख्रायते //

16 TSN. verses 2, 15 and 29.
seeks to overcome, namely ignorance and misconceptions (avidyā, moha, etc.), and do not signify a positive reality. Therefore, the term viññaptimātra is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end. Or it can be directly realized by spiritual experience which transcends the subjects-objects duality.

With the Yogācārin emphasis that consciousness (viññāna or viññapti) exists. This raises the question of whether consciousness itself is ‘real.’ Yogācāra answered as follows:

“Self and dharmas are not existent. Emptiness and consciousness are not inexistent. Neither existent nor inexistent, hence, corresponding to the Middle Way.¹⁷

When Yogācārins say that consciousness is depend on other (paratantra), they are saying that consciousness is empty. This emptiness considered as dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) or dependent on other (paratantra) or middle way.

But if the Mahāyāna view consists of the insight that all dharmas are empty, as even this passage admits, isn’t consciousness empty as well?

No.

Why?

Because that is not what we hold. What this means is that, when, due to consciousness altering … one erroneously clings to [seemingly] substantially-real dharmas that are in principle unattainable, those dharmas are considered empty. Because [they are unlike] viññapti-mātra which is not inexistent, apart

¹⁷ CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 39b2.
from language and realized by correct cognitions [and hence not unreal and
ture, therefore] these [aforementioned false] dharmas are said to be empty.¹⁸

This passage clearly showed that holding or attachment which is the
important issue. What one attaches to must be emptied, as must attachment
ught to; it is existent, non-linguistic and comprehended through correct
cognition. Consciousness is not a false projection (abhūta) one tries to
appropriate; it is incapable of being attached to in that way. The term empty is
used as device, aimed at the overcoming of desire or attachment that clings to
false mental construction. As in the previous verse, emptiness and
consciousness together serve as correctives.

Sthiramati also states that: “It should be admitted that consciousness
(vijñāna) exists reality because of its nature of dependently originating
(pratītyasamutpāda). And a consciousness that dependently originates is
known by the term “transformation” (parināma).¹⁹

From this statement, it is clear that consciousness, discrimination
(parikalpita) and the like are to be understood as dependently arising; hence
they are of the dependant on other nature (paratantra). Thus, consciousness
is the only reality, since emptiness and consciousness only exist dependently
(samvṛti)²⁰, not paramārtha, and they are not eternal realities, Sthiramati
explains the motivation for the compilation of the Tris śikābhāṣya as follows:
“Something that, like consciousness, the object of knowledge exists as a
substance. [Others assume] that like the object of knowledge, consciousness

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¹⁸ Ibid., p. 39b14-17.
¹⁹ Triṃśb. 1, p. 28: चिन्तान पुनः प्रतीत्यसमुपत्तिवादु द्वयोपपस्तीत्यभुजेयम् / प्रतीत्यसमुपत्तव पुनर्ज्ञानस्य
प्रर्थमांशदेन ज्ञापितम् //
²⁰ The word samvṛti corresponds to the Pāli sammuti. From the root वृत, samvṛti means first of all ‘covering,’
‘concealing,’ and so forth. From the other root वृत, two of the earlier meanings of samvarāte are ‘to turn or
go towards,’ ‘to encounter,’ and then later, ‘to come into being,’ ‘to be’ and ‘to exist.’ These meanings
suggest an affinity between samvṛti and pravṛti (coming forth), uṣpāda (origination, production). Sthiramati
explained samvṛti as paratantra, which, in turn, is a cognate term of pratītyasamutpāda, both meaning
“dependent origination”; see also Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya-ṭīkā, p. 94.
exists only in terms of convention (samvrtitah) and not in an ultimate sense (paramārthatah). The treatise compiled for the sake of rejecting these two extreme views.\(^{21}\)

It is not necessary to say, however, that to be dependently originating and thus to be the dependent on other nature (paratantra) does not mean to be the ultimate nature (parinispanna). Ch’eng wei shih lun cites Madhyāntavibhāga, I.2-3 as scriptural and reasoned proof.\(^{22}\)

The unreal discrimination (abhūta-parikapa) exists. In this duality is entirely non-existent. In this, only emptiness exists. In that (i.e., emptiness) this also exists.

Consciousness is discussed in the context of ‘unreal discrimination or imagination’ (abhūtaparikalpa). With a consideration of the process of consciousness in its dependently arising character proceeds to deny the dichotomy of subject and object that always appears within that process, and then expresses the meaning of emptiness through this negation. Further it points out that in the midst of that emptiness; the activity of consciousness nevertheless undeniably exists.

And in the Mahāyānasamgraha also equates consciousness with abhūta-parikapa which though dependent on other nature, is the basis for the ‘unreal’ appearance.\(^{23}\)

Here, discrimination or consciousness in general is modified as the ‘unreal’. It is not that a specific discrimination is singled out from the many and labelled unreal. Insofar as discrimination is dependent on other nature, it is conditionally real; still it is unreal from the perspective of the ultimate truth

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\(^{21}\) Trīṣṭū, I, p. 27; अथवा विज्ञानविद्येयमात्र दृढ़त एवंति केचिन्मात्रादि / विज्ञानविद्येव विज्ञानमात्र संज्ञित एवं न परमार्थात् इत्यादि, प्रामाण्यमध् प्रतिपाद्यं प्रगृहारमेत्: //

\(^{22}\) MVS. I.2-3: अभूतपरिक्षोभिः हि तस्मात् न विद्यातेन / शून्यतेन विद्यातेन तस्मात् तत्त्वात्यत्त्वात् / 2/ न शून्यं नाग्यां च अविच्छेदित्यत्वं तस्मात् तत्त्वात् सर्वं विद्यातेन / सत्यतस्कल्यं सत्योऽनुस्माय प्रतिपाद्य स / 3/

(paramārtha-satya). That is, although discrimination arises depending on other, it arises as unreal so long as the darkness of the basic ignorance (avidyā) is not removed. A judgment that has its basic in this ignorance is, owning to that every ignorance, one colored by the attachment to its own judgment as truth (or false) and this means that one clings to the fruit of one’s judgment as truth (or false).

But when the Yogācārin say that consciousness exists that is: “Since Citta and caittas depend on other things to arise (paratantra), they are like a magician’s trick, not truly substantial (real) entities. But so as to oppose false attachments to the view that external to citta and caittas there are perceptual-objects (viśaya) composed of real, substantial entities, we say that the only existent is consciousness. But if you become attached to the view that vijñaptimātra is something truly real and existent, that’s the same as being attached to external perceptual-objects, i.e., it becomes just another dharma-attachment.”

Thus, Ch’eng Wei shih lun declares that consciousness is not true dravya (substance). The claim that consciousness is the only existent is made for epistemological not ontological reasons. Thus, vijñaptimātra indicates not reality. On the contrary, it is a “magician’s trick” as explained above. The claims made are the name of vijñaptimātra is aimed only antidotes to attachment, one that involves positing an external world ripe for appropriation. Therefore, vijñaptimātra aimed at the overcoming of attachment of grāhya or grāhaka.

24 CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 6c23-26: STCL, [識大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 118b11-16. (Thus all conscious objects are consciousness-only because there are no external objects. They are like a dream. In a dream everything is consciousness-only without any relationship to any external object. All the objects that appear as real therein, such as the various material forms, voices, odors, tastes, touches, villas, gardens, lands, mountains, etc., have no real objective being whatsoever. This example shows how in all cases there is consciousness-only. The term “etc.” above indicates other examples, such as magician tricks, mirages, optical illusions, and so forth.)
The above explained the phrase *vijñaptimātra* does not at all refer to anything absolute or ultimate. On the contrary, the perception of *vijñaptimātra* is presented only as the first step towards the realization of the unreality of graspable-grasper duality. This is clear from the above analyses. However, to illustrate this point still more clearly, I shall once again recall the instances in Asaṅga and Vasubandhu’s writings where the phrase *vijñaptimātra, prajñaptimātra, and cittamātra* occur:

In the Mahāyānasūtrałārka, Asaṅga says that: “There is mind-only which has the appearance of duality; the appearance of grasper and the grasped; thus alone, it has the appearance of suffering, passion, etc.”25 And he continues in his Mahāyānasūtrałārka, the doctrines of mind-only are not to be understood as ultimately valid, since in the end the goal is to realize that even mind does not exist, and thus realizing that there is no subject-object.26

He uses this phrase, he means whatever falls within the reach of one’s samsāric experience (*grāhya-grāhaka*), is *citta*-only or consciousness-only.

Even in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, he explained that entities are taught to be *representation-only (prajñaptimātra)*27:

“What philosophical reasoning is the inexpressible nature (*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvataḥ*) of all dharmas to be understood? As follows: Whatever is a designation for the individual characteristics of the dharmas, for example, form or feeling or other personality aggregates, or, as before explained, even

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25 MSA. XI.34: चित्मत्तात्मैव द्वैपतितासमित्यते ग्राह्यप्रतिभासं ग्राह्यप्रतिभासं च तथा रागादिक्लोणाप्रभावम् तदवेष्यते //; TCZYCL [大乘庄严经論], T. 31, No. 1604, p. 613b14-16; Laṅka. III.33, p. 154: इसाम न विद्यते बा हिं हि हि हि हि हि हि // देहेऽगतिप्रियाचर्या चित्मत्तात्म वद्यक्षयम् //
26 MSA. VI.6-9: चित्मत्तात्मैव नासिनवाचर्यान्मग्नाम्ग्राह्याप्रभावो ग्राह्याप्रभावो ग्राह्याप्रभावो // 11.47 तत्व प्रविष्टति विज्ञितात्मतत ग्राह्याप्रभावं ग्राह्याप्रभावं ग्राह्याप्रभावं //
27 Prajñapti displays at least nominal, heuristic existence, but whatever is ‘unreal and false’ does not exist at all, though it may appear in certain types of erroneous cognitions to be the case (e.g., mistaking a rope for a snake).
up to ‘nirvāṇa,’ that should be understood to be only a designation or representation-only.  

Asaṅga concludes that what valid arguments establish these other consciousnesses [i.e., the last six] as consciousness-only? In sum there are three approaches: (1) since all consciousnesses have been shown to be consciousness-only, then the only criterion is consciousness, for external objects have no existence; (2) there are only two functional divisions (bhāga) in consciousness, i.e., image (nimitta) and perception (darśana); and (3) because the images variously produced are included in consciousness. 

Here, it is quoted the Asaṅga’s Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā, I.7, and its commentary by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati: 

Dependent upon perception 
There arises non-perception, 
And depending upon non-perception 
There arises non-perception. 

Vasubandhu’s commentary: 

Dependent upon perception that there are consciousness-only, there arises the non-perception of knowable things. Depending upon the non-perception of knowable things there arises the non-perception of consciousness-only. Thus one understands the negative definition of graspable and grasper.

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28 BB. IV, p. 30: तद कथा युक्ता निर्मितिवस्त्रभक्ता सर्वायां प्रवक्तवच्या / वेदं तद्वर्त्त्तत्त्त्तत्त्तत्त्तत्त्तत्त्तत्त्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तত्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत्तत

29 STCL [lectures], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 119a1-3.

30 MVK. I.7: उपलब्धिः समाधिः नोपलब्धिः नावाद्य नोपलब्धिः नावाद्य नोपलब्धिः / आवाद्य नोपलब्धिः निबद्धिः बिज्ञानिविवाहस्य गवावलब्धिः गवावसंविवाहस्य / /}

31 MVKB. I.7: विज्ञानिवाहस्य निबद्धिः बिज्ञानिवाहस्य निबद्धिः बिज्ञानिवाहस्य निबद्धिः / आवाद्य नोपलब्धिः नावाद्य नोपलब्धिः नावाद्य नोपलब्धिः / / T. 31, No. 1600, p. 465a7-9.
Asaṅga begins his Madhyāntavibhāga with a clear assertion of existence which serves to differentiate the cittamāra from the Mādhyamaka: the imagination of the unreal (abhūta-parikalpa). In it duality does not exist. Emptiness, however, exists in it.

Vasubandhu understands this stanza as a further illustration of the negative definition of the abhūta-parikalpa namely, that it is lacking in graspable-grasper duality.\(^{32}\) Sthiramati adds in his subcommentary that the imagination of the unreal from the point of view of inherent existence, and free from duality.\(^ {33}\) What precisely is this imagination of unreal (non-existent)? It is already clear from the way the term has been used that it must correspond in some way to mind or consciousness,\(^ {34}\) that is, the flow of perceptions and experiences, but consciousness understood apart from its normal dualistic connotation into subject and object. Because form (rūpa) etc. is not perceived outside the consciousness, the consciousness arises in the appearance of form, as in a dream.\(^ {35}\) The fundamental point here is that the imagination of unreal is the same as the non-dual flow of perceptions which manifests itself (erroneously) as exterior and interior objects. This inherently existing non-dual consciousness is also stated to be the same as the dependent nature.\(^ {36}\) However, the dependent aspect is referred to as the imagination of unreal it appears to be the tained dependent aspect which is being considered, the dependent aspect which is the substratum for samsāra, which has as a matter of fact been constructed into subject and object.

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\(^ {32}\) MVKB. 1.2: अभूतपरिकल्पनश्च प्रत्यक्षेऽवत्सः कथाप्रवृत्तिः //
MVKB. 1.7: तस्मिन्तथाभूतसप्तसमस्तासां ततुपादिलक्षणं परिदीप्यति //

\(^ {33}\) MVBT. 1.7: अभूतपरिकल्पद्वायुपादिलक्षणं च / प्रायंगायक्षोरसाश्चात्तसिद्धांतमय /

\(^ {34}\) MVKB. 1.7: अर्थस्वत्त्वार्थाविज्ञातिप्रतिभाग्ये प्रज्ञाते विज्ञान //

\(^ {35}\) MVBT. 1.2: न भूतपरिकल्पनं कस्यं चतु गायको व्याख्यानाय नापि केतनव गुहाते / / कति तह गायकहर्षं भावमात्रे विज्ञान //

\(^ {36}\) MSA. XI.40: प्रायंगायकलक्षणं / / अभूतपरिकल्पतीं हि परतन्त्रस्य लक्षणम् //

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So what this above mentioned MVK (1.7) stanza wants to get across ultimately is the unreality of the graspable-grasper duality.\(^{37}\)

The same stanza clearly says also that there are no perceivable objects.\(^{38}\) If there are no perceivable objects, what else, then, is experienced by the ordinary people as objects?\(^{39}\) They are all, as stanza from MVK 1.5 says, ‘imagination of the unreal’\(^{40}\) or, as stanza 1.8 says ‘appearance of unreal objects.’\(^{41}\) This ‘imagination of the unreal’ or ‘the appearance of the unreal object,’ the present stanza calls *vijñapti*, the representation of consciousness, and starting with this idea it recounts the whole process of realization once again.

Thus the first step towards the realization of the unreality of the graspable-grasper duality is the perception that there are consciousness-only (*vijnaptimātra-upalabdhi*). The second step there is non-perception of objects (*artha-anupalabdhi*), as Vasubandhu says, which arises depending upon the first perception of *vijnaptimātra*: ‘Depending upon perception, there arises non-perception.’ The third step in the process of the realization of the unreal of the subject-object duality. This is the non-perception of even the representation-only (*vijnaptimātrasya-api-anupalabdhi*).\(^{42}\)

Therefore Vasubandhu concludes, ‘one comprehends the negative definition of the graspable and grasper.’\(^{43}\) That is, through the non-perception of the objects one comprehends the unreality of graspable, and through the non-perception of even the consciousness-only one comprehends the unreality

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\(^{37}\) MVKB, 1.7: एवमसत्त्वक्त्रणं प्राणं प्राणः: प्रविशिति //

\(^{38}\) MVKB, 1.4: नासितं चास्यार्धश्रद्धावताः /

\(^{39}\) MVBT. 1.8: बालामस्तत्त्वश्चार्थपल्लवो /

\(^{40}\) MVK. 1.5: अभूतपरिकलप्तम् सिद्धमः प्रविशितः: //;

\(^{41}\) MVBT. 1.5: अभूतपरिकलप्तवच वेषावचतीन्नि विज्ञानां सिद्धम् //

\(^{42}\) MVBT. 1.8: अभूतसमापत्तश्च: //

\(^{43}\) MVKB. 1.7: अंतःनुपल्लित्व निन्दित्व विज्ञानार्थम्बुद्धिमाधि-अनुपल्लित्वं //

\(^{44}\) Ibid., 1.7: एवमसत्त्वक्त्रणं प्राणं प्राणः: प्रविशिति //
of the grasper. Thus finally one attains to the realization of the unreality of the graspable-grasper duality.

By this reasoning it can be seen that the doctrine of representation-only is established, leading way to the realization of the non-substantiality of all dharmas (sarvadharma-rainātmya).  

A similar analysis can be carried out also with Trisvabhāvanirdeśa verse 36, which is an instance of cittamātra, which only the term vijñaptimātra in this later case is replaced by the term cittamātra (mind-only):

Through the perception of mind-only

One achieves the non-perception of objects;

Through the non-perception of objects

There is also the non-perception of mind. 

Apparently external objects are constituted by consciousness and do not exist apart from it. Vasubandhu begins his Vimsatikā: “All this is consciousness-only, since consciousness manifests itself in the form of unreal objects,” means that the perception of the sixfold object is consciousness-only. In other words, in perception one’s psychological disposition, especially the idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, makes the object (artha) appear in a way in which it does not really exist (asat). Thus the way an object is perceived is consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra).

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44 Vims. 9, p. 11: तदात्मार्थ: विज्ञातिमात्र नास्तिति / धर्मान्तत् प्रवेशायेन भवति /; WSESL [唯識二十論], T. 31, No. 1590, p. 75c11-12.
45 TSN. 36: विपिनसुपत्ताब्रम्भेण ज्ञातारुपावलम्बता / ज्ञातारुपावलम्बन स्थायितानुपलम्बन /
46 Vims. 1: विज्ञातिमात्र विषयाक्षरस्वस्यास्त्र /; Vims. 1: महावर्तन वैद्यात्मार्थ: विज्ञातिमात्र विषयायात्मार्थ: / विज्ञातिमात्र भो निम्नोपा / यदूत भैषारकवितिः सुनबस्त /
47 Trimś. 8: (विषयवस्त्र विज्ञातिः) शहिरवस्त्र या विषयवस्त्रपरि: /
Triṃśikā-17 says that: The transformation of consciousness is imagination. What is imagined by it does not exist. Therefore everything is consciousness-only.  

In Triṃśikā one comes across a more comprehensive use of the term *vijñaptimātra*. In some instances quoted above *vijñapti* is meant the subjective forms of consciousness which the ordinary people mistake for objects, and thus it is ultimately meant the forms of subjectivity. But in Triṃśikā it includes not only forms of subjectivity but also forms of objectivity; although in the final analysis all of them will turn out to be just appearances / transformations of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*). In other words, in Triṃśikā, *vijñapti* is the general term for subject-object (graspable-grasper), or ātma-dharma distinction. Therefore, transformations of consciousness discriminates (*vikalpa*) what is discriminated (*vikalpyate*). Since everything that is discriminated (“this” from “that”), and perhaps even the discriminator, are entirely inexistent, thus it all belongs to nothing but consciousness.

*Citta* and *caittas* are transformations of consciousness. These *citta* and *caittas* invariably involve the discrimination (*vikalpa*) between the subjects and object. This discrimination, however, having no extra-mental basis is but consciousness-only (*tena idam sarvam vijñaptimātrakam*). This stanza is a reaffirmation of what the first one in Triṃśikā stated, namely that all provisional expressions (*upacāra*) of ātma and dharma (subjectivity and objectivity) are transformation of consciousness. Further, as Sthiramati says: all *upacāras* of ātma and dharma being just transformations of consciousness, have no independent existence, is further clarified here, all *citta* and *caittas*, and the forms of subjectivity and objectivity in which they appear, too, are here referred

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48 Triṃś. 17: विज्ञानपरिणामोऽव विकल्पो यदिकल्प्यते / तेन तत्स्वस्ति तेनेत्र सर्वव विज्ञानित्वात्रकम्//; WSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 61a2-3; CSL [轉識論], T. 31, No. 1587, p. 62b20-22.
49 Trīṃśāb. 17, p. 102: इत्यार्थार्थविकल्पास्य यद्यपि एवं इत्यार्थार्थविकल्पास्य विज्ञानपरिणामम् पूर्वभागवाच्या धर्मा वेदि यत्राति तत्राति तत्प्रसाधनायमाह //

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to as consciousness-only. “In any case, what the stanza describes as consciousness-only cannot include anything more than subjectivity and objectivity (ātman and dharma), the discrimination between them (vikalpa), and citta and caittas. It does not include any of the bhūtas (existence) and bhautikās.” In short, what is described as vijñaptimātra in this context are the contents of one’s psychological experience, and not anything absolute or ultimate.

Significance of the suffix ‘tā’

The vijñaptimātratā as against vijñaptimātra can also mean the state in which one realizes that the entire contents of one’s saṃsāric experience are consciousness-only. When this term vijñaptimātra is used, it means to say that the contents of one’s saṃsāric experience, (subject-object distinction) are consciousness-only. When this term vijñaptimātratā is used, it means a state of nirvāṇa, which one realizes that what one experiences in the state of saṃsāra is a consciousness-only. What is the purpose of adding the suffix ‘tā’ with vijñaptimātra? From the study of two usages of the suffix ‘tā’ in the Yogācāra tradition (i.e., the usage of such terms like tathatā and dharmatā) it can be shown that the suffix ‘tā’ when added to any such terms like dharmatā, tathatā or vijñaptimātratā, the term is used to show the state of nirvāṇa. In other words, the function of the suffix ‘tā’ is to indicate the state to be realized (sākṣat karoti). Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi, which happens to be the general title for Vasubandhu’s two treatises, Trimsikā and Vimsatikā, thus would mean ‘the attainment (siddhi) of the state in which one realizes that whatever is experienced in the state of saṃsāra is consciousness-only’. Vijñapti-mātra refers to the fact that the contents of one’s experience are consciousness-only, while vijñapti-mātratā refers to the state of nirvāṇa in which one realizes the same fact. This does not mean that the state of nirvāṇa

50 MSA. VI.8, p. 72-73: नासित्वित्वमुपेत्रि तस्मात् / इवस्य नासित्वित्वमुपेत्र दीनानां/ सतित्वमत्रद्विधिवर्धणम् //
is itself consciousness-only. To take an example from ordinary life, one wakes up from sleep to realize that what one was experiencing in sleep was all dream-only. This does not mean that the wakefulness in which one alone has this realization, is itself mere dream. 51

A few instances of *vijñapti-mātratā* meaning the state in which one realizes that the contents of samsāric experience are consciousness-only, may be cited from Mahāyānaśāstra and Triṃśikā:

In the Mahāyānaśāstra explains that: “in all cases those things that are seen by a person who is awake are consciousness-only like objects in a dream. But when a person awakens from a dream, he recognizes that the dreamed objects are consciousness-only. Why then does one not similarly awaken from [the illusion of objectivity]? It is similar, for a person who has attained wisdom awakening to suchness does not lack such an understanding. Just as a person yet dreaming does not wake up as long as he remains dreaming, but a person already awakened does have this awareness. So one who has not yet attained an awakened wisdom to suchness lacks this awakening, but one who has already attained a wisdom awakening to suchness certainly has this awareness. If one has not yet awakened to suchness in wisdom in regard to consciousness-only, then how can he infer this understanding? He can do so by reflecting upon the scriptures and by true reasoning. In scriptures said that the three worlds are mind-only. 52

The *vijñaptimātratā* meaning as described in the Mahāyānaśāstra that: By reasoning upon this scripture we can clarify the meaning of consciousness-only. How so? When the mind of a practitioner of meditation is already in the meditations of totality, he enters into a totality of color-image,

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51 Vins. 17: विज्ञाप्ति-प्रतीत्तिसम्बन्धता, ब्रह्मवैद्यम्।। विज्ञाप्ति-प्रतीत्तितर्थम्।। विज्ञाप्ति-प्रतीत्तिश्च, प्रतीत्तिसम्बन्धता।।

52 STCL [般大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 118b16-25.
as when he sees blue or yellow, but this mind does not itself see these material forms of blue or yellow as external objects. From this reasoning a bodhisattva can infer the meaning of consciousness in regard to all consciousnesses.

The conscious construction of blue or yellow is not consciousness of memory, because the object seen is immediately present. In the mental consciousness of remembering what has been heard or reflected upon, consciousness has as its object things past, which arise as past. Therefore [this case of the concentrated mind] does demonstrate the meaning of consciousness-only. From this inference a Bodhisattva, even if he has not yet attained a wisdom awakening to suchness (tathatā), can infer the meaning of consciousness-only.53

It is clear that if man has not yet realized tathatā (suchness), he experiences in the state of saṃsāra is consciousness-only.

Trimśikā 25 says that:

This supreme truth about all dharmas (dharma-paramārtha),

Is also tathata (suchness, absolute reality),

Because it is immutable, remaining constantly thus in its nature.

This is the true nature of consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātratā).54

According to Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi śāstra, Paramārtha is of three kinds: (i) Artha-paramārtha, which is tathatā (suchness), because the latter is the artha of parama, i.e., the object of supreme wisdom; (ii) Prapti-paramārtha, which is nirvāṇa, because the latter is the parama artha, i.e., the supreme thing; (iii) Pratipatti-paramārtha, which is the Noble path, because the latter has parama as artha (object), i.e., the supreme dharma, nirvāṇa. All these three kinds are included in parinispāna: the first two, because they are

53 Ibid., p. 118c5-12.
54 Trimś. 25: धर्मार्थ सत्यसत्यतां सत्यसत्यतां सत्यसत्यतां सत्यसत्यतां // CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 48a1-2.
immutable; the third because it is non-erroneous. And this Paramártha is the ‘real nature of vijnaptimátratā.’ In fact, vijnapti-mátra is of two kinds: (i) unreal or false, i.e., parikalpita; (2) real, i.e., parinispam which is Tathatā (suchness) or nirvāṇa as mentioned above. So, vijnaptimátratā is understood to mean the state of nirvāṇa which is the same as suchness, and in which one realizes that what one experiences in the state of samsāra including the threefold transformation of consciousness, citta and caittas, and the subject-object distinction (vikalapa) is consciousness-only.

The same interpretation of vijnaptimátratā applies also Triṃśikā 26, 27, and 28:

As long as consciousness does not abide in vijnaptimátratā, the attachment to the twofold grasping will not cease to operate.

One does not abide in it [i.e. vijnaptimátratā] just on account of the [theoretical] perception that all this is vijnaptimátratā, if one places [= sees] something before oneself.

One does abide in vijnaptimátratā when one does not perceive also a supporting consciousness, for, the graspable objects being absent; there cannot either be the grasping of that, [namely, the grasping of the supporting consciousness].

In short, consciousness manifests itself into subject and object. It arises out of its own seed and then manifests itself as an external object. That is the reason why the Buddha said that there were two bases of cognition internal and external. By knowing this, one realizes that there is selflessness of

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55 CWSL [成唯識論]. T. 31, No. 1585, p. 47c1-4; 56 Ibid., p. 48a28-29; Triṃś. 25, p. 125: कि पुनस्वभिं तेजोर्ज्ञस्य एक विज्ञातिस्मात ज्ञात्य विज्ञातिस्मात // 57 Triṃś. 26: याबल्कविज्ञातिमेयेव विज्ञान नावतिक्षति / ग्राहंद्वस्यानुभूतिक्रमं विनिवर्तते // 58 Triṃś. 27: विज्ञानविज्ञानभद्रव्येव द्विपलक्ष: स्थायिकः: किचिद् तन्नयेऽनवतिक्षति // 59 Ibid., वद्वल्लत्तर्विज्ञानेव नैवोपलभते तद / स्वतं विज्ञातिस्मातेऽयेव चाहार्यते तदग्रहत //; see also Laiika, chapter III, p. 169: यदा त्वालस्मार्यम् नैवोपलयते ज्ञाने तदा विज्ञातिस्मातव्यवस्थानं भवति / विज्ञातिस्मातः ग्रहस्यस्य प्रधानः भवति / तदग्रहणात्र प्रवर्तते ज्ञान विकल्पसंश्चिदितम् //
persons (pudgala-nairātmya) and the selflessness of dhammas (dharma-
nairātmya), and that there are no external objects, as both (grāhya-grāhaka or ātma-dharma) are only manifestations of consciousness.  

3. Three self-natures (trisvabhāva)

With the Yogācārin emphasis that consciousness is not empty and that all external objects are unreal, one fundamental question is raised: How do we view the world in which we live? The answer to this fundamental question was written by the Yogācāra masters Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and is known as the three-nature theory (tri-svabhāva). The theory defines the three ways by which we perceive our world. The three-nature theory holds that the world is constituted of these three natures. This does not mean that the world is divided into three divisions or parts, and that these three components make up the world. Neither does it mean that there are three separate and different worlds. According to the three-nature theory, the world remains at all times one and the same, appearing on different occasions to possess one of the three natures. In other words, all beings, whether psychical or physical, can be comprehended within these three states of existence, which in this context are called ‘natures’ (svabhāva). Everything in the world possesses these three natures. The three natures are (1) the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva),

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60 Vīpaś. 9-10: यत: स्वभावविडितव्यवमासा प्रदत्तते / विविधायतनवेन ते तत्स्य मुनिकवीत // तथा 

61 Consciousness depends on other things to exist (paratantra). Thus, consciousness or paratantra exists, but only by depending on other causations, consciousness is also the same thing, it is a definite product created out of nothing by the interaction of the indriyas and viṣayas. Therefore, consciousness is not empty, but it is like a magician’s trick, not truly substantial (real) entities. As CWSL explains that, T. 31, No. 1585, p. 6c23-26: Citta and caittas depend on other things to arise (paratantra), they are like a magician’s trick, not truly substantial (real) entities. But so as to oppose false attachments to the view that external to citta and caittas there are perceptual-objects (viṣaya) composed of real, substantial entities, we say that the only existent is consciousness. But if you become attached to the view that vijñaptimātra is something truly real and existent, that’s the same as being attached to external perceptual-objects, i.e., it becomes just another dharma-attachment.

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(2) the dependent on other nature \( (paratantra-svabhāva) \), and the ultimate perfect nature \( (parinispanna) \).\(^{62}\)

The word \( vikalpa \), \( vi \) used as a prefix to verbs or nouns and other parts of speech derived from verbs, to express “division,” “distinction,” “on distribution.”\(^{63}\) Therefore, the word \( vikalpa-parikalpa \) means ‘imagination’ with a common implication of falsity; hence its cognate word, \( parikalpita \), means ‘imagined or imagined attachment.’ When one falsely imagines something and becomes attached to it, the reality and existence of the thing imagined are negated. The imagined nature \( (parikalpita-svabhāva) \), therefore, is characterized by ‘unreality’ and ‘nonexistence.’

In contrast to this, \( parinispanna \) means perfect, real, and existent and connotes ‘reality,’ ‘truth,’ ‘real existence,’ or ‘the absolute.’ It is a reality completely perfected by a practitioner through arduous practice.

The imagined nature on the one hand, which is nonexistent, and the perfect nature on the other, which is real and existent, stand as direct opposites. Between them is the third nature, called ‘\( paratantra \)’, the dependent on other. It exists, but only by depending on some other entity. It is relative and characterized by relativity.

As in the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāsyā says that “The imagined nature \( (parikalpita-svabhāva) \) is always nonexistent. The dependent on other nature \( (paratantra-svabhāva) \) is existent, but not as real reality. The perfect nature

\(^{62}\) Trimśā, 19, p. 115; यदि विज्ञातात्मकपावेदं करव न सूक्ष्मविद्याः। / सूक्ष्मव्याहति त्रय। स्वभावा उक्तं। परिकल्पितं। रतन्त्रं। परिनिर्विशेषक एव च। / त्रय। स्वभावा धीर्मण्ड । / MVS. 1.6, p. 18; कल्पित: परस्त्रक ग्रिनिप्रेषणतं एव च। / अयोध्य कृत्यविशेषक द्वाराभवाच दे:धित्वाः। / chapter 3; STCL [増大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 118a22-23; MSA, XI.13, 38-41; Yogācārabhūmi-viniścayasamgrahaṇi, T. 30, p. 703a24-703b5; Sandhi, chapter VI-VII; See also Daisetz T. Suzuki has written on the three svabhāvas in his *Introduction to the Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, p. xxxiv-xxxv.

\(^{63}\) SED, p. 949.
(parinispanna-svabhāva) is both existent and non-existent in an absolute sense."\(^64\)

According to the Yogācāras, this doctrine derives its scriptural authority through the Vaipulyasūtra, the Abhidharmasūtra, and the Ghanavyūha. It receives more thorough treatment however in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Mahāyānasamgraha, and the Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā of Asaṅga, and the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and the Triṃśikā both ascribed to Vasubandhu, and Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya-Tīkā of Sthiramati.

Of the three natures only parikalpita (the imagined) and paratantra (dependent on other) are defined as characterized by defilement (saṃkleśa-lakṣanam); while parinispanna (absolutely accomplished nature) is defined as characterized by pure (vyavādāna-lakṣanam).\(^65\) However, by distinguishing the three natures into just two groups, namely, saṃkleśa-lakṣanam and vyavādāna-lakṣanam; that means one is parinispanna-svabhāva looks at things as they are (yathā-bhūta),\(^66\) while one in paratantra and parikalpita-svabhāvas looks at them as subjects and objects or ātman and dharma. This in turn means that the distinction between nirvāṇa and samsāra is basically only a matter of view point: one in the state of nirvāṇa view things as they are in themselves, while one in the state of samsāra is bound to view them as endowed with the forms of subjectivity and objectivity.\(^67\) Hence, the attainment of nirvāṇa is the basis revolved (āśraya-paravṛtti) from paratantra

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\(^64\) MVKB. III.3: परिकल्पितलक्षणं नित्यमस्वप्तित्तु परिकल्पितस्वभावे तत्त्वम्, अविपरीतत्त्वम् / पत्तनतत्त्वकं सचं न च तत्त्वो भावत्त्वम्, इत्येव भावत्त्वम् / विनिवध्वेणलक्षणं सदसतत्त्वत्त्वम्, इत्येव धवनिनिवध्वेणस्वभावे तत्त्वम् //

\(^65\) TSN. 10: सदसतत्त्वो बृद्धकालां संस्कृतत्त्वदानवश: लक्षणार्थकत्त्व तत्त्वावधानम् गणभीरता //

\(^66\) The accomplished nature of course represents a level of knowledge in which independent existence of self and other are precluded and there is perfect union of knower and known, Epistemology and ontology. In this state things are seen as they are (yathābhūta). This is conveyed by the Trimb 21b: निधानस्तत्त्व पूर्णं सत्त्व भिन्नताः तु या //; Trimb 28 and Trimb 28, p. 130: when one attains non-discrimination wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) and sees things as they are (yathā bhūtadarsana); See also AN V 3: Dhammata esa ... yaṁ samāhito yathābhūtām jānati passati.

\(^67\) See Kochumuttom., A Buddhist Doctrine Experience, p. 91-126.
and *parikalpita-svabhāvas* into *parinispanna-svabhāva*. Let us elaborate the three natures one by one in more detail.

### 3.1. The imagined nature (*parikalpita*)

The first *svabhāva* is called *parikalpita*, because it is the ‘self-nature’ of objects that is grasped by *chou-p’ien-chi-tu* (周遍計度), i.e., false imagination in a general manner.

In the *Mahāyānasamgraha* Asaṅga says:

Why is it termed imagined nature? Because the discriminations of thinking consciousness in unlimited ways cause error, it comes to be imagined. Because it has no specific character of its own, but is only the seeing of imagined distinctions, it is termed imagined. And the imagined nature is of two varieties. The first is the imagining of essences, while the second is the imagining of specific qualities.68

This nature is the world as it is perceived through the first six levels of consciousness. In this imagined nature, things are incorrectly conceived based on attached and erroneous discriminations. Thus, *parikalpita* constitutes a cognitive closure that intrudes into the very process of knowing/perceiving one’s self and the world, or anything in cognition. In fact, since *parikalpita*’s basic assumption is that whatever it discriminates has substantialistic existence (*svabhāva*), it basically functions at that which ‘discriminates’ the world into ‘self’ and ‘perceived components,’ i.e., *ātman* and *dharmas* or subject and object (*grāhya*, *grāhaka*). What renders *parikalpita* erroneous is not simply the fact that it discriminates, but more importantly, that these discriminations instigate and deep attachment to the ‘self’ and ‘*dharmas*,’ thereby generating a self-made obstacle on the path of cultivation. This is the

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source of the cosmic illusion that results in so much suffering. It is said in the Trımśikā that:

Whatever thing is imagined by whatever imagining
Is of an imaginary own-nature, and non-existent.

CWSL explains this verse as follows: the first line describes the consciousness that imagines (neng-p‘ien-chi-shi). The second line describes the object which is imagined by the imaginative consciousness (suo-p‘ien-chi-shi). The last two lines say that the nature of ātman or dharmas conceived or by grasped by the imaginative consciousness absolutely does not exist, because we have already sufficiently demonstrated the non-existence, as such, of the ātman or dharmas.

It is clear that the parikalpa or false imaginations being of numerous kinds, the text says: ‘whatever imagining’. It signifies that there are a number of false imaginations (abhūtaparikalpa-hsu-wang-fen-p‘i-虛妄分別) which imagine and discriminate falsely. What is imagined by these false imaginations is a great variety of imagined objects, that is to say, the numerous svabhāvas ['self-natures' or entities], skandhas, āyatanas, dhātus, etc., are falsely conceived as ātman or dharmas.

These multiple entities falsely conceived are designated by one single name: ‘nature of mere-imagination’, parikalpita-svabhāva. This svabhāva refers to the forms of ātman and dharma or subjectivity and objectivity; its reality depends entirely on its cause (i.e. the dependent on other nature, which is the same citta) and therefore is mere imagination, and as such it is unreal.

69 TSN. 4: तत्र कि यथायसनक्त्यं कथं यथात्ति इत्यादयम् /and 35a: विचार्यकारणाः दत्तं...योक्ष्यापत्तेनस्त; /
70 Trīṃś. 20: येन येन विकल्पेन यद्य यद्य वस्तु विकल्प्यते / परिकल्पिते एवासी स्वभावे न स विद्यते /; WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 61a14-15; however, in the Lankāvatāra sūtra contains one particularly close parallels to Vasubandhu Trīṃś. Lankā 3.163: पुरुषस्य महामतिविशालं यथैववैवद्वैं प्रभवति येन येन विकल्पेन से व वाक्य विकल्प्यते / न हि स तेष्व स्वभावे भवति / परिकल्पिते एवासी /
71 TSN. 2: प्रत्ययाधीनवृत्तिवातु कल्पनामात्रभावतं /
(abhūtāparikalpa) and totally non-existent (asat-kalpa) of duality (dvayābhāva) and illusory. Thus, subject and object distinction is the only factor the Yogācārins attribute to the operation of imagination. Sthiramati further make it clear that by the negative definition of the imagination of the unreal Asaṅga and Vasubandhu mean the non-existence of subject and object (grāhya-grāhaka).

3.2. Nature of dependent on other (paratantra-svabhāva)

After having been explained the ‘parikalpita’, the ‘paratantra-svabhāva’ has to be discussed upon; and so it said: ‘nature of dependent on other is produced by discriminative cause and conditions.’ So the term paratantra (dependent on other) is the same meaning as the term pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination). It connotes the idea of the ‘relativity’ of all things, and denies all absolutes, either ātma, Brahman and so on, as permanent entities.

Similarly in the Mahāyānasamgraha Asaṅga says:

Why is it said to be nature of dependent on other? Because, arising from its own perfumed seeds, it is interwoven with causes and cannot be independent [it is dependent on others]. Because it does not arise spontaneously and cannot for an instant be independent, it is termed dependent on other.
The nature of dependent on other is the very source of the saṃsāric existence of an individual. The dependent on other is citta which imagines the non-existent (asat-kalpa) forms of subjectivity and objectivity or ātman and dharma; it manifests itself (khyāti) under the double forms (khyāti dvayātmanā) of subjectivity and objectivity. This nature emphasizes everything arises dependent on things other than itself (everything lacks self-existence). By reason of their dependence on conditions it is described as the nature of dependent on other. Sthiramati summarizes all these points as follows: There the (subjectivity-objectivity) discrimination is the own-form of the dependent on other nature. It is named the 'dependent on other', because it comes into being depending upon conditions. There the imagination of grāhya-grāhaka is the same as the citta and caittas, good as well as bad, belonging to all three worlds. It has been said: the imagination of the unreal (subjectivity-objectivity discrimination), however, is citta and caittas belonging to three worlds.

Understanding this nature is the equivalent to understanding the basic Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda), i.e., the identity of pratītyasamutpāda and paratantra. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu held pratītyasamutpāda and paratantra to be synonymous. They both operate in a way that makes sense of the worldly discrimination between the ignorant and the enlightened state. The explanation of these two states is undertaken with either pratītyasamutpāda or paratantra as the central term in all the Buddhist writings we have examined, be they the Nikāyas, or the writings of Asaṅga and...
Vasubandhu. All our authors then recognize the centrality of pratītyasamutpāda /paratantra, that uncreditable state of things which provides the rationale for the arising of bondage/release. Thus, we see that paratantra is referred to as both a base (āśraya) for the appearance of things, and that state which gives coherence to the twin notions of saṁsāra and nīrṇāṇa.

Paratantra may, in a sense, be considered under two aspects. The first is that which occurs in tandem with perfumed seeds, while the second is that which is unformed in regard to purification or defilement. Thus we speak of dependence on other in virtue of these two mutual relationships.\(^{82}\)

Asaṅga puts these notions in the following manner:

_Saṁsāra_ is referred to the dependent nature in its aspect of defilement. _Nīrṇāṇa_ is referred to the same in its aspect of purity.\(^{83}\)

Expanding a little we may say that _paratantra_ is the basis for the arising of all the pairs of concepts which define the distinction between enlightenment and unenlightenment, be they _nīrṇāṇa/saṁsāra_, purity/defilement, bliss/suffering, self/non-self etc.\(^{84}\) the only stipulation we need to make is that this basis (āśraya) must not be assumed to have equality of relationship with both elements of the pairs. Taking _nīrṇāṇa/saṁsāra_ as an example it is clear that saṁsāra represents a falling away from the base; a failure to understand it as it is. _Nīrṇāṇa_ on the other hand is complete identification with the base for objectivity and subjectivity does not exist as this point.

When imagined in terms of self- and other-natures, it is infected by _parikalpita_. _Paratantra_ can therefore be considered the equivalent of relative knowledge or relativity, whereas the _parikalpita_ consists solely of the fabrications of one's own imagination or mind. Furthermore, _paratantra_

\(^{82}\) STCL [攔大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 119c23-25.
\(^{83}\) STCL [攔大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 129a29-129b2.
\(^{84}\) Ibi., p. 121a21-27.
embodies at least some degree of truth with regards to objects, but *parikalpita* implies “not only an intellectual mistake but some affective functions set in motion along with the wrong judgment”. A mind that functions at the level of understanding *paratantra*, compared to *parikalpita*, is closer to achieving insight into the ultimate nature of reality. *Parinīśpanna* is *paratantra* devoid of *parikalpita*. So *parikalpic-paratantra* is a *saṃkleśa* or defiled *paratantra*, while *parinīspannic-paratantra* is a purified *paratantra* from which all *parikalpita* has been flushed away, cleaned.\(^{85}\)

### 3.3. Ultimate nature (*parinīśpanna-svabhāva*)

The third way to view existence is *parinīśpanna* ‘perfectly, accomplished ultimate nature’. Vasubandhu states in his *trimśikā*:

“When the dependent on other nature (*paratantra*) obtains a state absolutely free of the imagined nature (*parikalpita*), it is then the ultimate nature.”\(^{86}\)

In the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, Asaṅga says:

“Why is it termed ultimate nature? Because suchness without not is suchness, it is ultimate. Because it perfectly purifies all realms and is the highest of all good states in the fullness of ultimate meaning, it is termed ultimate. The accomplished nature is also of two varieties. The first is essential perfection, while the second is purified perfection.”\(^{87}\)

*Parinīśpanna* is *paratantra* cleansed of *parikalpita*. It is defined as characterized by purity (*vyavādāna-lakṣaṇa*). If individual destroy subject and object discriminating activity of the mind, there one has the absolutely nature. It corresponds to Right View of the Noble Eightfold Path and reflects the suchness (*tathatā*) of reality, allowing us to become acquainted with things as

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\(^{85}\) CWSL. T. 31, No. 1585, p. 46b7-9; Wei Tat, p. 633; TSN. 17.

\(^{86}\) Triṃś. 21cd: निष्प्रतास्य पूर्वेण सदा रहिततं तु या //

\(^{87}\) STCL [攝大乘論]. T. 31, No. 1593, p. 119b28-119c2; and p. 119c26-27.
they really are. In this way, \textit{parinispanna-svabhāva} or ultimate reality is the complete and perfect ‘real nature’ of all \textit{dharmas} which is revealed by the two ‘voids’ of \textit{grāhya} and \textit{grāhaka} or neither a subject nor an object (\textit{pudgalanairātmya} and \textit{dharmarainātmya}).

It is beyond making distinctions, names, words, appearances and concepts. However, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu take great care to explain that ultimate nature is neither different nor non-different from compounded phenomena. This is an illustration to explain this point with the analogy of a conch and its white colour.

The ultimate, which has a character completely transcending difference and non-difference, is subtle...profound...and difficult to understand. For example, consider a conch and its white colour. The white colour of the conch is not different from the conch, since it is a quality that pervades it. On the other hand, the white colour is also not the same as it, since they can be differentiated by thought and discussed separately.

In the same manner, the ultimate and conventionalities exist in mutual dependence and are not suitable as being either “non-different” or “different”.

The conch is compared to the character of phenomena, and whiteness is compared to ultimate nature because it is a property or trait that pervades the entire conch. This implies there is a necessary and intimate connection between conventional existence of phenomena and the ultimate, just as the conch and its whiteness must exist in a mutually dependent manner. This does not mean, though, that the whiteness is the conch, since there are other qualities of the

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88 Trimś. 25: धर्माणां परमार्द्वं वस्ततथनावि सः /
89 MVKB. 1.2: शून्यता तस्याभृतपरिक्लप्तस्य ग्राह्यग्राहकभावेन बिहितता //; Trimśb. 21, p. 118-119.
90 Trimś. 22: अत एव स नैवाचयो नानय: परतन्त्र: / अनिवादिकं वाचयो //; WSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 61a18-9; MVKB. III.3 परिनिष्ठालक्षणं सदसत्तवत्क्ष, इत्यतदू परिनिष्ठालक्षणं तत्क्र //; Wei Tat., p. 635.
conch, such as its shape, that do not pertain to its whiteness. Colour is a quality that reflects the nature of, and yet is not bound by, the conch.

Similarly, parinispanna transcends both the conventional reality of parikalpita that fuels attachments and the relative reality of paratantra that affirms a dependence on substantial matter to exist – the third svabhāva is, in essence, the ultimate reality of emptiness (śūnyatā). Parinispanna gives rise to a heightened awareness that negates ātman-dharma or the subject-object dichotomy and existence of an external world. Therefore, parinispanna is characterized on the one hand by the absence of the imagination of non-exist forms and on the other hand it is the very non-duality of subjectivity and objectivity;[92] further, the absolutely accomplishment nature can never be otherwise.[93] When one can recognize the external world as simply an extension or projection of one’s own mind, this can help overcome mental afflictions due to grasping and clinging, and free of all false imagination, thereby restoring inner tranquility. Therefore, the world is no longer imagined and contaminated; it is pure (vyavādāna-laksana) and perfect nature (parinispanna-svabhāva).

Thus, the parinispanna-svabhāva is not entirely different from the paratantra-svabhāva, but is not quite non-different either. The simile of ‘impermanent etc.’ should not, however, be stretched too far to say that one can never have parinispanna-svabhāva as such. For the realization of parinispanna-svabhāva is the ultimate aim of the Yogācārin. Therefore, the comparison applies only to the ‘neither different nor non-different’ aspect in both cases.

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92 TSN. 4: तस्य का नासिकता तेन या तब्राण्याधर्मं।
93 Ibid., 3: परिनिष्पन्नश्चाभावोजन्यादानतः।
Now, let us examine one of the examples that appears in the Yogācāra texts as an illustration of the three-nature theory. In the following, I shall examine the “magician’s trick” simile.94

The magician in a magic show takes pieces of wood or other materials, and by employing chemical compounds, incantations, and so on, creates an elephant, or some other illusion. The audience is astonished, even frightened, by the magically created form. But once the magic show is over, what remains on the stage is not elephant, but the wood or other material that was hidden from the audience throughout the performance. Although the audience is frightened by the magically created elephant, the magician is not. He remains calm and unmoved throughout; because he knows the truth about the magic and the skillful deception he is performing.

The purport of this simile can be summarized as follows. An elephant form appears; but this magically created elephant is not real; what really exists is the wood or other material. It is not difficult to see which of the three natures these three elements are intended to represent. The words ‘an elephant form appears’ stand for dependent on other nature (paratantra); ‘magically created elephant’ stands for the imagined nature (parikalpita) which is “not real”; and ‘what really exists is the wood or other material’ stands for the dependent on other nature as well as the ultimate nature (parinispānna).

The audience is frightened on seeing the magically created elephant, because they believe that the elephant they are seeing really exists. They believe and become attached to what they see on the stage. This belief, attachment, or imagination is called the “imagined nature” (parikalpita). Because the audience believes that what is not real is real, their belief is called ‘imagination.’

94 MSA. XI.18-29; TSN 26-30; SED, p. 811: The word māyā means deception, trick or apparition; secondary meaning illusion, magic, unreality. Thus, māyā, as the ‘unreality’ or ‘illusory image’ of the universe.
The wood and other materials the magician employs, and the whole process of making the elephant form appear from these materials, can also be understood to pertain to dependent on other nature (paratantra). The form of the elephant is magically created with these materials as basis, in the manner of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), and this means that the creative process at work has a dependent on other nature.

Thus, the appearance of the magically created elephant and the process by which it was made to appear on the basis of certain materials are events that occur to both enlightened and unenlightened. For the unenlightened ones, the events that occur serve only to expand their imagined world (parikalpita), because they are the causes of their attachment to the world that is originally of dependent on other nature (paratantra). For the enlightened ones, such is not the case. But the unenlightened ones look at the dependent on other world without attachment, delusion or imagination that is they realize the ultimate nature (parinīspanna).

So, for vijñaptimātra or cittamātra philosophy, like any Buddhist system, is soteriological in intent. The point of the system is to gain liberation from the delusions, attachments and suffering of samsāra in order to be able to assist other sentient beings in accomplishing the same. From the cittamātra point of view, the root delusion is the taking the imagined nature of things to be their reality, and to fail to appreciate the other two natures, the identity of the three natures, and hence to fail to achieve the viewpoint represented by the ultimate nature (parinīspanna) which reveals the world as it is.

In short, the unfolding of the three natures in praxis leads to the realization of vijñaptimātra. This is not other than the realization of emptiness.
It is the limit of the real, it is suchness, it is emptiness, it is sameness, it is liberation, it is the state of consciousness-only.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{Vijñaptimātra} then is the complete elimination of discursive and dichotomous thought and is equivalent to the attainment of the accomplished nature:

But here [i.e. \textit{parinīspanna-svabhāva}] there is nothing outside, because both are mutually established. It is not between. But it is certainly not totally non-existent, for it is established as mind-only.\textsuperscript{96}

At this stage one realizes that, up to this point one has taken the products of mere representation of consciousness (\textit{vijñaptimātra}). One attains an understanding of things non-discriminative wisdom (\textit{nirvikapajñāna}) and sees things as they are (\textit{yathābhūtadarśana}).\textsuperscript{97}

In short, the three-nature theory not only defines the way in which we perceive the world, but also explains the illusions of the world that we see around us, and how those illusions are created. One who truly understands the intentions behind the \textit{trisvabhāva} teachings will, \textit{parikalpita} will represent the starting point of the path in ignorance which has been established as none other than the subject-object distinction, while \textit{paratantra} becomes the bedrock of this samsāric condition but at the same time signifies those moments of consciousness at the base of everyday experience which may be met with more powerfully in meditation. \textit{Parinīspanna} corresponds to the end of the path in which nothing but consciousness (\textit{vijñaptimātra}) exists and there is no subjectivity (\textit{grāhya}) and nothing objectivity (\textit{grāhaka}). This is \textit{nirvāṇa}.

\textsuperscript{95} MVK. I.14; STCL [\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \textcopyright], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 120c2-8; Samādhi. 28; Trīṃś. 25; and Laṅka. X.174.

\textsuperscript{96} A Garland of Light: kambala's \textit{Ālokamāla}, tr. by Christian Lindner, p. 121: \textit{तत् किंचिद् बहिन्नत्रिलोकत्तेऽसिद्धितं: / नानास्वभावं नानावेयं वित्तमात्मावस्थितं: //}

\textsuperscript{97} Trīṃś. 28 and Trīṃśūb. 28, p. 130: यथा भूलायतदार्टत् न तु जात्यथवित् ... एवं हि सम्मानात्मावलब्धं निविकल्पं लोकेऽत्रं ज्ञातविकल्पं /
All *citta* and *caittha* are transformation of consciousness (*vijñāna-parināma*) has been said, this transformation of consciousness is of three kinds, namely, the ālaya-vijñāna, kliṣṭa-mana, and mano or *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. Let us elaborate them in some detail.

4. Mechanism behind the creation of reality-Ālayavijñāna, Kliṣṭa-mano-vijñāna, Pravṛtti-vijñāna

As we before-mentioned in the Theravāda Tipiṭaka as well as in the Pāli commentaries, three terms *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are considered as synonyms. In the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda system, Asanga and Vasubandhu divided the aggregate of consciousness (*vijñānakṣandha*) the fifth of the five skandhas, into three different aspects, namely, *citta* is ālaya-vijñāna, *manas* is kliṣṭa manas and *vijñāna* is *pravṛtti-vijñāna*.  

What is the definition of the aggregate of consciousness? It is the mind (*citta*), the mental organ (*manas*) and also consciousness (*vijñāna*). And now, what is the mind? It is the store-consciousness of all the seeds impregnated by the residues of the aggregates, elements and spheres. The result-consciousness and the appropriating-consciousness are the same thing also, because of the accumulation of those residues. What is the mental organ? It is the object of the store-consciousness which always participates in the nature of self-notion.
associated with the four defilements, viz. the view of self, love of self, pride of I am and ignorance. And this is present everywhere in favorable, unfavorable and neutral states, except in the case of one facing the path, the attainment of cessation, the stage of the learned and also the consciousness that has just this instant ceased among the six kinds of consciousness. What is consciousness? It consists of six groups of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental consciousness.

(1) The first is the consciousness in which fruits (retribution) ripen at varying times. It is the ālaya-vijñāna. It is called ‘retribution’, vipāka, or literally, the ‘varyingly maturing consciousness’, because it possesses in abundance the nature that matures at varying times and in varying categories, that is to say, it is vipāka in the largest number of cases.

(2) The second is the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates, i.e., the consciousness of intellection. It is the seventh consciousness or kliṣṭa-manas. It is called ‘cogitation’ or ‘deliberation’ because it cogitates or deliberates at all times without interruption in contradistinction to the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna), which is subject to interruption. [The eighth consciousness and the first five are exempt from cogitation.]

(3) The third kind is the consciousness that perceives or discriminates spheres of objects. It is the same as the first six consciousnesses (the five sense-consciousnesses- eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, - and mano-vijñāna which is the sense-centre-consciousness). It is so called because it perceives and discriminates between gross spheres of objects.

These three kinds of consciousness or eight consciousnesses are all called ‘consciousnesses that are capable of transformation and manifestation’ (vijñāna-parināma).

The complete eight consciousnesses necessarily functioned within the wider Yogācāra’s philosophy to explain first why man is enmeshed in the
cyclic world (*samsāra*), second how man should extricate himself from it, and lastly the state of liberation when he is free from it.

This intention of Yogācāra philosophers leads them to give a moral dimension to their eight consciousnesses which are distinguished in this whole mental system of Buddhist psychology. Let us examine eight consciousnesses in detail.

4.1. The nature of Ālaya-vijñāna

The first transformation of consciousness is *ālaya-vijñāna* which called the mind. It is the store-consciousness of all the seeds impregnated by the residues of the aggregates, elements and spheres. The result-consciousness and the appropriating-consciousness are the same thing also, because of the accumulation of those residues. The term *ālaya-vijñāna* first occurred in the *Samdhinirmocana,* which the term *ālaya-vijñāna* considered as the most basic scripture of the Yogācāra School, the problem of the *ālaya-vijñāna,* one of the major theses of the Yogācāra School.

Lambert Schmithausen also said that the starting point of the whole philosophic enterprise in Yogācāra is *ālaya-vijñāna,* which is taken “as the basic principle of pollution (*samklesa*) . . . as the seat or sum of badness (*dausthulya*), and . . . as constituting, or having the nature of it, ultimate unsatisfactoriness (*samśkāraduhkhhatā*) or the Truth of Suffering (*duḥkha-satyā*).”

4.1.1. Etymology and names of the Ālaya-vijñāna

**Etymology of the Ālaya-vijñāna**

First, let us look at the notion of “*ālaya-vijñāna*” (store-consciousness). Etymologically the word *ālaya* is a nominal form composed of the prefix ā
“near to, towards” with the verbal root *lī, “to cling or press closely, stick or adhere to, to lie, recline, alight or settle on, hide or cower down in, disappear, vanish.” Therefore *a-lī means “to come close to, to settle down upon, to stoop.” Thus *ālāya means “a house, a dwelling, and a receptacle.” Accordingly, *ālāya-vijñāna is usually translated as “storehouse-consciousness or receptacle consciousness.”

Names of the Ālaya-vijñāna

The ālāya-vijñānam is mentioned in some different names in the Mahāyānasamgraha, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Saṃdhinirmocana, Abhidharmasasamuccaya, Yogācārabhūmi, Trīṃśikā, Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi, and Pañcaskandhapakaraṇa which presents five synonyms of this consciousness, along with “etymological” explanations of their characteristics:

The Ālaya-vijñāna

Why this consciousness (vijñāna) is called the ālāya-vijñāna?

It is called ālāya-vijñāna because all afflicted dharmas which have an origin dwell (*āliyante) in this [vijñāna] as a fruit (*phalabhāva), and because this [vijñāna] also dwells in them as cause (*hetubhāva). Or it is called ālāya-vijñāna because sentient beings adhere (*āliyante) to this consciousness (vijñāna) as [their] self.⁴⁴

The name of this consciousness has three meaning: (1) it is actively ālāya (storehouse), because it plays the active part of storing up the bijas which, being stored, are passively ālāya. (2) it is passively ālāya (store) in the sense that it is ‘perfumed’ by the defiling dharms of saṃklesha. (3) It is

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⁴² SED. p. 903.
⁴³ Ibid., p. 194.
⁴⁴ STCL [大乘論], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 133b21-133b24; Sthiramati also explains the same as ASAṅga in the Trīṃśī. 2, p. 30: तत्र सर्वत्थर्थग्यं: धम्मेऽनुचलाद्वा आलयं: / आलयं: स्वायत्तिक ह्वात्माया: / अयः वालिवन्ते उपनिर्ध्रयं उपनिर्ध्रयं कारणाय वहने सर्वध्येऽस्ति/ ASM. I, p. 11: आलाये वहने सर्वत्र धर्मो वालये: सत्त्वा वालिवन्ते ग्रंथावलीविशिष्ठये: / TCCYL [大乘成業論], p. 784c28; Saṃdhi [解深密經], T. 16, No. 676, p. 692b16-17.
the object of attachment (我愛執藏). *Manas* attaches itself to it as to its ātman. In other words: The ālāya-vijñāna and the defiling dharmas of *samkleśa* are the cause of one another; sentient beings hold on to the ālāya-vijñāna and imagine that it is their inner self.105

CWSL defines as follow, by the word ālāya-vijñāna, the specific nature (svalaṅkaṇa) of the eighth consciousness. This consciousness has the characteristics of being both cause and effect: its ‘self-nature’ (svalaṅkaṇa) is to ‘concentrate’ on these two characteristics and to depend on them.

The self-nature of this consciousness admits of many variations according to the three stages of spiritual progress. The name of ālāya is appropriate for this consciousness only when it is in the first stage which is characterized by its being ‘grasped’ by *manas* as the inner self.106

Ādāṇa-vijñāna or characteristics of Ālāya-vijñāna

“This consciousness continues (pratisamādhāti), and since it appropriates to itself (upāḍadāti) the body (kāya), it is called the appropriating consciousness (ādāṇa-vijñāna).107

This consciousness is also called clinging consciousness (ādāṇa-vijñāna), because this consciousness follows and clings in the body.108 The appropriating consciousness appropriates and upholds all the physical sense organs of sentient beings and because it is the support for taking up all the experiences of rebirth. Why is this so? Because all the physical sense organs, having been appropriated by this consciousness, do not pass away until the end of life. When it continues into new rebirths, it is able to engender and make its own their formation, for this is how the physical bodies in the six

106 CWSL, Book 2, p. 104-105.
107 ASM. I. 9A, p. 11: ध्यान: ध्यान: प्रतिद्विक्षितः विद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायविद्योपायवि
destinies are appropriated. It is thus that the bodies in the six destinies are made one's own. Because this taking up is due to the appropriating of this consciousness, it is called the appropriating consciousness.  

"With the clinging consciousness (ādāna-viṣṇā) as the basis, the foundation, the bodies of six types of consciousness operate—the consciousness of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and intellect. Here, the eye, consciousness, and form and color are the conditions producing eye-consciousness. Discriminating conceptual consciousness operates along with eye-consciousness, at the same time and with the same objects.

The ear, nose, tongue, and body with consciousness, and sound, scent, flavor, and feeling, are the conditions producing ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness. Discriminating conceptual consciousness operates along with these consciousnesses, at the same time and with the same objects.

When the eye-consciousness alone is operating, there is only one discriminating conceptual consciousness operating along with the eye-consciousness. When two, three, four, or five bodies of consciousness are operating, there is still only one discriminating conceptual consciousness operating along with the five consciousness bodies.

"It is like a torrent of water: if conditions for the production of one wave appear, then only one wave is formed; if the conditions for the production of two or more waves appear, then two or more waves form. The torrent itself, nonetheless, flows constantly, without interruption of exhaustion.

It is also like a clear mirror: if the conditions for one image are there, just one image appears; and if the conditions for two or more images are there,
then two or more images appear. The surface of the mirror itself does not change into images, and no end to its function can be found."

In the same way, because the torrent like clinging consciousness acts as a basis, as a foundation, when there are conditions producing the eye-consciousness, then the eye-consciousness operates, and when there are conditions producing the five consciousness bodies, the five consciousness bodies operate.\(^{110}\)

Thus, the ādāna-vijñāna is the basis of body, world of body, living of consciousnesses as well as objects of consciousnesses. It appropriates and upholds all the physical sense organs of sentient beings and because it is the support for taking up all the experiences of rebirth. In other words, the ability, feature or bīja and currentness of bīja of all dharmas are representation of mūla-vijñāna. What is called to be the world is representation of karma-vijñāna or community of actions. Karma is, after all, only accumulated when it is informed and instigated by the affliction (kleśa). Nevertheless, the affictive tendencies of ‘attachment’ and ‘clinging’ that accomplish this, and which were already implicit in the very terms ādāna and ālaya themselves, are clearly indicated in the famous verse which mentioned in the Mahāyānasamgraha śāstra:

"The appropriating consciousness, profound and subtle; like constantly flowing, proceeds with all of its seeds. I have not revealed it to the foolish fearing that they would only imagine that it is a soul."\(^{111}\)

Ādāna is described to be a very deep and subtle. Therefore, common or ordinary people can not aware of what it grasps and receives, of its place and of its power of perception and discrimination. Why would the foolish imagine

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\(^{110}\) Samdhī [解深密經], p. 692b19-692b8.

\(^{111}\) STCL [識大乘論], T.31, No. 1594, p. 133b27-28; Triṃśāb. 34: अनन्तिकालिको धातृ: सर्ववत्ससमाधव: न्यास्मि पति सति गति: सर्वं निर्विन्धिगमयमि व। (阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如爆流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執為我); TCCYL [大乘成業論], p. 784c25-26; Samdhī [解深密經], p. 692c22-23.
that it is a soul? Because this consciousness has no beginning and lasts until the end of samsāra: because, very subtle in its aspect, it does not change. But the six consciousnesses, in their points of support, object, aspect, and modality, are gross and easy to know; as they are associated with the defilements and with the path which opposes them, as they are included within the categories of defilement and purification, their nature is that of a caused consciousness. By this argument, one will know that a cause-consciousness (būja-vijñāna) exists. Nevertheless the sūtras through expediency, do not speak of this cause-consciousness (hetu-vijñāna) because it differs from the aforementioned [six consciousnesses]. Such is the intention of the sūtra when it speaks solely of the six consciousnesses. By this, we have explained why the sūtras of the other schools (Nikāya) speak solely of the six bodies of consciousness as limb-of-existence consciousness (bhavānga-vijñāna), etc; and, considering their circumstances, they are not in error.112

Vipāka-vijñāna

Sthiramati explains the word vipāka as follows: Vipāka means the accomplishment of maturation as the natural outcome of impression (vāsanā) of good or evil deeds (moral antecedents) as foreshadowed (by the antecedents).113

Since it is the retribution (vipāka) of actions laid down in past lives (pūrvajanman), it is also called retribution-consciousness (vipākaphalavijñāna).114

Considered as effect, the eighth consciousness is called vipāka. It is the vipākapalha [異熟果], the ‘fruit of retribution’ of good or bad deeds which draw or direct the individual concerned into a certain sphere of existence, into

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112 TCCYL [大乘成業論], p.785a24-785b3.
113 Trisūh. 2, p. 30: (तिष्कंक) तत्र क्रुद्धादिकिन्यक्षरलक्षणस्मृतिप्रभावस्वरूपः कस्ये कल्पितेऽन्तर्गताः /
a certain destiny, and into a certain womb \( (dhātu, gati, yoni) \)\(^{115} \) for reincarnation. Apart from this consciousness, there is neither ‘vital principle’ nor any \textit{dharma} which can form a perpetual series and be truly and pre-eminently \textit{vipākaphala}.

“By the term \textit{vipāka} [異熟], the author indicates all the ways in which the eighth consciousness becomes the fruit \( (phala) \) [果] of past actions etc. The fruit of this consciousness assumes many forms and is of many kinds according to the different stages of spiritual life. We must distinguish these different stages: the eighth consciousness of the Buddha is not \textit{vipāka}, but it is \textit{vipāka} in all other sentient beings. It is also the only \textit{dharma} which is really \textit{vipāka}, none of the other consciousnesses being entitled to that name. Furthermore, this name is extensively used to cover four of the five stages of spiritual progress. For this reason, the eighth consciousness is designated generally by the term “\textit{vipāka}”.\(^{116} \)

\textbf{Sarvabṭjaka
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Considered as cause, the eighth consciousness is called \textit{sarvabṛjaka} or the ‘all of the seed’\(^{117} \), which means that it is endowed or furnished with all the \textit{bījas}. It is capable of holding firmly and retaining the \textit{bījas} of all dhammas, without allowing them to be lost. Apart from this consciousness, no other \textit{dharma} is capable of retaining the \textit{bījas} of all things.

\textbf{Citta
}

This thought is also called mind \( (citta) \) because of it accumulates \( (cita) \) of the various seminal impressions.\(^{118} \)

\(^{115}\) Trīṃsāb. 2, p. 30: विज्ञानावति विज्ञानम् / सर्वधातुरत्तिप्रविधायलिक्षुः कुशलाकृतिशल कर्मविपाककलात् सर्व‌िनपाकः

\(^{116}\) CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 7c26-29; CWSL, Book 2, p. 105-107.

\(^{117}\) Trīṃsāb. 2, p. 30: सर्वधर्मवैस्वेद्यालात् सर्वबौजकम्

\(^{118}\) STCL, [攝大乘論本], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 134a9-10; See also ASM. I. 9A, p. 11: तत्त्वसृष्ट्यमृत्युमित्र्याम्रः / सर्वधर्मवैस्वेद्यालात् / Samūhi [解深密經], T. 16, No. 676, p. 692b17-18.
The Yogācāra emphasizing this aspect define the ālaya-vijñāna as citta (mind)\textsuperscript{119} in the sense of being built up by the residua or impression (vāsanā) of former experience. Citta is both stores and gives rise to all seeds of phenomena and knowledge.\textsuperscript{120}

4.1.2. The origins of the Ālaya-vijñāna

The concept of the ālaya-vijñāna is already introduced into in terms of earlier canonical background and its contemporaneous Abhidharma context. We know this from the Scriptures and by logical reasoning.

It is first explained that the support for the knowable is termed the storehouse-consciousness. Where has the Blessed One spoken of this consciousness? Where did he call it the ālaya? In the Mahāyāna-Abhidharma-Sūtra the Lord spoke these verses:

"The element since beginningless time is the common support of all dharma;
As this exists, so do all the destinies as well as the attainment of Nirvāṇa."\textsuperscript{121}

A discussion of the verse from the Vijnānavādin standpoint is found in the Vijnānavāda-sūtra, Astānga and Vasubandhu explained the 'element' as the ālaya-vijñāna.

Thus, the fundamental eighth consciousness, mūlā-vijñāna, inasmuch as it is provided with all bijas, is capable of enveloping and storing up all impure dharmas (samkleśa). This is why it is given the name ālaya-vijñāna. The

\textsuperscript{119} Pañcaśīra. 114: वृत्तचित्रविज्ञान तत्तथैव तत्त्वसंस्काराणां संचित बीजम् \ (Sakv. II 34, p. 208: वासनासहितविज्ञानान्य सौज्ञुलिकमात्र मोहावायस्मात् वा /).

\textsuperscript{120} ASM. I, p. 11-12: तत्र विभग्ने कथम\textsuperscript{122} सक्तवर्धात्वकस्य निदर्शनपरिचितम् सर्वविज्ञानविज्ञानम् विद्याधिकारमित्रमुदापादव / तत्रवाजस्ताधिकमादनिधीविज्ञानसमयि तत्/ तदानुप्रस्तातितमुपादव //

\textsuperscript{121} STCL, [護大乗論本], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 133b15-16: 師資時來者, 一切法等依, 由此有諸趣, 與涅槃證得; Sthiramati’s commentary on the Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu, verse 19, p. 108: अनादिकालिको धातुः सर्वधर्मसामायः तस्मिन् सति गति: सर्वं निर्विबोधिगमोपि वा /
Buddha teaches it only to the Superior Ones. And also because sentient beings cling to it as to their own ‘self’, therefore in the Samdhinirmocana said that the Buddha have not taught it to the ignorant, lest they should imagine it as a self.

In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra it is also said: ‘Just as the ocean, by reason of the wind which conditions its surface movements (pratyaya), produces many waves while its potentialities continue without interruption, so the ocean which is the ālaya-vijñāna, battered by the wind of objects etc., always produces waves which are temporary consciousnesses while its potentialities continue without cessation.’ The eye-consciousness and those other sense-consciousnesses which are not ālaya-vijñāna are not, like the ocean, perpetual series that can produce consciousness-waves. Therefore an eighth consciousness must exist.

4.1.3. The Ālaya-vijñāna as seed

As we mentioned above the ālaya-vijñāna is considered as sarvabijāka.

The term bija means seed which is another name for vāsanā (perfuming). Both the term “seed” and “perfuming” used interchangeably and indiscriminately in the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra.

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122 The Bodhisattvas who having entered the ‘Path of insight into transcendent Truth’, have obtained the ‘actual discernment of truth (tattva-abhisamaya) are called ‘Superior Ones.’ They are capable of realizing and comprehending the nature of the ālaya-vijñāna. It is therefore fitting that Bhagavat should reveal it to them.
123 Samdhī [解深密經], T. 16, No. 676, p. 692c22-23; Wei Tat, Book 2, p. 194-195.
124 Laṅka. II.99-100, p. 46: तरंग वृहद्वैधव्यप्रत्येकाः: नृत्यानां: प्रत्यक्षाने युच्छेदव न विद्यते // (99) आलोकीयस्य नित्यं विषयपन्नित: चित्तस्तरस्वतं विचारन्त्रितमात्र: प्रत्यते // (100); CWSL. Wei Tat., Book 2, p. 194-195.
125 TCCYL [大乘成論], 783c5-6; Adv. 261, p. 225: शास्त्रविविधत्वानि विषयस्त्रितां चित्तस्तरस्यादिकेतिनेनादि नित्यथेत तदनावषयव्याप्तां प्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेण च नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च/ न/ विचित्रविविधप्राप्तिः प्रद्धिः। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादिकीप्रक्षविलैत्वधिकारेन। नात्मनन्तरविस्तारितं च। विद्यासाधनीत्वादि...
The bijas are the different potentialities (śaktiviśeṣa) which are found in the mūla-vijñāna, root-consciousness, i.e., the ālaya-vijñāna, and which immediately engender their fruit, that is to say, the actual dharma.\(^{127}\)

The standard model in which the forms of manifest consciousness arise sequentially and argues instead that the various forms of vijñāna must arise simultaneously in order for the seeds and impressions to be able to be infused (paribhavita) into the ālaya-vijñāna, and thus, by extension, for karma to be able to operate. The ālaya-vijñāna which has all the seeds (sarvabījaka) is present at all times as the cause of just those defiled dharma.

Bijas are of two kinds

Natural or inborn bijas: these refer to the potentialities which have innately existed since before the beginning of time in the vipāka-vijñāna by the natural force of things (dharmatā) and which engender skandha-āyatana-dhātus.

It is in regard to these bijas that Bhagavat (the World-honoured One) has said in the Aksayamati sutra: ‘All sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have had different kinds of dhatus (bijas) which are inherent in them and which, like heaps of myrobalan grains, exist by their own specific nature (dharmatā).’ These bijas are called ‘natural bijas residing or inherent in the basic nature.’

Bijas whose existence has had a beginning:

These bijas have come into being as a result of perfuming (vāsanā) by actual dharma which has been repeated and repeated since before the beginning of time.

\(^{126}\) CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 8b8-10; Wei Tat., p. 112-114; STCL [攝大乘論本], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 134c24-6; STCL, T.31, No. 1953, p. 115a25-26; T.31, No. 1594, p. 134c13-14; CWSL [成唯識論], T.31, No. 1585, p. 8a6-7.

It is in regard to these bijas that Bhagavat has said: 'The mind of sentient beings is perfumed by defiled and pure dharmanas. Hence it is an immense accumulation of bijas.' – The sāstras also say: 'Defiled and pure bijas are born by reason of perfuming by defiled and pure dharmanas.'

Thus, seeds (bijas) contain both pure and impure seeds. The pure seeds spontaneously produce pure dharmanas, and the impure seeds impure dharmanas.

The impure seeds (sāsrava) [有漏種], are the acquired cognitive habits preventing one from reaching enlightenment. The Pure seeds (anāsrava) [無漏種] also labeled ‘unpolluted,’ which as they reach full maturity, bring one closer to awakening.

Bija is another name for vāsanā. The perfuming occurs as the basis is ceasing and the perfumer arising, this is simultaneous. Vāsanā is defined in the Mahāyānasamgraha as “that which, based upon arising and ceasing simultaneously with a dharma, is the cause of its arising [in the future].” It is like, for example, when a sesame seed is perfumed by a flower (puspabhāvanā), while the flower arises and ceases simultaneously with the sesame seed, the sesame seed [later] arises as the cause of the arising of another odor of that flower. Also, while the impression of sensual desire, etc. (rāgādivāsanā) of those who are engaged in sensual desire, etc. (rāgādicarita) arise and cease simultaneously with sensual desire, etc., mind (citta) [later] repeatedly arises as the cause (nimiita) of that [desire]... The ālaya-vijñāna should be understood in the same way.

128 Wei Tat., p. 116-117.
129 The etymology of the term vāsanā as “perfume,” but it also translated as an impression or predisposition.
130 The Abhidharmakosā discusses the seeds which immediately produce a fruit. This formula did not get to the heart of the problem, since it lacked a simultaneous medium for those seeds that was distinct from the six modes of consciousness themselves. (AKB. II 36d: What is called a seed? Any psycho-physical organism (nāma-rūpa) that is capable of producing a fruit, either meditately or immediately, through a specific modification of the mental stream (santati-parināma-viśesat)).
131 STCL [攝大乘論本], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 134c2-10.
The Mahāyānasamgraha stresses that this process of infusion or impression occurs simultaneously, not sequentially. Perfumation and infusion are processes wherein their respective components - the flower and seed, the desire and mind - arise simultaneously and inseparably with each other.

Division of vāsanā

Seeds are basically divided into two types: inner and external seeds. In general Yogācāra differentiates inner seeds (personal conditioning) from external seeds (being conditioned by others). One own seeds can be modified or affected by exposure to external conditions (external seeds), which can be either good or bad. Exposure to polluting conditions intensifies one’s wholesome seeds, while contact with ‘pure’ conditions, such as hearing the correct Teaching (Saddharma), can stimulate one’s wholesome seeds to increase, thereby diminishing and ultimately eradicating one’s unwholesome seeds.

The ālaya-vijñāna is categorized here in terms of three kinds of impressions (vāsanā). The Ch’eng wei-shih lun and Mahāyānasamgraha mention three types of vāsanās in particular: (1) vāsanās of names and words [abhilāpavāsanā, 名言習氣差別], (2) self-view vāsanās [ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā, 我見習氣差別], and (3) linkage vāsanās [bhavāṅga-vāsanā, 有支習氣差別].

133 STCL [彌勒論], T.31, No. 1593, p. 115c9-16; CWSL. Book 2, p. 128-129: Internal and external bijas. Internal bijas, which are either innate or created by perfuming, must necessarily be perfumed before they can engender fruit. As a result of this perfuming, new bijas are born while the innate bijas increase and grow. These bijas are the ‘condition qua cause’ (hetupratyaya) of the fruit. As regards external bijas, they are sometimes perfumed and sometimes not. They are actual dharmas, not ‘potentialities’ or bijas in the proper sense of the word. They are not the ‘condition qua cause’ (hetupratyaya) but the ‘condition qua contributory agent’ (adhipatityaya) of the fruit which they produce. The condition qua cause of this fruit is the internal bijas: the fruit of the grains, like the entire receptacle world, is, in reality, the fruit of the internal bijas of the ‘non-person’ category.

134 STCL [彌勒論], T.31, No. 1594, p. 137b1-2; CWSL [成唯識論]), T.31, No. 1585, p. 43b3-14. In this passage vāsanā is rendered hsi-ch’i (習氣), while in the passage just cited it was rendered hsun-hsi (薰習). These terms are interchangeable. The first connotes ‘perfumed or impression or habit energies’, the second ‘habitual force.’ Hsi means ‘what is acquired through repetition’ hence, ‘habit’ or ‘practice’, etc.
Vāsanās—the karmic ‘perfuming’ of the consciousness stream—are conditioning. Experiences produce vāsanās that are ‘planted’ in the ālaya-vijñāna, latently conditioning subsequent experiences until the planted vāsanā comes to fruition. Then, depending on the type of fruit produced (kusala, akusala, or avyākṛta), new vāsanās are produced which get planted. In this way volitional formation (saṃskāra) cyclically continues until broken.

The commentaries on this section describe the impression of names and words, the impression self-view, and the impression of link existence. First, the commentary, the Asvabhāva’s Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-upanibandhana [攝大乘論釋], states that consciousness (vijñāna) arises in regard to expression of selves, dharmas and actions due to the “special power” (sakti-viśeṣa) of the impression of speech (abhilāpa-vāsanā). That is, the text continues, consciousness arises due to the impressions of conventional expressions (vyavahāra) such as humans and gods, eyes and visible forms, and comings and goings, respectively.\(^{135}\)

The impression of names and words (abhilāpa-vāsanā) is conceptual conditioning, which produces linguistically conditioned experience as certain types of citta and caittas.

The impression of self-view (ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā) refers to the impression of attachment to self (ātmagrāha) due to the view of self-existence (satkāya-dṛṣṭi). It precedes form the false concept of I and mine. Self-attachment is two-fold: Inherent self-attachment [俱生我執] and Self-attachment from discrimination [分別我執]. Because of the view of self-existence (satkāya-
which leads human beings to perpetuate the cycle of samsāric existence.\textsuperscript{136}

The impression of link existence (bhavāṅga-vāsanā) meaning the karmic seed, ‘differently maturing’ (vipāka), that carry over from one existence to another in the three worlds. And it accounts for karmic continuity between lives and between moments. Since vāsanā are karmic conditioning, they are impure (sāśrava), with impure though they can be either good or bad, leading to better or worse karmic consequences, better or worse births, and so on. It also accounts as the special impressions of the twelve factors of dependent arising, from ignorance until old age and death within the diverse destinies of gods, and so on, all of which arise due to the predominant power of karmically determinate activities.\textsuperscript{137}

**Characteristics of seeds**

The Mahāyānasamgraha and Vijnaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra describe characteristics of seeds as follows:

All seeds are considered to have six characteristics: [they are] momentary, simultaneous, they continue in an uninterrupted stream, are [karmically] determinate, require conditions, and are completed by their own fruit.\textsuperscript{138}

1. The bijas are momentary, kṣanika. - Only those dharmas can be bijas which perish immediately after birth and which possess a superior power of activity. This excludes the eternal dharmas which, being changeless and immutable, are incapable of generative action.

\textsuperscript{136} CWSL [成唯識論], T. 31, No. 1585, p. 43b6-10; Trims. 19: 小識不來, विभवकल्याण यथा / श्चेष्टे पुरुषोब्द्धकेष्कः सिद्धान्त च नवर ।; CSL [轉識論], T. 31, No. 1587, p. 62c21; WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, verse19, p. 61a10-11.

\textsuperscript{137} STCLS [攝大乘論釋], p. 397b3-4; CWSL [成唯識論], p. 43b10-13.

\textsuperscript{138} STCL [攝大乘論], T. 31, No. 1954, p. 135a24-26; CWSL. Book 2, p. 126-127.
2. The bijas are simultaneous with their fruit. Only that dharma is a bija which is simultaneously and actually connected with its fruit (that is, with the actual dharma which it engenders). This excludes those dharmas which are anterior to their fruits and those which are not related with their fruits.

3. The bijas form a continuous series. They must, for a long period of time, continue in a homogeneous and uninterrupted series until the final stage, i.e., until the moment when the Holy Path is attained which will counteract and thwart them.

4. The bijas must belong to a definite moral species. They must possess the capacity to engender actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined: this capacity is determined by the cause of the bijas, i.e., the actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined, which have perfumed and created them.

5. The bijas depend on a group of conditions. To realize their capacity to produce an actual dharma, the bijas require a concourse of conditions.

6. The bijas ‘lead’ to their own fruit. Each bija leads to the production of its own fruit: a bija of mind (citta) leads to the manifestation of mind, and a bija of rupa leads to the production of rupa.

These six characteristics belong only to the powers or potentialities of the mūla-vijñāna or the ālaya-vijñāna. Only these potentialities are actual bijas. As regards the external grains, grains of rice, wheat, etc., they are only the manifestation of consciousness by reason of the potentialities (or bijas) of consciousness. They are only conventionally called bijas: they are not real bijas.

In short, the basic character of the ālaya-vijñāna is maturing consciousness endowed with all its seeds. This consciousness is found in all persons in the three worlds.

4.1.4. The Ālaya-vijñāna’s aspect and object (ākāra – ālambana)
Alaya-vijñāna is described in the Saṃdhinirmocana, Mahāyānasūtra, Yogācārabhūmi, as well as in the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa to be a very deep and subtle (suksma). Therefore, common or ordinary people even by the wise ones of the world can not be aware or not discerned of what it appropriates and receives, of its place and of its power of perception and discrimination. The subliminal processes of the alaya-vijñāna do not produce a clear perception of their objects, but rather give rise to a vague, subtle, virtually imperceptible form of awareness.

Trīṃśikā and Yogācārabhūmi also said that:

"Its appropriation and its perception of location are not discerned consciousness."\(^{142}\)

Vasubandhu explains that the alaya-vijñāna operates subconsciously. The alaya-vijñāna is not directly cognizable as an object but can be known through inference because of its effects.

CWSL explains that the "mode of activity or aspect" of consciousness is perception or discrimination (vijñapti)\(^{143}\), because it is in perception or discrimination that consciousness has its aspect (ākāra).

Perception is that which is called darśanabhāga [見分], that aspect of consciousness which is vision or perception. The object of perception

\(^{139}\) YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T. 31, No. 1579, p. 580a13-14.

\(^{140}\) The term asamvidita [不可知] (incomprehensible or the eighth consciousness is extremely subtle, and therefore it is difficult to perceive. Or imperceptible) in the Stanza means that the ākāra (that is, the darśanabhāga [見分] or act of perception) of the alaya is described as incomprehensible because its internal object (the bijas and the sense-organs held by it) is extremely subtle while its external object (the receptacle-world) is immeasurable in its magnitude.

\(^{141}\) TCCYL [大乘成樂論], p.785a24-785b3.

\(^{142}\) Trīṃś. 3: असविद्विदविद्विद्विद [瑜伽師地論], T. 31, No. 1579, p. 580a8-10; (ASM. I, p. 21: असविद्विदविद्विद: भाजनविद्यविद्विद:; सर्वकालपरिवर्त्तकारात्मकः, TSAPTMCL [大乘阿毘達磨集論], T. 31, No. 1606, p. 705b29; also Trīṃśb. 2, p. 31: सोमसम्भितः इति तद्निति प्रतिसम्यदनकरणसविद्विद इत्यतसदविद्विद्विदविदविदकालित्यत्वतः).

\(^{143}\) The term "vijñapti" in the Stanza signifies that the vipākavijñāna (i.e., the alayavijñāna) has an activity of perception in relation to its object. This activity of perception is the "vision" or "perception" aspect, the darśanabhāga [見分] of the alayavijñāna.
of the ālaya-vijñāna is twofold: its “place” (sthāna-處) and “what it holds and receives” (upādi). By “place” or “locality” is meant the receptacle-world, because it is the place that supports all living beings. The upādi is twofold: the bijas and the “body with its sense-organs”. Upādi means hiding and receiving, that is to say, the bijas and the physical body are held and received by the ālaya-vijñāna.

These two (bijas and body) are held and received by the ālaya-vijñāna, integrated in its being and sharing its good or bad destiny.

Both the upādi and the sthāna are the objects of perception (ālambana-所緣) of the ālaya-vijñāna.

It should be understood that the ālaya-vijñāna is momentary regarding its objective support, and though it arises continuously in a stream of instants (ksanika srotah-saṃtāna-vartin), it is neither singular (ekatva) nor eternal.

The ālaya-vijñāna arises by means of twofold objective supports: (1) by the perception of the ‘inner appropriation’ (upādāna-vijñāpti); and (2) by the outward perception of the receptacle world whose aspects are undiscerned.

Of these, the “inner appropriation” means (1) the impressions which are attached to the falsely discriminated (parikalpita-svabhāvabhīnineśa-vāsanā)

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144 Triṃś. 2, p. 31, Sthiramati explains Sthāna as sthānavijñāptih (स्थानविज्ञाप्तिः), which means ‘cognition that is directly intent upon cognizing the world of experience’.
145 The bijas are meant three kinds of perfuming influence (vāsanā); image (nimitta), name (nama), and discriminating influence (vikalpavāsanā).
146 The “body with its sense-organs” are the five material organs and their support (i.e., their supporting physical body).
and (2) the material forms of the sense faculties along with their bases (sādhīśṭhānam indriya-rūpam). Moreover, [they both occur] in the realms with material form [i.e. kāma-and-rūpadhātu]. Only the appropriation of impressions (upādana) [occurs] in the formless realm (ārupyadātu).

The “outworld perception of the receptacle world, whose aspects are undiscerned” means the continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuity of the receptacle world based upon that very ālaya-vijñāna which has inner appropriation as an objective support.¹⁵¹

The “continuous perception of the continuity of the external world” is based upon the ālaya-vijñāna with its inner appropriations, the sense-faculties together with their material bases and the cognitive and affective predispositions—which in effect represent the physiological and psychological structures necessary for any cogent moment of consciousness to arise. In other words, this indistinct yet uninterrupted perception of the external world continuously arises whenever the bodily faculties are sufficiently impinged upon for some form of consciousness, however subtle, to arise, and the shape and content of this consciousness are continuously informed by the predispositions, the impressions instilled by past experience.

The Yogācārabhūmi uses the analogy of a lamp flame to illustrate how “outer” perception depends upon the “inner” conditions of mind:

Thus, one should know that the way the ālaya-vijñāna [arises] in regard to the objective support of inner appropriation and the objective support of the receptacle [world] is similar to a burning flame which arises inwardly while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil.¹⁵²

In short, the ālaya-vijñāna in its nature is born depending on causes and conditions. Being born, it has twofold activity. It develops internally as

¹⁵⁰ Trimśb. 2, p. 31: तत्त्राध्यायमप्राप्तं परिकल्पितस्वभावभिन्नवास्तवायाय वासाध्यायनम् इन्द्रियरूपं नाम च
¹⁵² YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T. 31, No. 1579, p. 580a10-12.
internal object into seeds (*bījas*) and a body possessed of sense-organs. Externally it develops into the receptacle world (*bhājanaloka*). According to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, these various *dharmas*, developed from the *ālaya* are its ‘image’ aspect (*nimittabhāga* - 相分). In this *nimittabhāga*, the *ālaya-vijñāna* has its object (*ālambana*). In relation to this object, it has its aspect (*ākāra*), i.e. perception. This activity of perception is the ‘perception’ aspect (*darśanabhāga*) of the *ālaya-vijñāna*. The *darśanabhāga* is very subtle and difficult to perceive or undiscerned (*asamvidita*). The *nimittabhāga* of the *ālaya-vijñāna* is also *asamvidita* (incomprehensible), because the internal objects of the *bījas* and sense-organs are extremely subtle while the external object of *bhājanaloka* is immeasurable.

### 4.1.5. The function of the Ālaya-vijñāna

The *ālaya-vijñāna* is understood to be the part of the consciousness that functions as a receptacle for the energy, technically termed “seeds,” generated by one’s good or bad actions. Like a warehouse, it can hold and disperse all sorts of *karmic* goods, without the goods altering its warehouse structure. Goods come into the warehouse, are stored for awhile, and are sent back out when the economy demands. It is the repository of *karmic* seeds and impressions, but is not itself polluted by the pollutants (*āśrava*) it houses and dispenses. As Yogācārabhūmi said that:

The *ālaya-vijñāna* functions as the condition of the form of arising *pravṛtti-vijñāna* in two ways: by being their seed (*bīja-bhāva*), and by providing their support (*āśraya-kara*).

Of these, “being a seed” means that whichever wholesome, unwholesome or indeterminate forms of evolution of consciousness occur, they all have *ālaya-vijñāna* as [their] seed.
"Providing a support" means that the five groups of consciousness will arise based upon the material sense faculties that are appropriated by ālaya-viśṇāna, but not from those that are not appropriated [by ālaya-viśṇāna].

The first way is by “being the seed” (bīja-bhāva) for their arising. Each moment of consciousness is itself a resultant state, an effect of past karmā, in other words, a fruition of a seed. The ongoing and underlying processes that comprise the ālaya-viśṇāna continuously condition the arising of supraliminal cognitive processes insofar as they store or “preserve” the specific causal conditions, the seeds, for these resultant processes to arise.

The second way is by “providing a support” (āśrayakara) for the manifesting consciousness by “appropriating” the sense-faculties upon which they are based. This is the second of two ways the ālaya-viśṇāna conditions the arising of manifest consciousness.

Then the forms of evolution of consciousness function as the condition of ālaya-viśṇāna in two ways: by nurturing (paripuṣṭi) the seeds in this life and by causing [it] to grasp to the seeds of its own reproduction (abhinivrūti) in the next life.

The ālaya-viśṇāna also functions to keep the continuity in the life of a being. However, this ālaya-viśṇāna like a stream or flow, it is perpetually changing with ever new conditions from moment to moment. Thus, it is a stream of changing causes and conditions with no permanent entities (such as the soul or the ātman) anywhere. It is a series of consciousness (cittasāntāna), momentary, instantaneous, which as soon as it arises, vanishes and are replaced by other consciousnesses, this series of consciousness come from a beginningless (anādi) eternity flowing like a river which has no source. As the Yogācārabhūmi has said:

The ālaya-vijñāna continuously arises in an unbroken stream because it occurs conditioned by the continuous effects of past samskaras.\(^{155}\)

And the Mahāyānasamgraha-upanibandhana said that the ālaya-vijñāna is stable, it does occur in a continuous, unbroken stream.\(^{156}\)

And the CWSL also explains as follows:

It is in perpetual evolution like a violent torrent.\(^{157}\)

By ‘perpetual’ is meant that, since before the beginning of time, this consciousness has evolved in a homogeneous series without interruption, because it is the creative basis of manifestations of the transmigratory course through the three realms of existence (dhātus), the five directions of reincarnation (gatis), and the four forms of birth (yonis), and also because in its essential nature it is firm enough to hold bijas without allowing them to be lost.

By ‘evolution’ is meant that this consciousness, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes from one moment to another, ever changing. As cause it perishes and as fruit it is then born. Thus, it never remains continuously a single entity. Through the evolutions of the other consciousnesses, it is perfumed and thus forms seeds.

If it were permanent, like space, it would not be perfumable; if it were not perfumable, the distinction between samsāra (birth and death) and nirvāṇa (true deliverance) would disappear.

The word ‘perpetual’ rules out the notion of impermanence or discontinuity; the word ‘evolution’ indicates that it is not permanent.

Vasubandhu gives an example.

\(^{155}\) ASM. p. 12: आलयविज्ञानं पूर्वसंस्कारादातुम् / ... सा जातिन्योपलभ्यते; Yogācārabhūmi, Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī [撮取分], p. 579a-b.


\(^{157}\) Wei Tat., CWSL, p. 170-173; Triṃś. 4, p. 49: तच्च वर्तते स्वोत्सौपन्तः //
‘Like a violent torrent’; it is the nature and being (dharmatā) of 'causation' which is foreign to permanence and impermanence.

In its sequence of cause and effect, it is like a violent torrent which is never impermanent yet never permanent, and which ever flows onward in a continuous series, carrying with it what sometimes floats and sometimes sinks. So too is this ālaya-vijñāna which, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes, forming a series which is neither permanent nor impermanent, carrying along sentient beings, sometimes floating, sometimes sinking, without allowing them to attain liberation from the cycle of mundane existence.

Again it is like a violent torrent which, though beaten by the wind into waves, flows onward without interruption. So too is this ālaya-vijñāna, which, though it encounters conditions producing the visual and other kinds of consciousness, perpetually maintains its onward flow.158

Or yet again it is like a violent torrent, in whose waters fish are borne along below and leaves of grass above, pursuing its onward course without abandoning it. So too is this consciousness, which perpetually follows its onward evolution, carrying with it the perfumed internal būjas and the external caittas (sparśa, etc.).

These comparisons show that the ālaya-vijñāna, from before the beginning of time, has been both cause and effect, and so is neither permanent nor impermanent. They mean that since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been one in which from moment to moment effects are born and causes perish. Because these effects are born, it is not impermanent; because these causes perish, it is not permanent. To be neither impermanent nor permanent: this is the ‘principle of conditional causation or dependent

origination’ (*pratipa-samutpaḍa*). That is why it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual evolution like a torrent.\(^{159}\)

The *ālāya-vijñāna* functions, it is at all times associated with the five universal factors associated with mind (*citta-samprayukta-sarvatāra*)\(^{160}\) mental contact (*sparśa*) attention (*manaskāra*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and intention (*cetanā*).\(^{161}\)

In this way, the *ālāya-vijñāna* arises and functions concurrently with the form of evolutional consciousness. It also arises and functions concurrently with adventitious (*āgantuka*) feelings as well as with adventitious skillful, unskillful, and indeterminate (mental factors-*caittasika-dharma*).\(^{162}\)

The most important issue is how the activities of *ālāya-vijñāna* become an issue of ethical concern. They appear to be mechanical and non-human. But the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda shows that the *karma*-by-human agency is the root cause of the whole functioning of the *ālāya-vijñāna*. This issue will see under.

4.1.6. Moral aspect of the *Ālāya-vijñāna*

From the moral point of view, the Yogācārins defined the *ālāya-vijñāna* as ‘non-intentional’\(^{163}\) meaning that it is *karmically* neutral, ‘non-covered and non-recording.’ Or in other words, it is purely resultant states (*vipāka*) and is

\(^{159}\) Wei Tat., CWSL, p. 170-173.

\(^{160}\) *Sarvātgadharma* [遍行] means general or universal features. They are thus called “universal”, because these *Caitasikadharman* pervade on every side (present at every consciousness), everywhere (three realms and nine bhūmās), and every time (the past, present and future), and every nature (good, bad and neutral). Wherever, there is the cognitive distinction between the “knower” and the “known,” the universal *dharmas* accompany the mental state. *Mahāyānasaṇadharman-prakāśanukha śāstra upanibandhana* (大乘百法明門論解), T. 44, No. 1836, P. 47c.

\(^{161}\) Tripi. 3: सदा स्वर्णमन्दकाविलिस्तः बेनलालिस्तः / YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T. 31, No. 1579, p. 580a29-580b1; Wei-tat., p. 154-155.

\(^{162}\) YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T. 31, No. 1579, p. 580c26-27:

\(^{163}\) Tripi. 4: उपेक्षा वेदना तच्यक्तित्व च तत्र / the word ‘*tatra*’ here refers to the *ālāya-vijñāna* only because that is the subject of discussion here. *Upeśka* is always the *vedanā* in the *ālāya-vijñāna* and neither pleasure or pain; WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60b4-60b7; 初阿毗耶識, 是無覆無記; CSL [轉識論], T. 31, No. 1587, p. 61c8-9 & 62a11.
thus karmically indeterminate (āvyākṛta), its emotional tone is neither painful nor pleasurable.\textsuperscript{164}

The term nivṛta means a veil, an obstacle. The defiled dharma is described by this term because it represents an obstacle to the Holy Path of Attainment (āryamārga); because it veils the mind and thus prevents its purification. The ālaya-vijñāna is not covered; it is, therefore, anivṛta “non-covered.”

The term vyākṛta means “karmically neutral or non-recording”. The good or bad dharma is described by this term partly because it produces an agreeable or disagreeable fruit which can definitely be defined or recorded and partly because its species is more easily discernible than that of the non-defined dharma. It can therefore be “defined”. The ālaya-vijñāna, being neither good nor bad, is avyākṛta [無記] “non-recorded”.\textsuperscript{165}

Asaṅga explains in the Mahāyānasamgraha śāstra that why the ālaya-vijñāna is called non-covered and non-recording?

For what reason is [consciousness that] matures both good and evil states itself non-covered and non-recorded (anivṛta-avyākṛta)? There is no contradiction between the morally neutral (avyākṛta) nature [of the ālaya-vijñāna] and the simultaneity of good and evil dharmas. It is rather the good and evil those are in mutual opposition. If maturation (vipāka) itself were good or evil, then there would be no way to attain liberation from affliction. And since there would be no way to engender either goodness or affliction, there could be no liberation and no bondage, for these two [qualities of being non-covered and non-recording] would not exist. Therefore the maturing consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) is certainly non-covered and non-recording.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{164} Trīṃś. 4, p. 47: उपेक्षाकाळविज्ञाने वेदना न सुखा न दुःस्क्रया //
\textsuperscript{165} Wei Tat., CWSL, p. 164-165.
\textsuperscript{166} STCL, [識大乘論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 118a14-19; see also CWSL, p. 12a20-26; (Wei Tat, p. 164-165: (1) if it were good (kusala), existence or the cycle of life and death (i.e., suffering) would be impossible; if it
In this way we can come to conclusion that the ālaya-vijñāna is non-covered and non-recorded that mean not obstructed or impeded by āvaraṇas, whether kleśa-āvaraṇas (afflictive obstruction) or jñeya-āvaraṇas (cognitive obstruction), and therefore, is described as non-covered (anirvṛtta). Nor can it be defiled as either good or as bad, and therefore it is described as non-recorded (avyākṛta).

4.1.7. Cessation of the Ālaya-vijñāna

Since the beginningless of time the ālaya-vijñāna has been flowing like a stream without interruption. The ālaya-vijñāna comprises those very processes, kleśa and karma, that both constitute and perpetuate samsāric existence:

The ālaya-vijñāna is “accompanied by the appropriations (sopādāna) and spiritual corruptions (dausthulya)”\(^{167}\) that coincide with samsāric existence, it is also called “root of all the defiled [dharmas]”\(^{168}\) and the “cause of the continuance of the afflictions” (kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu).\(^{169}\)

And who cessation of the ālaya-vijñāna is tantamount to liberation, as in the Triṃśikā has said: the ālaya-vijñāna ends at the stage of Arhatship.\(^{170}\)

The Āryas or the saints are called Arhats\(^{171}\) from the moment (vajropamasamādhi) when they have completely cut off the afflictive

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167 ASM. II Viniścayasamuccaya: What is dausthulya? It has twenty-three dausthulyas; here I mention only two dausthulyas in twenty-three dausthulyas, namely; kleśa-varana-dausthulya (spiritual corruption caused by the afflictive obstruction) and jñeya-varana-dausthulya (spiritual corruption caused by cognitive obstruction).


170 Triṃś. 4: तत्त्व व्यावित्तिहल्ले, WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60b8; 阿羅漢位捨.
obstruction (*kleśāvarana*). At that moment the spiritual corruptions (*dausthulya*) of the defilements is dissociated completely and forever, and it is then said that the *ālaya-vijñāna* is "arrested".

And in the Yogācārabhūmi also says that:

The distinguishing characteristic of the *ālaya-vijñāna* being eliminated (*prahāna*) [is that] as soon as [the *ālaya-vijñāna*] is eliminated, the two aspects of appropriation are abandoned and the body remains like an apparition (*nirmāṇa*). [Why is that?]

Because the cause which brings about rebirth (*punarbhava*) and suffering in the future has been eliminated, the appropriation which brings about rebirth in the future is abandoned. Because all the causes of defilements (*saṃkleśa*) in this life have been eliminated, all appropriation of the basis of the defilements in this life are eliminated. Free from all the spiritual corruption (*dausthulya*), only the mere conditions of physical life remain. Or the *ālaya-vijñāna* itself, gradually eliminating it "in all aspects" until finally the *ālaya-vijñāna* becomes completely "seedless," that is, the "basis is revolved":

Inasmuch as the weak, medium, and strong [impressions from having heard the Dharma] gradually increase (*vardhate*), so much does the resultant consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) diminish, and the basis is revolved (*āśraya-paravṛtti*). When the basis is revolved in all aspects, the resultant consciousness possessing all the seeds (*sarvabījakam-vipākavijñānam*) also becomes without seeds and is eliminated in all aspects as well.

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171 CWSL., p. 13a23-24; Wei Tai, CWSL., p. 178-179: The term *Arhat* denotes only the saints of the three Vehicles who have attained the fruit of *Āśāśa:* (1) all of them have killed the enemies which are the *kleśas*; (2) they all deserve the veneration and assistance of the world; (3) they are all liberated from 'existence in fragments.'


In short, the Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas, irreversible Bodhisattvas and Tathāgatas no longer possess the ālaya-vijñāna. The Abhidharmasamuccaya which says that Bodhisattvas destroy the kleśa-āvaraṇa, right up to the end of their career as Bodhisattvas: ‘At the moment when they attain bodhi, the Bodhisattvas cut off instantaneously the kleśa-āvaraṇa and jñeya-āvaraṇa; they become Arhats and Tathāgatas.

The ālaya-vijñāna has now been radically and irreversibly transformed so that one’s life is no longer driven by the maleficient influences of ignorance, the cognitive and afflictive obstructions (kleśa-āvaraṇa and jñeya-āvaraṇa) and the activities they engender, but rather is infused with the wisdom and compassion emanating from awakened mind itself. Now we come to see what is the kliśṭa-vijñāna?

The seventh consciousness (kliśṭa-maṇas-vijñāna) is particularly mentioned and it has two aspects or functions: it serves as the immediate mentation which ensure for the continuity of the mind and it also is responsible for the afflicted mentation (kliśṭa-maṇas) which is responsible for generating the afflictions or defilements. The kleśa are indispensable to the perpetuation of samsāric existence as a whole, we remember, since, as the Yogācāra commentator Sthiramati stresses:

The causes of samsāra are karmas and kleśas; of these two, the kleśas are foremost ... even the action (karma) which has projected rebirth (punar-bhava) will not produce rebirth if there is no kleśa ... because they are foremost, the kleśas are the root of origination.
4.2. The nature of Kliṣṭa-manas-vijñāna (afflictive mentation)

The idea of grasping to aspects of one’s *samsāric* existence as a self has strong antecedents in earlier Buddhist traditions, as does its association with the term *manas*, or “mentation.” In the early Buddhist view one of the main factors keeping being trapped in the vicious cycle of compulsive behavioral patterns was taking the five aggregates of grasping as a substantive “self” (*ātman*), as if they constituted or included a permanent, independent, and ultimately unitary entity. In the Yogācāra tradition, this process of grasping to the self-identity came to be thought of as a distinct level of mentation (*manas*) which conceives of its object, the *ālaya-vijñāna*, as a self — exactly what the *Saṃdhinirmocana* sūtra warned against as the end of chapter V: “I have not taught it [the appropriating consciousness] to the ignorant lest they should imagine it a self.” And this continuously present belief in a self gives rise to desire, anger, ignorance, envy, pride, and so on, and this is to obscure or prevent the attainment of liberation.

4.2.1. Name of Kliṣṭa-manas

*Manas* is the second evolution of the Mind-only. As *Trīṃśikā* says the second that actively alters, this consciousness is named *manas*¹⁷⁷ which means mentation, [思量] because in its continuous practice of deliberation it surpasses the other consciousness. It is also known as “afflictive mentation”¹⁷⁸ because it is always associated with the four afflictions which by nature arise innately (*sahaja*) and simultaneously: a view of self-existence (*satkāya-drṣṭi*), the conceit ‘I am (*asmimāṇa*), self-love (*ātmasneha*), and ignorance (*avidyā*).

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¹⁷⁷ *Trīṃś. 5: उन्हें नाम विज्ञानम्* / *WSSSL (唯識三十論)*, T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60b10; See *CWSL*, Book 3, p. 250-251.

¹⁷⁸ *STCL* [摯大乘論], T. 31, 1593, p. 114a20-22; *Trīṃśb.* p. 50-51: ... विज्ञान यस्मात् आत्मर्थ आत्मवन्न तत्तत्त्वम् / ...

*...अथवा विधिभेदी भोजयो वाल्यविज्ञानैः विषयकतादि किंतु यह हमें तत्तत्त्ववन्न अश्वत्तत्त्वः भेदः तत्तत्त्ववन्नविषयवन्नतत्त्त्ववन्न ध्वस्तः / MVK. I.4: आत्म प्रतिभास्य किंतु यह हमें तत्त्त्वः / आत्माःहार्दिक समयोऽन्नः /
It is also known as mental organ or thought. There are other reasons for calling the seventh consciousness by this name: 1. it is desired to distinguish it from citta (that is to say, from the eighth consciousness) and from the first six consciousnesses (mano-vijnāna, eye-consciousness, etc.), because it is inferior to Citta in power of accumulation (accumulation of bijas etc.), and inferior to the first six consciousnesses in power of discriminative perception; 2. Or it is desired to indicate that this consciousness is the immediate support (āśraya) of mano-vijnāna.

4.2.2. The function of klīṣṭa-manas

It is in the Mahāyānasamgraha, that the klīṣṭa-manas is finally distinct class of mental process, which is systematically described the two main functions of manas used in the Yogācāra tradition. The first follows definitions of function of manas as the preceding moment of mind (vijnāna) insofar as it serves as the support (āśraya) for a succeeding mental consciousness or cognitive awareness. Triṃśikā also says that the ālaya-vijnāna is the support of the manas and takes ālaya-vijnāna as its object.

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179 ASM. I, p. 11-12: मन: क्तमण/ यज्ञवल्क्यकालवर्णमानवसिद्धांस्तु चतुर्मि: कलेये:। संपुत्तविद्यामयस्मृतिसंज्ञानविद्याः च /वचच सस्वायं कुञ्जापुरस्मृतिसत्त्वात्सर्वत् मयात्मसाक्षीयां विशेषस्मृतिमृद्दापूर्व्य। च वचच क्तण्य विज्ञानमस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृतिसारस्मृति/TSAPTML [大乘阿毘達磨集論]. T.31, No. 1605, p.666a6-10; YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T.30, No. 1579, p. 280b9: 意謂恒行意及六識身無聞滅意 ... and p. 651b23-24; STCL [攝大乘論], p. 114a18-113c11; Wei Tat., CWSL., p. 250-251. 180 CWSL. Book, 3, p. 250-251.

181 STCL [攝大乘論], T.31, No. 1593, p. 114a18-20; STCL [攝大乘論本], T.31, No. 1594, p. 113c6-7.


182 Wei Tat., CWSL. Book 3, p. 252-279: there are three kinds of support: (1). Hetupratyaya 因緣依 (2). Abhipatipratyaya-āśraya [增上緣依], (3). Samanantarapratyaya-āśraya [等無間緣依].

183 Trinil 5: तदाद्यत्र राज्यतिष्ठति। तदाद्यत्र मन्य नाम वि: ज्ञान नन्दात्तकप्रे// See also CWSL. Book 3, p. 252-253.

184 Wei Tat., CWSL. Book 3, p. 280-285: What is the object of manas? Vasubandhu answers: Manas takes that its object. By “that” is meant the consciousness that is its support (āśraya-所依), because the sacred texts teach that the seventh consciousness takes the ālaya-vijnāna as its object. CWSL. Book 3, p. 269: The
Sthiramati explains that being supported that ālaya-vijñāna proceeds on or flows on in a stream (of personal life). Or (it may also mean) that in whatever dhātu or bhūmi the ālaya-vijñāna functions as the maturing influence, the manas also pertains to that very dhātu and bhūmi, and thus the functioning of manas being bound up with that (ālaya) (it is said) that it proceeds on, being supported on ālaya. Manas takes ālaya-vijñāna as its object (ālambana), because of its (ālaya’s) universal association with the view of self-existence (satkāyadrṣṭī), etc., the ālaya-vijñāna functions as the object of the consciousness of ‘I’ (ahāṃ) and ‘mine’ (māma) and the like.¹⁸⁵

The second function is the innovation peculiar to Yogācāra:

The second is the afflictive mentation (kliṣṭa-manas) which is always associated (samprayukta) with the four afflictions or defilements (kleśa): the view of self-existence (satkāya-drṣṭī), the conceit ‘I am’ (asmimāṇa), self-love (ātmasneha), and ignorance (avidyā).¹⁸⁶ It is the support for the defilements (saṃklesāśrayaya) of the form of consciousness. The consciousness arise through the first [manas, as] support, but are made defiled by the second.¹⁸⁷ Besides the four afflictions, manas is also accompanied by other

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Laṅkāvatāra sūtra says: ‘Having the ālaya-vijñāna as its support, manas manifests itself; depending on citta (i.e., ālaya) and manas for support, the other pravṛtti-vijñāna are born.


¹⁸⁷ STCL (善見論論本), T. 31, No. 1594, p. 133c8-10; STCL [善見論], T. 31, No. 1593, p. 114a20-23; Trinś. 6: तत्त्वविद्वसतिः ... सत्त्वदुद्वाहारिविनः / WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60b12-13; ASM. 1, p. 11: चित्तविद्वसतिः ... सत्त्वदुद्वाहारिविनः / TSAPTMCL [大乘阿毘達磨集論], T. 31, No. 1605, p. 666a7: YBS. 1, p. 11: विद्वसतिः च मनो
five universal mental associates such as mental contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra), sensation (vedanā), conception (saṃjñā) and volition (cetanā).  

In the Mahāyānasamgraha continues to describe afflictive mentation as follows:

Because it is held that grasping to self (ātmagrāha) is present at all times, even in good, bad, and neutral states of mind. Otherwise, since the affliction of the conceit “I am” is associated only with bad states of mind, it would be present [only in bad states] but not in good or neutral ones. Therefore, since [we consider] it to be present simultaneously (sahabhū) but not present associated (samprayukta) [with those forms of mind], this fault is avoided.  

Thus, if the four afflictions that are “present at all times, even in skillful, unskillful, and indeterminate states of mind” were always associated with the citta, then all those moments would be afflicted and it would be impossible for skillful moments of mind to ever occur. Since these particular afflictions persist until far along the path.  

This conception of manas extrapolates upon traditional relations between mind (P. mano) and the conceit (māna) “I am,” in order to posit a continuous, simultaneous, yet afflictive sense of self-identity as an essential component of each and every moment of mind. This level of mentation (manas) thus represents the ongoing sense of self-existence which taints all one’s mental process and activities until one realizes liberation. As the last part of this section of the Pravṛtti Portion declares:

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188 Tripī. 7: अन्य: स्वर्णविव च: / WSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 133c20-23.
189 STCL [嚮大乘論], T. 31, No. 1597, p. 60a13.
The *manas* always arises and functions simultaneously with the *ālaya-vijñāna*. One should know that until it is completely destroyed it is always associated with the four afflictions which by nature arise innately (*sahaja*) and simultaneously: a view of self-existence (*satkāya-drśti*), the conceit ‘I am’ (*asmimāna*), self-love (*ātmasneha*), and ignorance (*avidyā*). One should see that these afflictions arise without impeding (*avirodha*) the [karmic quality of] skillfulness (*kuśala*) etc., in states of collectedness (*samāhita*) or non-collectedness, and are obscured-indeterminate (*nirvṛtāvyākṛta*).

Thus, these afflictions persist until far along the path toward liberation, they are continuously present in each moment without, however, preventing karmically good states of mind (*kuśala-dharma*) from ever arising; yet at the same time they are now able to serve as an ever-present basis upon which further afflicted and ill-informed thoughts, feelings, and actions can arise.

In short, *manas* functions with *ālaya-vijñāna*, which is the support of the manas and takes *ālaya-vijñāna* as its object. Therefore, *manas* is constantly “conceiving and mistaking the *ālaya-vijñāna* as ‘I am [this]’ and ‘[this is] I’ or a self, and for that reason it is always associated with four afflictions and therefore, one is very attached to this, because of this attachment, sentient beings are bound to the cycle of birth and death (*samsāra*) until finally being severed at the root through sustained spiritual practice to eliminate it along the path.

### 4.2.3. The nature and characteristic of kliṣṭa-manas

As Triṃśikā in the verse 5 says that *manas* has the nature and character of deliberation\(^\text{192}\) or *manas* is so called because the process of intellecction

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192 Triṃś. 5: 想相作意 / STCL [攝大論], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 133c11: 思量義故…; YBS, p. 651b23 & 651c1; WSSSL [唯識三十論頌], T 31, No. 1586, p. 60b11: 思量為性相。Ssu-liang (思量) can also be read as a compound meaning ‘deliberation’. The word hsing hsiang (性相) have no correlate in the Sanskrit text as I mentioned in Triṃśikā verse 5. This entire line is an attempt to render the word *mananātmakam* which simply means ‘essence of mentation’. CWsL, Book 3, p. 286-287 makes clear that hsing hsiang are
(manana)\textsuperscript{193} is always going on in it. By reason of (its) such deliberation, or ‘manana’ it is called ‘mana’ in accordance to the rules of etymology.\textsuperscript{194} In the sacred teachings, this consciousness is given the special name of manas, because in its constant practice of cogitation (manana).\textsuperscript{195} We mean the continuous consideration of the internal world, a kind of subconsciousness which has, for the object of its contemplation, egoism or ātman.

Mahāyānasamuccaya says that it is the object of the store-consciousness which is always willing and deliberating in the nature.\textsuperscript{196} And Chuan-shih lun: this consciousness takes attachment as its essence.\textsuperscript{197}

This expression shows that manas is cogitation or intellection both in regard to its essential nature (svabhāva) and to its mode of activity (ākāra). In fact, the essential nature of manas (i.e., its samvittibhāga) consists in cogitation or intellection, and it is in cogitation or intellection that manas has its mode of activity (i.e., its darśanabhāga). The special name of manas - which is also entitled citta and consciousness — is justified from the point of view of its essential nature and mode of activity; it is named manas because it is capable of cogitating and reflecting upon its object.

When manas has not yet been revolutionized (aparāvṛtta), it constantly cogitates upon the supposed ātman; after the revolution (parāvṛtta), it meditates and cogitates also upon nairātmya, i.e., egolessness.\textsuperscript{198}

\textsuperscript{193} deliberate insertions, meant to signify svabhāva and ākāra, respectively. Manas has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection.
\textsuperscript{194} Vijñaptimātradīhi by Vasubandhu, ed. S. Levi, Paris, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{195} Trimśāh. 5, p. 52-53: तत्तु: कि स्वाभाविकत्वात् मन्नत्त्वकर्मित्वा अव मन्नत्त्वकर्मानि इत्युच्चे नैतके निर्देशने विधिने
\textsuperscript{196} Lanka. X.400, p. 316: विज्ञानेन विज्ञानाति मनस मन्यते पुन: \textsuperscript{197} CWSL. Book 3, p. 286-287.
\textsuperscript{198} ASM. 1, p. 11: मन: कृतमान्त: विज्ञातकाल्पनेनात्मकम् / TSAPTML [大乘阿毘達磨集論], T. 31, No. 1605, p. 666a6.
4.2.4. Moral aspect of kliṣṭa-manas

Regarding the moral aspect of manas, Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Trīṃśikā said that kliṣṭa-manas is covered-neutral.\(^1\) Manas is covered (nivrta) and associated with kleśa, or, as Sthiramati writes, it is kliṣṭa (afflictive).\(^2\) This gives kleśa – as an abstraction – primacy over karmic conditioning understood as pain/pleasure conditioning. This reinforces that the notion of kleśa has replaced the notion of āsava expounded in chapter I (the earlier Theravāda text).\(^3\) It is covered; it is supported to be an obstacle to the realization of the Holy path (Ārya-mārga) and the attainment of nirvāṇa. It darkens the pure light in our mind, as it is a purely egoistic principle. On the other hand, kliṣṭa-manas is neither good nor bad, its ‘support’ being subtle and its manifestation being spontaneous and consequently that is neutral (avyākṛta).\(^4\)

In the Muktaka sūtra says that: “The afflictive mentation always comes into being and perishes with the kleśas; when it is emancipated from the kleśas, it will not only cease to exist but will have neither a past nor a future”.\(^5\)

The sūtra itself gives the following commentary on this stanza:

‘There is an afflictive mentation, which, since before the beginning of time, has come into being and perished at the same time as the four kleśas, that is, Self-belief (ātmadrṣṭi), Self-love (ātmasneha), Self-conceit (ātmamāna), and Self-delusion (ātmamoha). When the way of counteracting these kleśas has been found and when these kleśas have been subdued and cut off by the treading of that way, manas will, from that moment, attain

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\(^{1}\) STCL [攝大乘論], T. 31, No. 1594, p. 134a3-4; Trīṃś. 6: मनो नाम विज्ञान, निन्तुवात्याकृतेः सदा\
\(^{2}\) Trīṃśb. 6: p. 50-52.मनो नाम विज्ञान, निन्तुवा: क्लिष्टत्वालः सदैवति स्वर्ववालचः यावदस्य ततवैः संप्रयुक्तम\n\(^{3}\) See chapter I.
\(^{4}\) Trīṃśb. 6, p. 54: अयायाकृता: कुःता-क्लिष्टत्वालेव नामयावकर्षणात् /; CWSL., Book 3, p. 304-305.
\(^{5}\) CWSL., Book 3, p. 304: 染污意恆時, 諸惑俱生滅. 若解脫諸惑, 非曾非當有.'

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deliverance. The kleśas associated with manas will then not only cease to exist in the present, but will have neither past nor future, because past and future have no self-nature of their own.\textsuperscript{204}

As we mentioned above, ignorance is often identified with the ideal of self, “I am” or “I was” or “I will be” the definitions here show that the view of self is an aspect of clinging, which is itself conditioned by craving, while the latter is in turn conditioned by ignorance.\textsuperscript{205} Ignorance comes to be glossed by Yogācāra as the more radical of the two primary āvaranās,\textsuperscript{206} namely the jñeyāvaranā (obstruction by what is known) and kleśāvaranā (obstruction by mental disturbances). Kleśa is kleśāvaranā, afflictive mentation (kliśṭa-manas) is always associated with the four primary kleśas. Nevertheless, among the four kleśas, avidyā, being the cause and support of the other three, is the ruler or controlling power and, as such, it is most potent and predominant. Although it is accompanied by three kleśas, since before the beginning of time, this avidyā has always been stupefying and bewildering the mind, resulting in its failure to realize Ultimate Reality. This failure is entirely due to the powerful nature of Self-ignorance that is as the most basic cause of sāṃsāric existence.

Now if the afflictive mentation processed on indiscriminative in kuśala, akuśala and avyākṛta stages, then it should have no cessation. And in case it has no cessation, where is liberation then? And thus why should it not involve the negation of liberation, we will see under.

\textsuperscript{204} CWSL. Book 3, p. 320-323
\textsuperscript{205} See chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{206} ASM. II. Vinīcayasanamuccaya: अक्षर बृत्तिः / मयंकलेसांसत्यसुत्तुत्तत्व अविश्वा / असामान्या अविश्वा / ; TSAPTMCML
[大乘阿毘達磨集論], T. 31, No. 1605, p. 676b18-19; YCSTL [瑜伽師地論], T. 30, No. 1579, p. 622a5-16; AKB. I, p. I: अक्षरपद्-अन्तर्गत, Trīṣṭāb. 1, p. 27: Kleśas are attachment, etc., which are called kleśāvaranā and the jñeyāvaranā is non-afflictive ignorance which is an impediment to the rise of cognition of all that is [mistakenly] know. (पुनः क्लेसाभावासनन्तर्यथा / तथा ज्ञेयक्लेसाशायत्वम् कर्मयादि: क्लेसाश्च ज्ञेयावरणीयादि / स्वस्मित्त्र प्रेमे। CWSL. p. 671, Dan Lusthaus., Buddhist Phenomenology, p. 65.

135
4.2.5. Cessation of kliṣṭa-manas

Since before the beginning of time this afflictive manas has continued in a perpetual series. In what state is it absolutely or temporarily cut off?

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu give the three cases in which there is no manas. The first is (Arhat), the second is nirodha-samāpatti and the third is lokuttara-mārga (supramundane path).

The Arhat, by reason of his completely doing away with all the kleśas gets rid off the afflictive manas. It dies out by virtue of the influence of the ānantarya-mārga that comes immediately with the attainment of the stage of the Arhat like kleśas that are liable to be destroyed by the repeated cultivation (bhāvanā) by the topmost of all beings (bhāvāgrika). It likes other kleśas does not exist at the stage of the Arhat. It is destroyed in regard to the Anāgāmin or one, devoid of any desire when at the stage of ākiṅcanyātana (non-clinging to anything specific) or when he has attained the stage of nirodha-samāpatti, it is destroyed along with the path (mārga) through which nirodha-samāpatti is likely to be attained. When he arises from the nirodha (i.e. when he comes back to the world of determinates), it again proceeds from the ālaya-vijñāna. Nor does it exist in the supramundane path (lokuttara-mārga).

The kliṣṭa-manas becomes incapable to proceed on in the ‘lokottara-mārga’ in as much as the false view of the self stands in direct confrontation with the cognition of non-self. Due to the non-simultaneousness of two

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207 TrActs, 7: अस्ति न तत् / न विशेषसमार्थस्त्र योक्तीस्य शरिकस्य / WSSL [唯識三十論], p. 608b15; Pañca, 118: अस्ति तत् न विशेषसमार्थस्त्र योक्तीस्य / TCWYL [大乘五蘆論], p. 850a10; ASM. 1, p. स्थायित्व मार्गमुखिष्ठानं निर्हेत्तपिकातिश्रीमुमिन /; TSAPTMCL [大乘阿毘達磨集論], p. 666a10; STCL [増譯大乘論], T. 31, No. 1597, p. 326b7-11.

208 The word lokottara is used in order to eliminate the laukika or worldly path (mārga); because in the laukika mārga the afflictive manas persists on. CWSL, Book 3, p. 308-309: Defiled manas, since before the beginning of time, has been subtle and homogeneous, manifesting itself spontaneously. The various impure mudance exercises are incapable of subduing it. But the Holy Path of the three Vehicles subdues it, being pure mind. For ātmāgrāhā (ātman-adhesion) is contradicted by the true intelligence of nairātmya (egolessness) [which is the ‘fundamental non-discriminating wisdom’]. Defiled manas is also impossible when there is in actual manifestation the ‘Subsequent Pure Wisdom’, which is the efflux (niśyanda) of the “fundamental non-discriminating wisdom”. As both these wisdom are pure, they receive the name of ‘supramundane Path’ (lokottara-mārga).
directly opposite, it dies out in the ‘lokottara-mārga.’ But in case of one who comes back (to the world of the determinate), it again proceeds on from the ālaya-vijñāna.

After the second kind of pariṇāma having been explained, the third kind of pariṇāma should be explained, now come to the pravṛtti-vijñāna.

4.3. The nature of pravṛtti-vijñāna (Six Consciousnesses)

The third transformation of consciousness is the pravṛtti-vijñāna. This consciousness is not a unity but a class, comprising six kinds of consciousness, all of which are grouped together because of their common empirical nature. These six kinds of consciousness can be classified into: (1) external; (2) internal. The former includes the five consciousnesses corresponding to the five sense-organs which give us all the information we have about the so-called external world. The five senses (eye, ear, nose, tongue and body) make possible the awareness of form (rūpa), sound (śabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa) and touch (sparśavya). The sixth or the internal consciousness is mano-vijñāna, mental objects (dharmas). These six consciousnesses constitute one kind of consciousness that “perceives and discriminates between gross spheres of objects. This means that the objects of this group of consciousnesses are external objects. Any perception of external objects requires the co-presence of “such factors as the act of attention (manaskāra) of mano-vijñāna, the sense-organs (indriyas) (whose attention is directed in accordance with mano-vijñāna), the external objects (viṣaya) towards which this attention is directed. In other words, the role of mano-vijñāna is to direct the attention of sense organs toward their respective objects in order to produce clear perceptions of those objects, but such a function is crude and unstable, and it might be interrupted in certain states

\[209\] See note 98, chapter II.
mano-vijnāna works with the five senses in cognizing external physical objects.

4.3.1. Meaning of pravṛtti-vijnāna

The pravṛtti-vijnāna is the third evolution of the Mind-only. The name of each of six consciousnesses is established by reason of the organ to which it is related, not by reason of the particular object perceived by it. This is because each organ has five values: (1) the consciousness depends on the organ for support (āśraya); (2) the consciousness is conditioned by the condition of the organ; (3) the bijas of the consciousness depend on the organ; (4) the consciousness assists the organ; and (5) the consciousness bears a resemblance to the organ.

Although all the six consciousnesses express themselves on the basis of manas, yet only the sixth consciousness receives the name of mano-vijnāna. This is because it is named in accordance with its special point of support which is the seventh consciousness or manas, the nature of which is not shared by the first five. In the same way, the first five, although all relying on manas for support, are named in accordance with their special “points of support”, namely, the eye, the ear, etc. The characters of the consciousnesses are thus distinct, and the term “mano-vijnāna” does not lend itself to confusion.

We may also say that mano-vijnāna is so called because it depends solely on manas for support, whereas the first five depend for support not only on manas but also on the material sense-organs, the eye, the ear, etc.

The six consciousnesses are therefore named in a certain manner by reason of their points of support, i.e., by their relations with them: consciousness of the eye and so on down to the consciousness of manas. This is not the case with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses which receive names that correspond to their particular nature: Manas by reason of its power of cogitation, citta by reason of its capacity for accumulation. This is why the
eighth consciousness, although depending on the seventh for support, is not named mano-vijñāna; this is why the seventh, although depending on the eighth, citta, for support, is not named citta-vijñāna.

The six consciousnesses are also named in accordance with the objects perceived by them: consciousness of rūpa (rūpa-vijñāna) and so on down to the consciousness of dharmas (dharma-vijñāna). This definition conforms to the meaning of the word consciousness or vijñāna, that is, the perception of the six objects. The first five: rūpa-consciousness, sound-consciousness, etc. — perceive respectively rūpas (colors and forms), sound, etc. The sixth, dharma-consciousness, perceives all dharmas (rūpas, etc.); or else it perceives that which, in a special sense, is dharmas, that is, the dharma-āyatana. This is why it receives the name of dharma-consciousness (dharma-vijñāna). The names given to the six consciousnesses are therefore suitable and proper, there being no “spilling over” into or encroachment upon one another.

The designation of the six consciousnesses in accordance with the objects perceived by them holds good as long as we are considering the state in which mastery of the five material sense-organs has not yet been perfected. When mastery has been achieved (after the first stage of Self-realization, according to some Schools; or in the state of Buddhahood, according to others) the activity of the sense-organs is interchangeable. In other words, the sense-organs can exchange their functions: the consciousness produced by one organ, no matter which, can reach and perceive all objects of the senses. In this case, we can no longer designate the consciousnesses in accordance with the objects perceived by them; in order to avoid confusion, we can only name them in accordance with the organs through which they manifest themselves.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{210} CWSL. T. 31, No. 1585, p. 26a16-26; Wei tat., Book IV, p. 343-345.
4.3.2. Function of Pravṛtti-vijñāna

Each consciousness has its own function. For example, the visual consciousness perceives an image of an object; the ear consciousness perceives a sound, and so forth. Since each sensory organ and each respective consciousness has a different function, they are not one but distinctly different consciousness. Therefore, the five sense organs and their consciousnesses are “without thought,” meaning they do not discriminate and make judgments about the perception. The eye consciousness merely sees a visual form; the nose only smells without the ability to distinguish, for example, between two smells. It is the mental consciousness which differentiates and thinks, and therefore the mental consciousness is said to be “with thought.” Now the six consciousnesses that need definition:

**Sixfold consciousness**

What is visual consciousness *(cakṣur-vijñāna)*? It is an intimation *(prativijñāpī)* having the eye as its basic and visible form as its object.

Auditory consciousness *(śrotravijñāna)* is a reaction having the ear as its basic and sound as its object.

Olfactory consciousness *(ghṛṇavijñāna)* is a reaction having the nose as its basic and odor as its object.

Gustatory consciousness *(jihvävijñāna)* is a reaction having the tongue as its basis and taste as its object.

Body consciousness *(kāyavijñāna)* is a reaction having the body as its basis and the tangible as its object.

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211 *Prativijñāpī* means “intimation or announcement of a thing.” When the eye comes into contact with a visible form, the consciousness arises that there is something in front of the eye. This consciousness is only a kind of reaction, response or awakening, and it does not perceive what the object is. It is the *samjñāstāndha* that perceives. For example, when the eye comes into contact with a color, the visual consciousness *(cakṣur-vijñāna)* which arises is only an awakening, response or reaction intimating the presence of some color, but it does not perceive or recognize what that color is. It is perception *(samjñā)* that recognizes it as red, blue, etc.
Mental consciousness *Mano-vijnāna* is a reaction having the mental organ (*manas*) as its basis and mental objects (*dharma*) as its object.\(^{212}\)

### 4.3.3. The nature and characteristic of pravṛtti-vijnāna

As the stanza 8 of the *Triṃśikā* says that “The nature and character (of the first six consciousnesses) consist of the perception and discriminative discernment of objects”\(^{213}\)

The nature (*svabhāva*) and the characteristics (*ākāra*) of the six consciousnesses have the perception and discriminative discernment of objects as their essential nature, and they make use of this same perception and discriminative discernment as their main characteristic. This enables us to understand why these special names are established and given to the first six consciousnesses in contradistinction to the seventh and the eighth. They are called consciousnesses because they perceive or distinguish the six spheres of objects.\(^{214}\)

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\(^{212}\) YBS. p. 4-7

\(^{213}\) *Triips. 8: Mhr*: “The third kind of *parināma* is what is the perception of the six kinds of objects (of cognition); *Vijñaptimatrāśiddhi* (with Sthiramati’s Commentary) p. 29-30 explained the word *sāvidhāsya* means the perception or grasping or the definite cognition of the six kinds of objects viz. *rupa* (form), *sabda* (auditory) *gandha* (olfactory), *rasa* (taste), *spraṭavya* (tactile) and *dharma* (mental object) (शब्दयोगोलित्वात् *विभवस्यायसस्य सत्यप्रकटः विभवस्यायसस्य सत्यप्रकटः*); WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No 1586, p. 60b18-19: See also AKB. 1.16a, p. 11 (विज्ञानः प्रतित्विश्लेषितः / विशेष विशेष प्रति धिनिरमुनिरविज्ञानस्य इत्युपचयिते /).

Among the six consciousnesses, the mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) is the most important. The visual consciousness may see an image which may or may not be beautiful; the ear consciousness may hear a pleasant or unpleasant sound and so on, but the mental consciousness decides if discern and discriminative cognition is beautiful or ugly. The liking of a perception or discriminative discernment brings about joy, attachment, and gives rise to the afflictions or defilements (kleśa) which then cause all the suffering and illusory appearances of samsāra.

4.3.4. Moral aspect of Pravṛtti-vijñāna

The five sensory consciousnesses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue and body perceived the five sense objects of visual forms, sounds, tastes, smells, and touches. Basically, the five sensory consciousnesses are neither good nor bad (neutral), none of the five sensory consciousnesses contain the potential for making moral distinctions, so they are of neutral, but mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna) or the sixth consciousness distinguishes between good and evil. The activities of the sixth consciousness can be characterized as having one of the three moral natures which are “an analysis of causal activity” and change from moment to moment. As an example of their impermanence or moment, a visual consciousness only arises when a sensory object contacts with the sensory organ. When this circumstance doesn’t occur, the visual consciousness ceases. When we see a red color, a visual consciousness perceiving red arises and ceases. A visual consciousness arises for an instant and then ceases, allowing the next visual consciousness to arise and cease in the next instant. This process also applies to the other consciousness – an auditory consciousness perceives a loud sound and then a quiet sound, and so on, with consciousness continually arising and ceasing in a succession of instants. Sometime it is perceived as being good and is accepted and sometime is perceived as bad and is rejected. These perceptions of pleasure
and displeasure give rise to the latent defilements which then cause all the suffering and *samsāra*.

Therefore Vasubandhu said in the *Trimsikā* that, “the six consciousnesses are good, bad, or neutral.”²¹⁵ When it is associated with *alobha* (absence of attachment), *adveśa* (absence of hatred), and *amoha* (absence of ignorance) it is *kuśala* or good. When associated with attachment, hatred and ignorance, it is *akūśala* or bad. When it is associated with neither good nor bad it is neutral.²¹⁶ That means if individual perceives something as pleasant or beautiful, he thinks that it is good, and he is pleased, and he then develops the defilement of desire or attachment. If man perceives something as unpleasant or ugly, he will dislike it, which will gradually develop the afflictive emotion of hatred or anger. If man sees something that he thinks of as neutral, one will not see the true nature of the object, and he will respond to it with the delusion.

Or in other words, *cittas* and *caittas* are like a king and his ministers. For, just as ministers follow the king whenever or wherever he goes, in the same way, whenever *citta* acts, *Caitta* necessarily succeeds. Thus, when the *mano-vijñāna* associates with the eleven *kuśala-caittas*²¹⁷ which is the cause to the cessation of suffering or get *Nirvāṇa*. On the contradictory, when the *Mano-vijñāna* associates with *akuśala-caittas*, namely, six *müla-kleśas* and twenty

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²¹⁵ *Trims. 8: तितीयः पादिप्रवधय या / विवाक्षपवन्तनं: सा / कुशलकुशलावशु /; WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No 1586, p. 60b18-19; CSL [轉識論], T. 31, No 1587, p. 62a20-22.

²¹⁶ *Trimsb. 8, p. 60: कुशलकुशलावशु / अलोभाद्वेषाद्वोऽस्यातः / संयुक्तकुशला / लोभोऽस्यः / संयुक्तकुशला/कुशलकुशलासंपुर्वुक्तमयमः आयुः न कुशला नकुशले /; WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60b18-19; CSL [轉識論], T. 31, No 1587, p. 62a20-22.

upakleśas, which cause all the suffering. Due to these akuśala caittas, beings are engaged in activities which engender birth and death and are born in different groups consisting of the five destinies in the continuity of existence.

The mano-vijñāna also associates with four indeterminate mental associations (aniyata-caittas), they are: repentance (kaukṛtya), drowsiness (middha), initial mental application (vitarka), and investigation (vicāra). These four caittas are called aniyata since they cannot be determined either bad (kliṣta) as well as good (akliṣta). When they are kliṣta, they are counted as so many more upakleśas. When they are akliṣta, they are counted as so many more kuṣalas.

The six pravṛtti-vijñānas, being subject to interruption and transformation and being undetermined (that is to say, the aspects of pleasure, displeasure, and indifference are easily transformed from one to the other), can be associated with the three sensations or vedanās, because they all

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218Trimś. 11-14: वेदना पापपतिपुद्रः / मानद्विपितिकसाध अधोपनषते पुनः / प्रक्षः प्रदानं ईश्वरः मास्य सह माया / शान्तवः मद्यतिरिनिषाठीवास्तवमपुद्रः / आश्रद्धाष्ट्र जातिः प्रवत्ते मुखिता स्मरितः / विज्ञाप्रसवणयः च कौशल् कृत्रिम् च /

219 víturka could be kuṣala if applied to the right object, but conducive to negative karma if focused on a detrimental object.

220Trimś. 14: विकृत्तक निद्रामय् च / वितर्कां विचारश्चूच्छकलेः हृद्वित्य / WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31, No. 1586, p. 60c2; CSL [轉識論] T. 31, No. 1586, p. 62b6-7: (21) remorse, (22) torpor, (23) awakening, (24) contemplative observation.) In the Sarvāstivāda, the number of aniyata-bhumi dharmas is increased to eight. To the four in the Viśṇuṇavāda's list are added rāga, dveṣa, māna and vicikitsā; all of them are elevated to the rank of klesas in the Viśṇuṇavāda. In the Sarvāstivāda, they are held to be klesas, but since these four cannot be combined with each other, they are put as aniyata dharmas.
receive and experience the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the neutral (i.e.,
neither the one nor the other) characteristics of objects. The experience of the
agreeable characteristics of an object, comforting the body and gladdening the
heart, is called joyful sensation (sukha vedaṇā). The experience of the
disagreeable characteristics of an object, disconcerting and molesting the
body and the mind, is called sorrowful sensation (duḥkha vedaṇā). The
experience of the neutral characteristics, producing neither comfort nor
discomfort to the body and the mind, is called ‘sensation that is neither joyful
nor sorrowful’ (aduḥkhāsukha vedaṇā).

The Yogācārabhūmi śāstra, fasc. 59, says: “All kleśas, when they are
spontaneous, manifest themselves in association with the three sensations
sorrowful (duḥkha), joyful (sukha), and indifferent (upeśsa). Those kleśas
which extend to all consciousnesses can be associated with all indriyas (i.e.,
sensations); those which do not extend to all consciousnesses (e.g. “I and
mine” views and kleśas proper to manas) can be associated with all the
indriyas (sensations) of the domain of manas.”

In short, six pravṛtti-vijñānas are associated with all its respective caittas
(mental dharmas) and all the universal (sarvatraga), specific (viniyata),
(advantageous) kuśala, defilements (kleśa), secondary defilements (upakleśa)
and indeterminate (aniyata) as well. So also it is associated with all the
threefold feeling – pleasure, pain, and neither pleasure nor pain. Its
apprehension is also kuśala, akuśala, and avyākṛta in as-much-as such an
apprehension arises in regard to colour and the like that are suitable to the rise
of agreeable, non-agreeable and indifferent feelings.

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221 Wei Tat., CWSL, Book 4, p. 361.
222 Trīpaś. 9: मध्यज्ञानिति: कृतांकोणादलितसः / संप्रकृता तथा कर्मसंपदेशोत्तिवेदन / WSSSL [唯識三十論], T. 31,
No. 1586, p. 60b-20-21; CSL [轉識論], T.31, No. 1587, p. 62a22-23.
4.3.5. Conditions of the Manifestation of Six Consciousnesses

As the above described, the six consciousnesses associate with fifty one caittas, and they always operate along with the ālaya-vijñāna. The characteristics and activities of the six consciousnesses are manifested as waves on the ocean which the analogy of mind-thoughts: water-waves already occur in the Samyutta Nikāya\textsuperscript{223}. Each wave of consciousness is a manifestation of ālaya-vijñāna, and it also depends on external conditions in order to foster and impact on the ālaya-vijñāna.

The Trīṃśikā says:

Depending on the root consciousness (mūla-vijñāna or ālaya-vijñāna), the five consciousnesses originate in accordance with various conditions, sometimes together, sometimes separately, just as waves originate on water.\textsuperscript{224}

The CWSL says: “The root consciousness is the ādāna-vijñāna or the ālaya-vijñāna because it is the root from which all pure and impure consciousnesses grow into manifestation.” In the stanza, the expression in dependence upon means that the six evolving consciousnesses (the five and mano-vijñāna) take this root consciousness as their common and immediate basis and support.

The five consciousnesses refer to the first five evolving consciousnesses, i.e., visual consciousness etc., which, being similar in category, are spoken of together. In fact, they all depend for support on material organs; they all perceive material and actual objects in an immediate manner; and they are all subject to interruption.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{223} SN V 40.

\textsuperscript{224} Trīṃś. 15: परम्परायो गुरुविद्याने वर्धाप्रत्ययमुद्धत्/ विज्ञानानां महान न व तत्वविद्याय यथा जाने //

\textsuperscript{225} Wei tat., CWSL, Book 4, p. 476-479.
However, Sthiramati is probably right when he writes that Vasubandhu had in mind the wave analogy from the Samdhinirmocana sutra (5.5).\textsuperscript{226}

The CWSL in fact says of this line only the following:

The five consciousnesses are dependent internally upon the mūla-vijñāna (ālaya-vijñāna), and that, externally, they can only manifest themselves by conforming to a concatenation of conditions, such as the act of attention (manaskāra), the five sense-organs (indriyas), the external objects sensed by these organs (viṣaya), etc. Consequently “they arise sometimes together, sometimes separately” according as the combining of external factors occurs suddenly or gradually.

Thus, they are like the waves on water, which, depending on the conditioning factors, are sometimes numerous, sometimes few. This comparison, with others, is explained in detail in the Samdhinirmocana.\textsuperscript{227}

Kochumuttom has this to say on Sthiramati’s technical discussion of this verse:

If sense-consciousness is the result of the co-operation of sense, object and consciousness, how can it still be called a transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-parināma)? The answer to this question is implied in the analogy of ‘the waves on water.’ Waves arise on water only under certain atmospheric conditions. In other words, the arising of waves depends not only on water but also on the atmospheric conditions. But, that the waves arise

\textsuperscript{226} Trīṃś. 15: सत्त्विनिर्विशेषण सं भवति रन्ध्नेऽपि ज्ञात्र ज्ञात्र: स चेतोन्यथ तरंगाव्यवस्थितम् ज्ञात्र प्रवृत्ति / स चेतोत्स्बोध्यां तत्र ज्ञात्राश्यतानि ज्ञात्र प्रवृत्ति / वासवंवहितं ज्ञात्र प्रवृत्ति / न च तस्योपक्रमया ज्ञात्र वहति: समुद्भितत्वम् / न परंपरायेष् प्रज्ज्वल्ये / एवविनिः तदाभिनर्ममार्माविहार्यं सत्त्विनिर्विशेषणम् \textsuperscript{227} Wei Tat., CWSL, Book IV, p. 478-479.
depending on the atmospheric conditions, does not make it impossible to say that those waves are just modifications \((parinäma)\) of water on which they arise. Similarly, consciousness depending on certain factors such as sense-organ and object, transforms itself into sense-consciousness. However, that the sense-organ and object co-operate with the consciousness in producing the sense-consciousness, does not in any way contradict the fact that the latter is a transformation of consciousness.

Sthiramati, too, finds it necessary to refer to objects \(älambara\) for adequately explaining the emergence of sense-consciousness. According to him the point of comparison between ‘five sense-consciousness on \(mūla-vïjñäna\)’ and ‘waves on water’ is that just as waves can together or separately arise on the same water, so the five sense-consciousnesses can arise together or separately on/from the same \(mūla-vïjñäna\). There are two kinds of causes at work in both cases: antecedent causes \(\text{\textit{samanantara-pratyaya}}\) and objective causes \(\text{\textit{älambara-pratyaya}}\). The former of these, for example, water or \(mūla-vïjñäna\), remaining always the same, the latter (waves or sense-consciousness) keeps changing. It is according to the number and nature of the \(\text{\textit{[objective]}}\) causes available \(\text{\textit{[yathä-pratyayam]}}\) \([\text{\textit{Yathä-pratyayamudbhavah}}\) iti yasya yasya yah pratyayah sannyitas-tasya tasya nuyamena-ubhavaḥ ātma-labhah\], that waves or sense-consciousness arise together or separate. By the objective cause \(\text{\textit{älambara-pratyaya}}\) of any consciousness is meant the object of that consciousness, but in the case of sense-consciousness it has got to be external objects, not the so called internal objects such as seeds \(\textit{bijä}\) left behind in the \(ālaya-vïjñäna\) by past experiences, \textit{samäskaças} and \textit{väsanaś}. For, while those internal objects remain always the same, the external objects can keep changing from time to time,
and from place to place, and thus can provide for different and multiple-
sense-consciousness...

Thus, the operations of the five consciousnesses are crude and unstable, and
the conditioning factors on which they depend are often incomplete.

Therefore they act only sometimes, and very often do not act at all.

As to the sixth consciousness, mano-vijñāna, it too is crude and unstable.
Nevertheless, the conditioning factors on which it depends are always present,
so that it is only when adverse factors are present that it is prevented from
operating.

Furthermore, the five consciousnesses are incapable of intellectual
operation; because they are devoid of the faculties of reflection and
investigation; they cannot arise by themselves, being dependent on mano-
vijñāna for direction; they have a bearing only on gross objects; they only
function externally; they depend on many conditioning factors; therefore they
are generally interrupted and are seldom in activity.

4.3.6. Cessation of Pravṛtti-vijñāna

The mano-vijñāna is capable of intellectual operation (being possessed
of powers of reflection and investigation); it functions both internally and
externally (for it knows principles and things); it does not depend on many
conditions; it can always manifest itself except in five cases. The mano-
vijñāna is absent in five cases as follows: āsamjñi-deva [無想天]; asamjñi-
samāpatti [無想定]; nirodha-samāpatti [滅盡定]; middha [睡眠] heavy
sleeping; and mūrchana [闇絕] in states of unconsciousness.

The Trimsīkā says:

The thought consciousness (mano-vijñāna) manifests at all times,
except for those who are born in the “heaven without thought,” for those in

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228 Kochumuttom, Thomas A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, p. 142-144.
the two mindless meditations, and for those who are in the states of heavy sleeping and unconsciousness.229

Āsamjñi-devas (heaven without thought) are those who, by the force of cultivating that meditation which suppresses crude thought, are born in a heaven blocking the sporadic operations of citta and caittas. Since the cessation of sanjñā is considered the most significant (thing that is blocked), it's called āsamjñi-deva-loka (World of Nonthinking Gods). Thus, the six pravṛtti-vijñānas are cut off in this (loka).230

So some Sūtras say that the Āsamjñi-sattvas are without pravṛtti-vijñānas, etc., it is the major duration of their life that is being talked about; that doesn’t mean that [desire, etc.] are completely absent for their entire life.

The two acitta samāpattis (two mindless meditations), this means that because both āsamjñi-samāpatti231 and nirodha-samāpatti232 are without the six consciousnesses, they are called acitta.233

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229 Trip. 16: मनोविज्ञानसमृद्धि: सम्बद्धसंस्कारादाने / समाधिप्रवृत्तिसुधामूलादत्ति / WSSL

230 Weit Tat., CWSL, Book 4, p. 480-481. There is an opinion (Yogācarabhumi, fasc.13): those in that heaven always lack the six consciousnesses because, the Aryan teachings say, they lack the pravṛtti-vijñānas. That is to say, they only have a rūpāṇa (but not nāma-rūpāṇa), which is why, they say, it is considered an acitta real (a land devoid of mind).

231 Āsamjñīsamāpatti (無想定): This samāpatti belongs to a class of ordinary people called prthagjñānas who have subdued or subjugated (not definitely cut off) the passion of covetous-ness existing in the realm of Śūbhākṣerīna (勝淨天), the heaven of the third dhyāna, but not the impure covetousness of the superior dhyānas. They cherish, as their antecedent or motive power, the false idea that this samāpatti constitutes Nirvana. Although this samāpatti causes the destruction of all the non-perpetual citta-caittas (the first six consciousnesses), nevertheless, inasmuch as destruction of samjñā (samjñāniruddha) is regarded as the first principle, it is named samjñā (absence of cogitation). And as it produces tranquility of the body and joyfulness of the heart, it is also called samāpatti.

232 Nirodhasamāpatti (無盡定): this samāpatti belongs to the saints, to those Āsūkas or Śūkṣas who have subdued or rejected the passion of covetousness existing in the realm of Ākincanya (third state of arūpya), in which there still remains or no longer remains the covetousness of the superior realm (the realm of naiśaksamjñā-niruddhavaśana (bhavdgra), fourth state of arūpya). It has as antecedent or motive power the idea that it is the cessation of all crude and defiled thoughts. Inasmuch as it causes the non-perpetual cittas-caittas (six consciousnesses) and the perpetual but defiled cittas-caittas (seventh consciousness) to be
These two _aniyatas_ of mindless sloth (_middha_)\(^{234}\) and unconsciousness (_mūrčāna_)\(^{235}\) signify that there are “extremely heavy” forms of sloth and unconsciousness which cause all the first six consciousnesses to be suspended, and which therefore justify the description that they are devoid of mental activity (_acittaka_).

It is clear from this that, except in the five mindless states explained above; _mano-vijñāna_ is always in manifestation. _Mano-vijñāna_, however, does not store a memory of all the objects – this comes from the seventh and eighth consciousness.

In short, we have examined attributing the existence of the entire outer world to inner consciousness through eight consciousnesses or the three categories of consciousness that are capable of evolution and manifestation, namely, the _ālaya-vijñāna_, _kliṣṭa-manas_, and the _pravṛtti-vijñāna_ (first six consciousnesses). We have said that ātman and dharmas are merely conventional designations of this double manifestation of consciousness, of its _nimittabhāga_ (the form division) and _darśanabhāga_ (the seeing division); that they are not real entities apart from these two bhāgas; or in other words, the form of knowledge by which the reality of things is assumed, is the imaginative consciousness (_parikalpita_). For things are only imagined to exist and they having no objective reality. The form of knowledge by which man investigates existence is depending upon another (_paratantra_). Thus the things are universally mutually conditioned and there is no substansility of

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^233^ As I mentioned above _citta_ is _ālaya-vijñāna_. The Cheng wei-shih lun is arguing that _acitta_ in this passage does not mean absence of the _ālaya-vijñāna_, but only the absence of the _pravṛtti-vijñāna_.

^234^ By sloth (extremely heavy drowsiness) is meant a state of body resulting from extreme fatigue and other causes, a state incompatible with the six consciousnesses. Although this state is not mental and has not the nature of drowsiness, it is given the _name_ of drowsiness (_middha_) just the same, because it proceeds from drowsiness and is similar to it.

^235^ By unconsciousness is meant a state of body provoked by disturbance of humors, high fever, incantations, etc., a state incompatible with the six consciousnesses. Alternatively, it can be said that both stupor and unconsciousness are parts of the tangible.
individual objects. The form of knowledge by which man is able to see the nature of reality as it is, is perfect (parinispanna), that means all things which are dependent on others and are wrongly regarded as ātman and dharmas, are in reality, all emptiness (śūnya), and that, in consequence, ‘all is consciousness-only’ or ‘nothing exists but consciousness only.’

The man who understands in this manner the meaning of vijñaptimātratā will unquestionable be able to equip himself adequately with all kinds of spiritual provisions and to penetrate rapidly into the ‘emptiness of dharmas’ (dharmaśūnyatā), to realize supreme Bodhi, and to save all sentient beings from the whirlpool of saṃsāra. Such success can never be achieved by the total negator who wrongly assumes the voidness of all things and acts in opposition to the scriptures and reason. One must therefore believe that all is consciousness-only.

As stated above Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are generally considered as “Vijñānavādins who follow scripture’ (āgamānusārin), while Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are “Vijñānavādins who follow reasoning” (nyāyānusārin).

However, the doctrine and philosophical position that have been advocated by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were being systematically presented by Dignāga. Dignāga in his Ālambanaparīkṣā has systematically explained what is the nature of object of knowledge and in his Pramāṇasamuccaya he has tried to explain the nature of known knowledge and means of cognition on methodological... in the next chapter we will discuss what is Dignāga’s position regarding consciousness.